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Abstract 
 
 
This aims of this thesis are, first, to consider peace and violence in the constitution drafting 
and implementation processes, and to return to constitutional theory, proposing that peace 
constitutions are distinctive in their source; and second, to show that courts, in reviewing 
peace constitutions, are in fact navigating between an elite pact and a more open 
constitutional way of doing business, where both remain important to any emergent 
constitutionalism. To do so, the intention of this thesis is to assess the peace constitution in 
both the short and long-term, by addressing two sets of questions: (1) what is the process of 
constitution-making as part of the political settlement and what type of constitutional 
arrangement result; and (2) how have courts interpreted peace constitutions and in what way 
(if any) are they engaging with the peace process? 
 
This thesis approaches these questions through a critical review of the legal and political 
literature. The research design is principally in comparative constitutional law, which as a 
specialised legal field has adopted its own methodological framework. The project is adopting 
the functional methodological approach, as defined in the comparative law literature. The two 
questions under consideration in this thesis have dedicated chapters, using separate 
illustrative cases. There are twenty-three possible cases identified by International IDEA as 
classifying as ‘peace constitutions’ since 1990. In the chapter on the distinctiveness of peace 
constitutions, I focus on three of these cases: the DRC, Nepal and Burundi. The chapter on 
the role of court looks at Colombia, Northern Ireland and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The reason 
for having, in effect, two-sets of case studies is dictated by an acknowledgement that locating 
generalizable cases is unlikely, as each case is context specific; nonetheless, it is possible to 
locate common themes and dilemmas that are present in the political settlement processes 
across time and place. Further, the influences, language and practices impacting these 
processes are always changing, so that processes that were completed before certain 
watershed points will present different learning outcomes.  
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
‘[T]here is nothing more futile than rebellion and liberation unless  
they are followed by the constitution of the newly won freedom’.1  
 
 
TRANSITIONS FROM WAR TO PEACE often require new or revised constitutional 
arrangements to give clarity to the post-conflict state and to legitimize the emerging political 
settlement.2 Constitutions are very often drafted following a revolution or a war – which as 
Hannah Arendt highlights, must be the consequence of rebellion and liberation, for without 
a new constitution, they are, in her words, futile.3 A constitution voices the idea of what the 
state is, and how it ought to be; it records the story of the state’s past, but also imagines its 
future; is it political and legal, and also symbolic. A constitution limits the power of the state, 
and protects the rights of the people. For a society deeply divided by conflict, a constitution, 
it is hoped, can capture the political settlement, and create stability. To do this a constitution 
must be more than a social contract and a legal guardian of rights.  
 
Constitutions are often coupled with a peace agreement as the political and legal pacts that 
dictate the terms of peace and the intentions of the parties in transitioning out of a state of 
war. A peace process is only truly concluded when a new institutional arrangement is 
formalized in the original or newly drafted constitution.4 In the context of political 
settlements, peace agreements and constitutions are connected. The political settlement is 
‘the invisible agreement between elites, and often between elites and society more broadly, on 
how power should be constrained and exercised.’5 The peace agreement and constitution 
                                                 
1 Arendt, On Revolution ([1963] 2006), 133. 
2 The best definition of a political settlement is from the UK Department for International 
Development: a political settlement is ‘the forging of a common understanding usually between 
political elites that their best interests or beliefs are served through acquiescence to a framework for 
administering political power’ (di John and Putzel, Political Settlements: Issues Paper (2009), 4). I 
would also contend that the implementation and interpretation of the constitution forms part of the 
political settlement. 
3 Arendt reframes the concept of revolution, taking it back from those who understand revolution to 
be continuous, with-out an ending. The end goal of revolution is a constitution of political freedom 
(see Bernal, ‘A Revolution in Law’s Republic’ (2009)). 
4 As Bell has noted, ‘the notion of ongoing agreements being “peace agreements” may begin to 
disappear … as the conflict resolution attempts of the peace process merge imperceptibly into the 
ongoing process of public law, signifying a measure of success’ (Bell, ‘Peace Agreements’ (2006), 
378). See also Darby and Mac Ginty, ‘Introduction’ in The Management of Peace Processes, edited 
by Darby and Mac Ginty (2000), 8.  
5 Bell and Zulueta-Fülsher, ‘Sequencing Peace Agreements’ (2016), 18. 
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operate within the political settlement, but in a way that is not necessarily sequential or 
logical.  
 
The ‘peace constitution’ and political settlement are the outcomes of a transition from conflict 
towards a sustainable peace. A peace constitutions6 (as a shorter, and more comprehensive, 
version of the terms ‘peace agreement constitution’7 or ‘constitutional peace agreement’) is a 
constitution drafted (or revised) as part of this process. Peace constitutions8 are not 
autonomous or free-standing, but are mutually constitutive of the peace agreement that 
provides legal and political authority for their enactment. Such constitutions do not become 
dissociated from the peace agreement after their implementation. Rather, peace constitutions 
derive their authority from the framework of the original peace agreement that precipitated 
a new or amended constitution. In effect, the peace agreement is foundational to the 
constitution, but may not be sufficient to maintain a fragile political settlement. Peace 
agreements and constitutions may be joined in more ways than the constitution acting as a 
peace agreement. For example, many peace agreements set out the principles for a new 
constitution, such as in Cambodia, in which the provisions for a new constitution were 
outlined in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Paris Agreement) or Burundi, where the 
principles for the new constitution were outlined in the Arusha Accord. In Bosnia-
Herzegovina the constitution was included, in its entirety, as an annex to the Dayton Peace 
Accords.  There are also constitutions that resemble peace agreements, such as the Colombian 
Constitution of 1991, which was written as part of the ongoing (and continuing) peace 
process. Some interim constitutions also resemble and perform the function of peace 
                                                 
6 I use the term ‘peace constitution’ rather than post-conflict constitution to make clear the link 
between the peace agreement and the constitution. The term that is frequently used is ‘peace 
agreement constitution’ - see, for example, Bell, ‘Peace Agreements’ (2006) and Easterly, ‘Peace 
Agreements as a Framework’ in Jus Post Bellum, edited by Stahn et al. (2014) who uses the concept 
‘peace agreement constitution’ as a comparative tool. See also Bell, On the Law of Peace (2008); 
Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights (2000); Widner, ‘Constitution Writing in Post-Conflict 
Societies’ (2008); Ludsin, ‘Peacemaking and Constitution-Drafting’ (2011); Samuels, ‘Post-Conflict 
Peace-Building’ (2005); Darby and Mac Ginty, ‘Introduction’ in The Management of Peace 
Processes, edited by Darby and Mac Ginty (2000); and Teitel, ‘Transitional Jurisprudence’ (1997) 
who uses the term ‘transitional constitution’. Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa (former justice of the 
Colombian Constitutional Court), calls such agreements ‘constitutional peace pacts’, Cepeda 
Espinosa, ‘The Peace Process and the Constitution’ (2016). International IDEA is a useful source on 
constitution building (www.idea.int/cbp/) – they also use the term peace agreement constitution in 
workshop report, Sapiano et al., ‘Constitution-Building in Political Settlement’ (2016).  
7 This is the term that I use in my article, ‘Courting Peace (2017), which is based on this thesis 
(chapter four). I have amended it in this thesis as it is a less cumbersome term, rather than because it 
has a distinct meaning. The term peace constitution (like the use of peace agreement constitution) 
includes peace agreement constitutions and constitutional peace agreements. 
8 Throughout this thesis, I refer to a peace constitution as a single document. Such peace constitutions 
are often written in more than one formal document (or as additions to a separate document) but in the 
interest of simplicity and consistency I use the singular form.  
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agreements. For example, in South Africa, the interim constitution was in fact the main peace 
agreement.9  
 
In Zimbabwe and Kenya, new constitutions were required in the settlement between political 
parties following disputed elections that resulted in violence, but not full scale civil war. There 
are also cases that would fall under the category of peace constitution in which the 
constitution and peace process are being drafted concurrently, although not necessarily in 
collaboration. Such cases include the current processes in Somalia, Yemen, and Libya. The 
concept of a peace constitution can also be extended to sub-state constitutional settlements, 
such as the Belfast (or Good Friday) Agreement in Northern Ireland, which exemplifies all 
the traits of a peace constitution and is illustrative of peace constitutions arising at a sub-state 
level. The purpose and intention of the constitutions in all these cases was to further the peace 
process as part of the political settlement. 
  
Objectives and Structure 
 
This aims of this thesis are, first, to consider peace and violence in the constitution drafting 
and implementation processes. Second, to suggest that peace constitutions are distinct in their 
foundation and source of authority, and that traditional constitutional theory does not address 
this distinctiveness. Third, and finally, to show that courts, in reviewing peace constitutions, 
are in fact navigating between an elite pact and a more open constitutional way of doing 
business, where both remain important to any emergent constitutionalism. To do so, the 
intention of this thesis is to assess the peace constitution in both the short and long-term, by 
addressing two sets of questions: (1) what is the process of constitution-making as part of the 
political settlement and what type of constitutional arrangement result; and (2) how have 
courts interpreted peace constitutions and in what way (if any) are they engaging with the 
peace process? 
 
This thesis has four substantive chapters, in addition to this introduction and a conclusion. 
The first chapter defines and analyses peace agreements, the first of the two documents 
forming the subject of this thesis. Peace agreements are legal and political documents that 
dictate the terms of peace and the intentions of the state and opposing parties in transitioning 
from a state of war to peace. There are several documents that are negotiated as part of the 
political settlement that would classify as a ‘peace agreement’, for example, pre-negotiation 
agreements, ceasefire agreements, negotiation agreements, implementation agreements, and, 
in some cases, a (interim) constitution.10 Still, like ‘peace’, the meaning and the legal standing 
of peace agreements are vague. Christine Bell best argues this point, suggesting that,   
                                                 
9 The 1996 constitution was required to comply with thirty-four constitutional principles set out in the 
interim constitution. The interim constitution required that the newly established Constitutional Court 
be responsible for determining that the new constitution fulfilled this obligation. In Nepal, the interim 
constitution was passed shortly after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which outlined the 
procedures for the drafting of a new constitution. 
10 For example, the 1993 Interim Constitution of South African. There is scope to argue that the peace 
agreement can be likened to an interim constitution, an interim constitution may perpetuate the ‘status 
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despite the prevalence of documents that could be described as peace 
agreements, and the emergence of legal standards addressing them as a 
category, the term "peace agreement" remains largely undefined and 
unexplored. The label is often attached to documented agreements between 
parties to a violent internal conflict to establish a cease-fire together with new 
political and legal structures.11 
  
Peace agreements often go beyond the immediate arrangements necessary to end violence, in 
laying a foundation for a new (or revised) constitution. As Bell explains, ‘[p]eace agreements 
can be understood as a distinctive form of political constitution’, so that ‘[o]nce we locate the 
peace agreement firmly within the constitutional discourse, conflict resolution dilemmas can 
be understood in terms of the dilemmas inherent to the political constitutional project’.12 By 
understanding the constitution as a form of peace agreement,13 interpretation of the 
constitution may be similarly thought of as an exercise in conflict resolution, which is the 
subject of this thesis.  Peace agreements are often negotiated with actors from outside of the 
domestic legal system of the state and can properly be categorized as international legal 
agreements.14 Still, to be implemented they must fit into the domestic legal system of the 
state. Legal authority may be acquired if the peace agreement obtains the status of a 
constitutional document and, in this way, gains ex post facto legal standing under domestic 
law. Similarly, the constitution may find authority in the peace agreement, making the 
documents mutually constitutive of the political settlement and the legal constitution. The 
                                                 
quo’ or baseline constitution that would be difficult to then later deviate from when forming a new, 
permanent constitution. However, interim constitutions can also be a more useful conflict resolution 
practice than drafting a permanent constitution immediately following the end of the conflict. For 
more on interim constitutions see Rodrigues, ‘Letting Off Steam?’ (2017) and Zulueta-Fülsher, et al., 
Interim Constitutions (2015). 
11 Bell, ‘Peace Agreements’ (2006), 374.  
12 Bell, On the Law of Peace (2008), 202.  
13 The most famous (or perhaps classic) example, the American Constitution, may be understood as a 
peace agreement. The American Constitution, signed in 1787, replaced the Articles of Confederation. 
The Confederacy was breaking (and indeed broke) and there was fear about the possibility of war 
between the states/regions or the possibility of renewed conflict with the British. The debate at the 
Philadelphia Convention in the summer of 1787 was between ‘nationalists’, who wished for 
sovereignty to remain with the states, and ‘federalists’, who advocate for a stronger, federal 
government. The delegates came to an agreement after the Great Compromise of July 16, which gave 
all states equal representation in the Senate, and representation by population in the House. The 
compromise included the counting of slaves as three-fifths of a person. A further compromise 
(necessary for South Carolina and Georgia) allowed the states to continue to import slaves until 1808. 
DC Hendrickson makes the convincing case that the Constitution is a peace pact (see Hendrickson, 
Peace Pact (2003). The claim that the US Constitution is a peace agreement may be rarely made, 
however, it is a claim that has been made of other constitutions (and is the argument being made in 
this thesis). The Colombian Supreme Court, pronounced ‘in a famous statement, that constitutions are 
peace treaties’, Cepeda Espinosa, ‘The Peace Process and the Constitution’ (2016). 
14 Bell, On the Law of Peace (2008), 27–45. 
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authority of the constitution is derived from a formally negotiated peace agreement, itself a 
comprised and foundational political settlement between elites that were formally violently 
opposed. Indeed, the case of a peace constitution indicates the way in which that document’s 
authority is constructed around a concept of non-violent stability or peace.15 Focusing on 
peace constitutions creates not only a foundation of comparison, but also links the 
comparative constitutional debate more closely to the conflict resolution and peace agreement 
literature. Such focus allows for a more complete evaluation of the peace process and 
agreement and makes sense of the subsequent constitution it produces, the peace constitution. 
 
The purpose of the second chapter is to address the first question being asked in this thesis, 
that is, what is the process of constitution-making as part of the political settlement and what 
type of constitutional arrangement results. This chapter refers to several examples of peace 
constitutions since 1990 to put into practical focus the dilemmas and tensions present in the 
process of drafting and implementation of the peace constitution. These cases are more alive 
to the current concerns and pressures of the peace and constitution making processes from 
the international, and make clear the continued potential for violence that is present in the 
political settlement process, which is less present in the latter three cases considered in the 
fourth chapter. In the concluding section of the chapter, three cases are used to illustrate the 
importance of continued violence for peace constitutions. These are the DRC, Burundi and 
Nepal.  
 
Chapter three is concerned with public law and constitutional theory, considering the 
distinctiveness of peace constitutions. Constitutional theory, a theoretical perspective that is 
distinct from both legal and political theory, but which also takes from both, is best described 
as an ‘account of the authority of constitutions and an account of the way constitutions should 
be interpreted’.16 Constitutional theory is a branch of study that is not to be confused with 
political theory, which takes a distinct approach and is broader in scope. Constitutional theory 
is also a discrete branch of theory outside jurisprudence (or legal theory) in recognising and 
allowing for pragmatism and politics in interpreting the law. Traditional concerns of 
constitutional theory – the source of constitutional authority, constituent power and 
constitutional interpretation – are present in the theory on peace constitutions, however, the 
distinct concerns and foundations of peace constitutions are not yet fully understood or 
considered in constitutional theory literature.  
 
The forth chapter, which addresses the second question considered in this thesis, cites cases 
from three domestic and two regional courts that have bearing on the political settlement, 
with the aim to evaluate the normative role of the judiciary in the process of constitutionalism 
                                                 
15 This argument borrows from Hannah Arendt’s theory, see Honig, ‘Declarations of Independence 
(1991). As Arendt argues: ‘The very concept of Roman authority suggests that the act of foundation 
inevitably developed its own stability and permanence, and authority in this context is nothing more 
or less than a kind of necessary “augmentation” by virtue of which all innovations and changes 
remained tied back to the foundation which, at the same time, they augment and increase’ (Arendt, On 
Revolution ([1963] 2006), 194). 
16 Raz, ‘On the Authority and Interpretations’ in Between Authority and Interpretation edited by Raz 
(2009), 328. 
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in post-conflict states. The judiciary, acting in some way to mediate between tensions inside 
the peace constitution, has limited the pace at which development of the political settlement 
has taken place, maintaining the constitutional link to the peace agreement, while 
acknowledging that the link should not preserve elite pacts permanently or without limit. 
Using cases from the constitutional courts of Colombia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the 
United Kingdom House of Lords, concerning the situation in Northern Ireland, there is 
evidence of an emerging global ‘peace jurisprudence’,17 based on purposive interpretation and 
the principle of proportionality, that protects the foundations of the political settlement. 
However, the jurisprudence of these domestic courts is contrasted to that of the regional 
courts, namely, the European and American regional human rights courts, which are less well 
placed to appreciate the context under which the peace constitution operates, and are in 
danger of unwinding the political settlement without providing a viable alternative for peace.  
International and regional organisations have been playing a more direct role in domestic 
constitution-making and in monitoring their implementation. For example, the charters for 
the African Union and the Organisation for American States both contain specific prohibitions 
on unconstitutional changes of government. The Venice Commission of the European Council 
also monitors constitutions among the member states. Regional human rights courts, as 
branches of the organisations, are likewise playing an active role in the constitutional 
arrangement. International and regional courts have also increasingly engaged in the 
interpretation of constitutional arrangements and peace agreements. It is, for this reason, 
necessary to consider their jurisprudence as it relates to the peace constitutions being 
considered in this thesis. This is done in chapter one, looking at international court decisions 
as they impact on peace agreements, and in chapter four, as regional human rights courts 
have engaged in decisions on the constitutional arrangement.   
This thesis lays out a foundation to better understand the relationship of peace and political 
settlements in judicial decisions. It does so by reviewing cases considered ‘foundational’. The 
aim is first, to provide evidence across constitutional jurisdictions concerning the 
fundamental meaning of the constitutional order, and second, to highlight the impact certain 
judicial decisions may have on the legal and political order of a post-conflict state. 
Constitutional courts interpreting peace constitutions have found that peace is foundational 
to the constitutional structure18  and is an acceptable justification to proportionally limit 
certain constitutional rights, 19  which suggest is evidence of an emerging global peace 
jurisprudence.  
                                                 
17 The theory of peace jurisprudence borrows language from Ruti Teitel’s concept of transitional 
jurisprudence. Teitel’s notion of transitional jurisprudence is connected to the concept of transitional 
justice. Teitel’s theory of transitional jurisprudence is applicable to transition from illiberal rule, such 
as the transitions that occurred in the Velvet Revolutions (see Teitel’ Transitional Jurisprudence’ 
(1997), 2068-2070). Teitel deals with both criminal justice and constitutional justice as part of her 
theory development. It is the latter which is of relevance here and is another reason for why the 
terminology for this thesis was borrowed from her article.   
18 For this argument, I rely on Barak, Purposive Interpretation (2005). 
19 There have been several recent publications on this topic: including, Alexy, A Theory of 
Constitutional Rights (2002); Barak, Proportionality (2012); Bomhoff, Balancing Constitutional 
Rights (2013); Cohen-Aliya and Porat, Proportionality and Constitutional Culture (2013). See also 
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Methodology 
 
This thesis approaches these questions through a critical review of the legal and political 
literature. The research design is principally in comparative constitutional law, which as a 
specialised legal field has adopted its own methodological framework.20 The project is 
adopting the functional methodological approach, as defined in the comparative law literature. 
The two questions under consideration in this thesis have dedicated chapters, using separate 
illustrative cases. There are twenty-three possible cases identified by International IDEA as 
classifying as ‘peace constitutions’ since 1990.21 In the second chapter, on the distinctiveness 
of peace constitutions, I focus on three of these cases: the DRC, Nepal and Burundi. The fourth 
chapter, on the role of court looks at Colombia, Northern Ireland and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
The reason for having, in effect, two-sets of case studies is dictated by an acknowledgement 
that locating generalizable cases is unlikely, as each case is context specific; nonetheless, it is 
possible to locate common themes and dilemmas that are present in the political settlement 
processes across time and place. Further, the influences, language and practices impacting 
these processes are always changing, so that processes that were completed before certain 
watershed moments will present different learning outcomes.  
 
Such is the case with the examples used to evaluate the second question – the constitutional 
courts of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Colombia, the UK House of Lords (concerning the 
situation in Northern Ireland), the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights – which concern peace constitutions that were completed 
in the 1990s. The time lapse since these constitutions were drafted means that several factors 
that are necessary to consider in understanding peace constitutions now, were not present at 
that time. For example, since the Belfast Agreement was signed (the last of these cases to 
have been completed), the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1325 pushing 
for the inclusion of women in the peace and constitution-drafting processes. The 1996 South 
African constitution-making process that emphasised participation has also meant that 
constitution-drafting that is not inclusive (as was the case with the Bosnian constitution, 
attached as an annex to the 1995 Dayton Peace Accord) would not now be seen to be 
legitimate. Moreover, the selection of case studies for court decisions must factor in a 
sufficient passage of time for the constitution to have been implemented and interpreted. For 
these reasons, the thesis does not adopt a direct case study approach, rather, in the second 
chapter, several examples are referenced to give clarity to the meaning of ‘peace constitution’, 
and to allow evidence for the distinctiveness of these types of constitutional arrangement. 
The fourth chapter accepts a more standard approach, comparing across three peace 
                                                 
Möller, The Global Model (2015) and Möller, ‘Constructing the Proportionality Test’ in Reasoning 
Rights edited by Lazarus, et al. (2014), who argues that the principle of proportionality is part of an 
emerging ‘global model’ of rights. See also Gardbaum, ‘Positive and Horizontal Rights’ in 
Proportionality edited by Jackson and Tushnet (2016).  
20 Jackson, ‘Comparative Constitutional Law’ in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Constitutional Law edited by Rosenfeld and Sajó (2012); Jackson, ‘Methodological Challenges’ 
(2010); Ginsburg and Dixon, ‘Introduction’, in Comparative Constitutional Law, edited by Ginsburg 
and Dixon (2011). 
21 Bell and Zulueta-Fülscher, ‘Sequencing Peace Agreements’ (2016). 
 8 
 
constitution (pulling on both domestic and international court judgments), locating in the 
decisions a similarity in reasoning, which this thesis suggests is evidence of an emerging peace 
jurisprudence.  
 
A new constitutional arrangement does not necessarily bring an end to violence as intended, 
and may, in fact, be a cause for continued conflict and instability. The intention of the second 
chapter is to give context to the peace agreement and constitution-making processes and 
highlight the challenges that are involved in the design, in both practice and substance, of 
such constitutional arrangements that courts are being asked to interpret.  All examples were 
selected to illustrate political settlements negotiated in the context of high-level violence both 
leading up to the peace agreement and since the adoption of the constitution. These processes 
have also been tainted by continued violence and uncertainty over their appositeness. 
Intentionally, the cases included in this section are also not ones commonly selected in 
comparative constitutional law. There has been increased attention given to methodology and 
case selection in comparative constitutional law. Ran Hirschl makes the point that there are 
a limited number of cases that are too frequently recycled in the literature, such as the UK, 
the US, Germany and Israel.22  
 
Similarly, the cases used in the fourth chapter, Colombia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Northern 
Ireland, have been commonly used in the comparative constitutional law literature.23 These 
three places have also all experienced protracted conflict, with high civilian casualties. The 
number of casualties across the cases differ widely, nonetheless, they all hit the threshold of 
violent conflict. The most commonly used indicator for ‘civil war’ is 1,000 war-related 
deaths.24 In selecting my cases I considered those that have had high-level of sustained (or 
ongoing) conflict. Northern Ireland is an exception to this criterion. Between 1966 and 2006, 
approximately 3,720 people were killed because of the conflict.25 However, as Brendan 
O’Leary and John McGarry argue, the conflict has been ‘very intense’ and so fits into this 
category.26 
 
In two of the cases, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Northern Ireland, the peace agreement and 
constitution resulted in a termination of the conflict (although the stability of that peace is 
fragile, it is holding). In the third case, Colombia, the conflict continued past the adoption of 
the 1991 Constitution, although it successfully brought an end to the M-19 movement (which 
                                                 
22 Hirschl, Comparative Matters (2014).  
23 There are also problems of accessing judicial decisions and commentary in English, which limits 
the cases that can be used. The initial cases selected for the section on peace jurisprudence were 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia and Lebanon.  The latter two cases had to be abandoned as there were 
not enough cases available in English. The translation of constitutional court cases is a political 
decision. 
24 See Wallensteen, ‘Theoretical Developments’, in Routledge Handbook of Civil Wars, edited by 
DeRouen Jr and Newman (2014). Chapter one deals in more detail on the distinction between 
international armed conflict and non-international armed conflict. 
25 Dixon, Northern Ireland (2008), 27. 
26 O’Leary and McGarry, The Politics of Antagonism (1996), 20. 
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had only years before attached the Palace of Justice, which left eleven judges dead).27 
Currently, the peace process between the government and the Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has been 
closer to settlement than any time previously. On 23 June 2016, the parties signed a ceasefire 
that came into effect on 29 August 216, with the intention of signing a peace agreement on 
26 September 2016. This has not impacted on how this thesis has considered this case study. 
In fact, as David Landau has reflected, the Constitutional Court, having played a significant 
role in the peace process to date (as detailed below in the case section) will most likely 
continue to take part in the implementation of the agreement, and the post-conflict 
transition.28      
 
Northern Ireland stands out as a case, however, the Belfast Agreement and the 1998 Act, I 
argue, are an example of a peace constitution; although one that concerns a sub-state entity. 
The case also stands out because the court that is being considered is the British House of 
Lords which is the court of last resort concerning matters on the implementation of the 
Agreement and Act. This differs then from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Colombia which both 
established strong-form constitutional courts within the new peace constitution. However, in 
Robinson v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland the House of Lords made a very clear 
determination on the status of the Belfast Agreement and 1998 Act, although the House of 
Lords (and now the Supreme Court) is an example of weak-form judicial review. 
 
The approach taken in this thesis, based in constitutional theory and comparative 
constitutional law, is grounded in normative functionalism.29 This methodological approach 
is borrowed from Stephen Tierney, who explains that,  
 
[normative functionalism] is both immanent and functionalist in its focus. Its 
methodology and content are therefore each distinguishable from the 
substantive normativity implied by both republicanism and deliberative 
democratic theory… it is an attempt both to understand constitutionalism as a 
form of political practice, and to frame evaluations of how this practice works 
against its own internal logic.30  
 
In laying out his approach, Tierney argues that ‘[i]t is the very contingency of constitutional 
theory, and the centrality of political practice to its essence, that makes inoculation of 
constitutional analysis from value judgement impossible’.31 In accepting this, he adjusts his 
approach to a functional normativity, by which he means that ‘even in functional terms any 
account of constitutional law must recognize that normative presuppositions are inherent 
                                                 
27 During the constitution-making process, other guerrilla groups (including the M-19) demobilised 
and participated in the Constituent Assembly.  
28 See Landau, ‘Can the Colombian Model Be Generalized?’ (2016).  
29 This methodological approach is influenced by Tierney, Constitutional Referendums (2012) and 
Jackson, ‘Comparative Constitutional Law’, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional 
Law, edited by Rosenfeld and Sajó (2012). 
30 Tierney, Constitutional Referendums (2012), 2. 
31 Ibid.  
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within any exercise of constitutional creation, reform, or practice’.32 Tierney’s approach 
marries constitutional theory and the functionalist method of comparative analysis, which has 
been described as a means to ‘identify an institution that exists in multiple constitutional 
systems and explores its function(s); or …. [is used to] identify one or more functions 
performed by constitutions or constitutional institutions or doctrines in some societies, and 
analyse whether and how that function is performed elsewhere’.33 This same approach is used 
here to compare the function and interpretation of peace constitutions. This legal 
methodological approach is used principally to address the second question of this thesis, 
namely, how have courts interpreted peace constitutions?  
 
The functional method is the most commonly adopted research approach in comparative 
constitutional law; however, scholars have criticised comparative functionalism for reducing 
the complex to a common base.34 This method, as used in comparative constitutional law, 
distinguishes constitutional institutions or doctrine, where the present research seeks to 
compare long-term peace building and stability, a function rather broader than a specific 
constitutional design feature.  There is an inherent tension in finding compromise between 
locating comparison between cases and accepting that context is ‘everything’. The thesis aims 
to find this balance in locating common themes and dilemmas in explaining the peace 
constitution in chapter two, using examples from several contexts, and in suggesting that 
courts are using common reasoning in interpreting peace constitutions because of increasing 
levels of constitutional borrowing and the emergence of ‘global’ rules of interpretation.  
 
Nonetheless, there continue to be limits to comparison that require clarification.35 First, 
constitutions are designed and interpreted in distinctive historical contexts, making 
comparison difficult. This is especially true in the type of comparison in this thesis. The 
challenge, which is common to all such studies, is to balance case specific analysis while 
recognizing certain common features across all cases.36 Second, constitutions are strongly 
expressivist, which makes comparison problematic. The states (and case law) selected for this 
chapter have singular histories, political and legal systems, and have moved beyond conflict 
(or not) discretely. By analysing many cases from various regions and courts, normatively 
valuable trends emerge to conceptualise a theory of ‘peace jurisprudence’.  
 
The literatures on conflict resolution and constitution making are often at odds in their 
methodological and epistemological approach and in their focus. This is not least because 
those working in the two academic fields are often from the disciplines of politics and law, 
                                                 
32 Ibid.  
33 Jackson, ‘Comparative Constitutional Law’, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Constitutional Law, edited by Rosenfeld and Sajó (2012), 62. 
34 Frankenberg, ‘Critical Comparisons’ (1985). 
35 Jackson, ‘Comparative Constitutional Law’, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Constitutional Law, edited by Rosenfeld and Sajó (2012), 71-72. 
36 Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971). 
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respectively.37 The distinction between subjects, as will be laid out below in the literature 
review section, has some impact on this thesis, its style, and conclusions. 
 
Literature Review  
 
This thesis sits broadly between the disciplines of International Relations, constitutional 
theory, international and comparative constitutional law. In so doing, this thesis adds value 
to several existing bodies of literature by: 
  
1) analysing the literature on constitutions as peace agreements across the disciplines of 
International Relations, international law, and constitutional law;  
2) contributing to the mediation and negotiation literature in measuring the interpretation 
of peace agreement provisions;  
3) participating in the international legal debate by locating the legality of peace 
constitutions;  
4) contributing to the constitutional law, comparative constitutional law, and constitutional 
theory literature by introducing the concept of peace constitutions and by evaluating the 
implications of violence on the process; and 
5) adding value to the peace and conflict literature by conceptualising the long-term impact 
of peace agreements and post-conflict political settlements by considering the interpretation 
of constitutional courts. 
 
The discipline of International Relations is largely preoccupied with war.38 This focus has 
meant there has been relatively less work on questions of peace, especially on long-term peace 
building. Oliver Richmond is damning of International Relations theory for its resolute 
attention to war at the expense of a deeper study of peace.39 The source of this single-
mindedness is accepting that war, not peace, is the natural state of being, a point of view that 
may be tied to Hobbes’ view of the human condition as being ‘nasty, brutish, and short’. The 
core of the discipline may be preoccupied by war; however, I would be cautious in overstating 
this fixation. On the topic of peace, there is a significant body of work in conflict resolution. 
There is also much written on the peace process itself, evaluating factors that lead to the 
                                                 
37 These methodological challenges were similarly recognised by Alan Kuperman in his edited book, 
Constitutions and Conflict Management in Africa. Kuperman’s book, like this thesis, is concerned 
with peace, not democracy, which as he notes, is the common focus in conflict management literature, 
but not comparative constitutional law. In the introduction he comments that, [a]s the first rigorous 
study of its kind, this book faces formidable methodological challenges’, however, he also makes the 
case that ‘[i]n the future, as research expands and knowledge cumulates on the ways in which 
constitutional design may buffer or exacerbate shocks, such challenges should diminish.’ (Kuperman, 
‘Designing Constitutions’, in Constitutions and Conflict, edited by Kuperman (2015), 9).  
38 This is of course not uniformly the case, however, as the grounding of the field was concerned with 
war (and the prevention of war, rather than the maintenance of peace), the discipline continues to be 
oriented towards the study of war.  
39 Richmond, ‘Understanding Peace’ (2005). 
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successful conclusion of peace agreements,40 factors that threaten that process,41 and the 
implementation phase of the agreement.42 Additionally, there literature on the mediation and 
negotiation and negotiation process and actors.43 This literature evaluates mediation and 
negotiation strategies, including direct accounts by facilitators and mediators involved in 
conflict resolution processes.44   
 
The concept and literature on political settlements is a response to the disappointment in 
standard theories to describe political transitions.45 The meaning of the political settlements 
takes as a starting point that the transformation from conflict to peace is a non-linear process 
that incorporates the peace agreement and the constitution. There is a growing recognition 
that political settlements must also be inclusive to be successful,46 even as there is an 
acknowledged tension between participation and elite-level bargaining across the process.47 
The literature on peace agreements critically evaluates the text and provisions included in 
peace agreements48, including transitional justice and amnesties,49 ethnic and national 
identity,50 human rights51 and peacekeeping and security.52 In addition, research on peace 
agreements assesses the representativeness of peace agreements, such as the inclusion, in both 
the process and agreement, of civil society,53 gender,54 and minorities. However, the literature 
does not thoroughly evaluate the long-term implementation of the agreement, not including, 
as a notable exception, active debates on power-sharing arrangements.55  
 
                                                 
40 See Zartman, Ripe for Resolution (1989). 
41 See Stedman, ‘Spoiler Problems’ (1997). 
42 See Stedman et al., eds, Ending Civil Wars (2002) and Walter, Committing to Peace (2002), 4 who 
argues that ‘it is the implementation phase, long ignored by scholars, that is the most difficult to 
navigate and the reason so many negotiations fail’. 
43 Those of note are J Bercovitch, FO Hampson, JZ Rubin, TD Sisk, IW Zartman. See also the United 
States Institute of Peace (USIP) especially, Crocker et al., eds., Herding Cats (1999).  
44 See Holbrooke, To End a War (1999) which memorialises Holbrooke’s role in the Dayton Peace 
Accords.  
45 Bell, ‘What We Talk About When We Talk About Political Settlements’ (2015). For more on 
political settlements see the Political Settlements Research Programme website 
(http://www.politicalsettlements.org/).  
46 Castillejo, Promoting Inclusion (2014). 
47 See Sapiano et al., ‘Constitution-Building in Political Settlement Processes’ (2016). 
48 Bell, On the Law of Peace (2008), 6. 
49 Bell et al., ‘Transitional Justice’ (2007). 
50 Noel, ed., From Power-Sharing to Democracy (2005); McEvoy and O’Leary, eds., Power-Sharing 
(2013).  
51 Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights (2000). 
52 Ratner, The New UN Peacekeeping (1995), 26-28. 
53 Bell and O’Rourke, ‘The People’s Peace?’ (2007). 
54 Chinkin, ‘Gender, Human Rights and Peace Agreements’ (2003); Bell and O’Rourke, ‘Peace 
Agreements or Pieces of Paper?’ (2010); and McWilliams, ‘Women at the Peace Table’, in Gender 
and Peacebuilding, edited by Flaherty et al. (2015).  
55 See, for example, Weller and Metzger, Settling Self-determination Disputes (2008). 
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Whether peace is best achieved by accommodating rival ethnic and religious groups or 
assimilating them under a single identity is disputed in the comparative politics scholarship. 
Nowhere is this better exemplified than in the debate between scholars Donald Horowitz and 
Arend Lijphart.56 Their exchange centres on the accommodation model, with Lijphart 
advancing consociationalism57 as a set of principles for institutional design to manage divided 
societies. Horowitz rejects Lijphart’s thesis in favour of centripedalism, as an incentive based 
approach through electoral engineering.58  Timothy Sisk offers a power-sharing approach 
that combines both approaches as part of the peace process in ethnic conflicts.59 These 
positions are in addition to other democratic alternatives to majoritarianism, such as the 
protection of minority rights through policies of multiculturalism or territorial pluralism in 
a federation.60 The accommodation model contrasts with the integration approach, which sits 
in fine balance between assimilation and individual rights and identity. The integration model 
approach to introduce democracy and peace into deeply divided states is to build common 
political institutions and identity, and to remove cultural, linguistic and ethnic identity from 
public discord. This policy is commonly favoured by the United Nations, the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, peace research institutes and academic conflict resolution 
centres.61 The success of this model is debatable. While there has been a marked increase in 
constitution-making, there has been a notable rise of constitutional breakdown. Focusing on 
Africa (the cases considered are Burundi, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan and Zimbabwe), 
Alan Kuperman ‘counterintuitively’ recommends against, 
 
promoting the constitutional design typically prescribed by academics for 
ethnically divided societies—which is based on decentralization and other 
explicit accommodation of ethnic groups— because it would be too different 
from what currently exists 62 
 
However, Nic Cheeseman takes the opposite view, critiquing Kuperman’s conclusions for 
‘[underestimating] the danger of centralized constitutions and [overstating] the risks of 
introducing inclusive political arrangements’.63 Cheeseman concludes, based on his own 
                                                 
56 In addition to Horowitz and Lijphart, DS Lutz, J Linz, G Sartori and G O’Donnell have contributed 
to the comparative politics literature. 
57 Lijphart, ‘Constitutional Design’ (2004); Lijphart, Thinking About Democracy (2008); Lijphart, 
Patterns of Democracy (2012). 
58 Horowitz also advocates federalism and presidential systems in Horowitz, Ethnic Groups (2000) 
and Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? (1991); see also Horowitz, ‘Constitution-Making’ (2007) 
and Horowitz, ‘Conciliatory Institutions’ (2008). 
59 Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation (1995). Sisk’s book is an effort to link 
scholarship on power-sharing, from the comparative politics literature, with the literature on 
mediation. 
60 McGarry et al., ‘Integration or Accommodation?’, in Constitutional Design, edited by Choudhry 
(2008). 
61 Ibid. Of course, this is a generalisation which is examined in more depth in Kymlicka, ‘The 
Internationalization of Minority Rights’, in Constitutional Design, edited by Choudhry (2008). 
62 Kuperman, ‘Designing Constitutions’, in Constitutions and Conflict, edited by Kuperman (2015), 2.  
63 Cheeseman, ‘Accommodation Works’ (2016), 539. 
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research on democracy in Africa, 64 that violence and instability are caused by centralised 
constitutional systems that exclude opposition groups for political ends, so that ‘allowing 
integrative constitutions to remain in place with only limited reforms, as Kuperman 
recommends, would pose a major risk to continental peace and democracy.’65 In agreement 
with Kuperman, however, he urges caution in undertaking constitutional transitions, when 
the risk of violence is high. 
 
Constitutional courts are political, not simply judicial, institutions.66 This assumption is 
widely accepted in practice and academia and reflected in the scholarship on constitutional 
courts. However, the debate as to whether authority is held in the law or politics at the 
foundation of constitutionalism, and so is critical to the discussion on constitutional 
interpretation. While Frank Michelman reasons that ‘nobody who participates seriously in 
constitutional discussions [can] overlook … one of the two viewpoints, the rule of the people 
or the rule of the law, in the long term’,67 the tension between those who give priority to the 
law or politics is ever present in the discourse.68 This tension is present in the debate between 
Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt on the foundational authority of the constitution. Binary 
arguments are also central to the issue of constitutional interpretation, between those who 
hold that the judiciary should be the final arbiter of the constitution against those who dismiss 
this, advocating the supremacy of the legislature to interpret the constitution.    
 
Hannah Arendt, who, as a political theorist writing on violence, revolution and authority,69 
also reflected on this most basic contest on law and politics. To Arendt, law is the foundation 
of society70, although much of the work on Arendt asks, ‘what is politics’ not ‘what is law’. 
Arendt, however, is unique amongst political theorists for her focus on law and legal 
proceedings:  
                                                 
64 See Cheeseman, Democracy in Africa (2015).  
65 Cheeseman, ‘Accommodation Works’ (2016). 
66 This argument is a reasonably well supported; however, some would disagree with this statement, 
see Dahl, ‘Decision-Making’ (1957) who makes this case about the American Supreme Court.  
67 Michelman, ‘Kollektiv, Gemeinschaft’ in Auf der Suche nach der gerechten Gesellschaft, edited by 
Frank Frankenberg (1994), 61 quoted in Volk, Arendtian Constitutionalism (2015), 173. 
68 There are some, for example F Michelman and J Habermas, who argue for a third approach that 
gives equal weighting to law and politics. Still, in the academy, which is entrenched in its disciplinary 
divide, their approach is not in the majority, see Volk, Arendtian Constitutionalism (2015). 
69 Arendt was a self-described ‘political theorist’, however, I would also place her in the more limited 
group of constitutional theorists, see Hayden, ed., Hannah Arendt (2014) which, in addition to 
Hayden’s introduction on Arendt as a theorist and person, each chapter is dedicated to a concept (such 
as revolution, violence, statelessness, evil, power and violence) or topic on which Arendt’s writing 
were influential.  
70 ‘No civilization — the man-made artifact to house successive generations — would ever have been 
possible without a framework of stability, to provide the wherein for the flux of change. Foremost 
among the stabilizing factors, more enduring than customs, manners, and traditions, are the legal 
systems that regulate our life in the world and our daily affairs with each other’ (Arendt, ‘Civil 
Disobedience’ in Crises of the Republic, edited by Arendt (1972), 79 quoted in Volk, Arendtian 
Constitutionalism (2015), 173. 
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[Arendt] was well aware of the intimate and reciprocal relationships between 
law and politics. Where political theorists generally tend to treat law as the 
result of politics (and thus as somehow epiphenomenal, and of lesser 
importance), for Arendt, so it seems, law was more than just the outcome of 
politics, or the reflection of politics, or the handmaiden of politics. Reflecting 
on legal trials and judgments made sense to her, precisely because of their 
political relevance. Law, to her, was an intrinsic part of political action and, as 
every activist will realize, often political action is geared to facilitate legal 
change.71 
 
Arendt has the rare ability to cross between legal and political theory, and into the discrete 
discipline of constitutional theory. It is for this reason that I use Arendt in making my 
argument here, especially on the place of violence in constitutions, for which Arendt had a 
distinct contribution as a scholar writing on the American and French revolutionary, on 
political violence and criminal courts (in her work on the Eichmann trials). However, apart 
from a few key contributions, Arendt’s reflections on law and constitutions have not gained 
the same level of academic interest as her work on violence and power. This does seem, 
however, to be changing with a renewed interest in constitutional change and contestation. 
At the international level, there is likewise, an increased recognition that international law 
and politics are intertwined, a ‘notable development because, traditionally, liberal theories of 
constitutional rule have construed law and politics as being in opposition and, further still, 
that law serves as an imagined check on the excesses of state power and authority.’72 There 
has also been a strong tendency in politics to dismiss the impact or strength of international 
law, as argued by Hans Morgenthau in Politics Among Nations, that ‘the political realist 
maintains the autonomy of the political sphere [and] thinks in terms of interest defined as 
power ... the lawyer, of conformity of action with legal rules’.73 This thesis aims to find some 
middle ground between law and politics accepting that politics can dominate, but also that 
the law is something more than simply politics by other means.74  
 
Comparative constitutional law and comparative politics have integral roots. Early scholars 
within the field were interdisciplinary,75 and while that trend was halted for a period, there 
are recent examples of cross disciplinary collaboration. For example, Sujit Choudhry, a 
                                                 
71 Klabbers, ‘Possible Islands of Predictability’ (2007), 2. 
72 Rajkovic et al., ‘Introduction’ in The Power of Legality, edited by, Rajkovic et al. (2016), 1. 
73 Morgenthau, Politics Nations (1966), 13 quoted in ibid, 2. 
74 On the need to better combine the social sciences and law, particularly in the study of comparative 
constitutionalism, see Hirschl’s 2013 editorial in the International Journal of Constitutional Law. 
Hirschl advocates a new methodological approach that combines the study of law and politics to get a 
more holistic understanding of the social and political impact of constitutions, not simply an 
evaluation of their jurisprudence. While this thesis continues with this trend of analysing court and 
their case law, it is also intended to draw together the two disciplines to understand how courts are 
acting in political ways to help hold together the peace agreement. This thesis also hopes to speak to 
both lawyers and social scientists. Hirschl, ‘Editorial’ (2013). 
75 Crane and Moses, Politics (1884) and Burgess, Political Science and Comparative Constitutional 
Law (1893) are both examples given in Hirschl, Comparative Matters (2014), ch 4.  
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constitutional theorist, in his edited book on constitutions in divided societies, synthesizes the 
legal and political scholarship.76 Choudhry’s stated motivation for doing so was to fuse the 
debates on divided societies taking place in comparative politics and comparative 
constitutional law. There is a similar push in methodology to combine politics and law. Ran 
Hirschl, in advocating the incorporation of social science methodology into comparative 
constitutional law,77 unequivocally argues that ‘[a]ny attempt to portray the constitutional 
domain as a predominantly legal, rather than imbued in the social or political arena, is 
destined to yield thin, a-historical, overly doctrinal or formalistic accounts of the origins, 
nature and consequences of constitutional law’.78 The current methodological fashion of 
straddling politics and law – although still shaky – makes this thesis a very timely 
contribution to the field. Comparative constitutional law, itself a subset of comparative law 
and constitutional law, has experienced a renaissance in the last three decades, being revived 
as an academic discipline following the constitution writings concluded in Eastern European, 
Latin American and South Africa after 1989. Contemporary literature in this field has largely 
been concerned with rights and rights-based institutions since its academic revival.79 
Comparative constitutional studies consider the constitution-making process80 and 
constitutional design.81 However, it is important to note that the impact of a constitution on 
long-term stability cannot be gleaned from its inception nor is it sufficient to simply consider 
the process of design and creation in and of itself.82  
 
Anne-Marie Slaughter and her co-authors wrote in the American Journal of International Law 
that ‘political scientists and international lawyers have been reading and drawing on one 
another’s work with increasing frequency and for a wide range of purposes’.83 However, 
interdisciplinary scholarship between international law and International Relations, 
irrespective of such pronouncements, is hesitant and, apart from some notable exceptions,84 
continues to be limited.85 International Relations scholars have, however, begun to delve into 
constitutional law, which has traditionally been the prerogative of the constitutional or 
                                                 
76 Choudhry, ed., Constitutional Design for Divided Societies (2008). 
77 Comparative constitutional law, which as a specialised legal field, has adopted its own 
methodological framework. See Jackson, ‘Comparative Constitutional Law’ in The Oxford Handbook 
of Comparative Constitutional Law edited by Rosenfeld and Sajó (2012) and Hirschl, ‘The Question 
of Case Section’ (2005). 
78 Hirschl, ‘From Comparative Constitutional Law’ (2013), 2. 
79 Choudhry, ‘Introduction’, in Constitutional Design, edited by Choudhry (2008). 
80 See, for example, Miller, ed., Framing the State (2010) and Elster, ‘Forces and Mechanisms’ 
(1995). 
81 See, for example, Choudhry, ed., Constitutional Design (2008) and Ginsburg, ed., Comparative 
Constitutional Design (2012). 
82 See Kuperman, ‘Designing Constitutions’, in Constitutions and Conflict, edited by Kuperman 
(2015), 19 who also argues that the process of constitution-making and institutionalisation may be 
more important than its design (that is, whether it is accommodative or integrative). 
83 Slaughter et al., ‘International Law and International Relations Theory’ (1998), 367. 
84 See, for example, work by Alec Stone Sweet; Martti Koskenniemi; and Benedict Kingsbury.  
85 There are, however, some notable exception. These include Friedrich Kratocwhil, Christian Reus-
Smit and Michael Byers.  
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comparative constitutional law scholars.86  The lure of constitutionalism and constitutional 
law to the International Relations academy is the effect of the constitutionalisation of 
international law and the internationalisation of constitutional law.87  
 
International law and constitutional law are two branches of law which have a strong bearing 
on the other. The link between the two has resulted in the development of an emerging 
literature in international constitutional law. There are three distinguishable exchanges 
between scholars in this field.88 The first perspective is the ‘internationalisation of domestic 
constitutional law’ which is occurring because of international human rights standards and 
tribunals and through constitutional borrowing.89 The second perspective is concerned with 
the influence capacity and reach of international law in domestic constitution-making 
processes, which ‘makes explicit … the idea that both domestic and international spheres play 
a role in creating constitutional orders’.90 The final perspective is ‘the constitutionalisation91  
of international law’ which is further sub-categorized into three projects. The first such 
project is concerned principally with the work of Jan Klabbers and Anne Peters,92 who see an 
emerging international constitutional order where the law is supreme to politics. The second 
project is a constitutionalisation of international law. The European Union is most often cited 
as having the necessary characteristics of this international constitutional order. The UN is 
also cited as the centre of a global constitutionalism.93 The third project suggests that the 
flow of constitutional language and values from the national level to the international level 
points to an emerging international constitutional method. The relationship between 
international law and constitutional law is still developing, the full implications of which are 
not yet clear.  
 
In addition to the literature on peace agreements and state building, this thesis draws upon 
constitutional law literature.94 Thus in addition to this thesis’ primary original contribution 
                                                 
86 Wiener et al., ‘Global Constitutionalism’ (2012). 
87 Bell, ‘What We Talk about When We Talk about International Constitutional Law’ (2014). Bell, in 
cataloguing these narratives, is looking to resolve whether, and if so where, these intellectual 
approaches speak to each other. It is her contention that while the first two perspectives are in regular 
discussion, the third is the outlier. 
88 Ibid. 
89 See for example, Jackson, Constitutional Engagement (2012) and Choudhry, ed., The Migration of 
Constitutional Ideas (2010). 
90 Bell, ‘What We Talk about When We Talk about International Constitutional Law’ (2014), 243.  
91 Constitutionalisation is defined by the editors of Global Constitutionalism as ‘the process by which 
institutional arrangements in the non-constitutional global realm have taken on a constitutional 
quality’ (Wiener et al., ‘Global Constitutionalism’ (2012), 5). 
92 See Klabbers et al., The Constitutionalization of International Law (2011).  
93 See, for example, Fassbender, The United Nations Charter (2009).  
94 See Rosenfeld and Sajó, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (2012); 
Ginsburg and Dixon, ‘Introduction’, in Comparative Constitutional Law, edited by Ginsburg and 
Dixon (2011); Jackson and Tushnet, eds. Defining the Field of Comparative Constitutional Law 
(2002). 
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of advancing the argument on peace constitutionalism, a secondary contribution is made by 
linking these two disparate bodies of literature. 
 
Most of the world’s modern one hundred and seventy written constitutions include some form 
of judicial review, making constitutional courts and judges the primary interpreters of this 
document. The legitimacy of courts as the ‘least dangerous branch’95 to interpret the 
constitution is disputed. Ronald Dworkin96 and John Ely Hart97 best enunciate the arguments 
for judicial review in contemporary jurisprudence. On the other hand, Jeremey Waldron,98 
Mark Tushnet99 and Richard Bellamy100 have argued against judicial review in favour of 
political constitutionalism. Although the merits of judicial review debatable, the inclusion of 
a strong constitutional court is commonplace, especially in newer constitutions in states 
where the political establishment is regarded with distrust.101  
 
There is no shortage of work on the spread of constitutionalism and judicial review. However, 
despite the close connection between peace agreements and constitutionalism, the evaluation 
of judicial review and the role of courts in constitutional orders have been assumed to be 
focused on a goal of democratisation, rather than of peace.102  Much of the key scholarship 
relating to courts and transitions has focused on authoritarian transitions and the role of 
courts as democratisers. I suggest that a distinctive set of peace constitutions exists, and that 
when we examine cases arising post settlement, in transitions from conflict rather than 
authoritarianism, peace is the foundation of the constitution and, in such cases, forms the focus 
of courts in judicial review. 
 
The American example is a fascinating case of constitutional theory and practice – for the 
constitution, although amended, is the oldest in the world, and has even survived political 
collapse in the American Civil War. For these reasons, constitutional theorists are drawn to 
the American model, a tradition which is followed here. However, there is danger in 
overextending its usefulness as a case study.103 Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to explore the 
                                                 
95 Alexander Hamilton contended that the US Supreme Court would be the ‘least dangerous to the 
political rights of the Constitution’ (Hamilton, Federalist No. 78 ([1788] 2009)). See also Bickel, The 
Least Dangerous Branch (1986) on the legitimacy and scope of judicial review by the American 
Supreme Court.  
96 Dworkin, Law’s Empire ([1986] 1998). 
97 Ely Hart, Democracy and Distrust (1980). 
98 Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case’ (2006). 
99 Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away (2000).  
100 Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism (2007). 
101 Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies (2003). 
102 See for example, Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies (2015).  
103 Tom Ginsburg makes the same case in his study of judicial review, see Ginsburg, Judicial Review 
in New Democracies (2003), ch 4 (he also includes a more detailed discussion on the foundational 
cases). James Madison, writing in 1830, makes the point that the American Constitution itself is ‘sui 
generis’. The American Constitution is ‘so unexampled in its origin, so complex in its structure, and 
so particular in some of its features, that in describing it the political vocabulary does not furnish 
terms sufficiently distinctive and appropriate, without a detailed resort to the facts of the case’. (James 
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American justification for interpreting judicial review into their Constitution. A plain text 
reading of the Constitution is non-determinative on this subject; however, the decision of the 
Marshall Court in the Case of Marbury v Madison104 altered the reading of the constitution and 
consequently the overall shape of American politics. The decision taken by Justice Marshall 
in this case as it concerns the jurisdiction of the Court can find extra-constitutional precedent 
in the writings of Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton, in a most famous pronouncement on the 
judiciary, reasoned in the Federalist Papers that,  
 
the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous 
to the political rights of the Constitution … has no influence over either the 
sword or the purse … It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, 
but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive 
arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.105 
 
The debate concerning the legitimacy of constitutional courts to practice strong-form judicial 
review, and whether the participation of courts in ruling on political questions benefits or 
hinders democracy, is contained in the debate between political and legal constitutionalism. 
However, this on-going debate does not address the concerns of judicial review under a peace 
constitution. By the nature of the negotiation, peace agreements attempt to achieve elite pacts 
that are comprehensive, however, there is then risk that these deals are limited. Courts often 
must both acknowledge and protect the elite pact while acknowledging its limited nature and 
the need to ultimately move beyond it.  
 
The question as to whether the court ought to act in such a capacity will not be tackled directly 
in this thesis; however, there is already extensive academic debate on the normative role of 
the judiciary in a democracy. That said, I do have a normative bias towards judicial review 
that is clear in this thesis.106 However, it is not intended to be made as an explicit argument 
that courts should have such a defining role in determining the meaning of a peace 
constitution, and through that interpretation, the meaning of peace. The position in this thesis 
is not that courts are the best institution to interpret the constitution, but that they are often 
put into a privileged place to do so as part of the constitutional arrangement. This is 
particularly so for constitutions drafted as part of a political settlement process where political 
institutions are viewed with suspicion.  
 
                                                 
Madison to Daniel Webster, May 27, 1830, Madison Letters, 4, 85 quoted in Hendrickson, Peace Pact 
(2003), 16). The tensions between comparative analysis and context is discussed in the methodology 
section above. 
104 Marbury v Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) (1803) 137. 
105 Hamilton, Federalist No. 78 ([1788] 2009). 
 106 As Mark Tushnet comments: ‘every approach to comparative constitutional law carries with it 
some ideological baggage’ for example, ‘ideologies associated with the field are cosmopolitan and 
liberal constitutionalism’. This study is no different in holding some bias, although the intention of the 
thesis is not to up hold that bias, rather, it is to begin to lay the groundwork to considering courts as 
actors in the peace process, whether that influence is useful or not. (Tushnet, Advanced Introduction 
(2014), 8). 
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Conclusion 
 
Part of the original contribution of this thesis is analysing the political settlement process – 
from negotiation of the peace agreement to the judicial interpretation of the subsequent 
constitutional documents – the outcome of which may influence those involved in the initial 
stage of constructing the peace agreement. The parties at a peace process are required to make 
numerous compromises in the interest of finding an approved settlement. To find agreement 
between warring parties, third party states or organisations, and non-combatant actors is, to 
say the least, hard. To begin a search for agreement without fully appreciating the 
implications of that agreement places an additional burden on the parties. Accordingly, this 
thesis attempts to navigate the process from negotiation to interpretation to supplement the 
comparative constitutional literature with a theory on peace jurisprudence.  
 
This thesis aims to explore how peace constitutions are interpreted, holding that 
interpretation of a constitution grants the constitution agency and transforms it into an on-
going activity rather than a one-time event. More specifically, it is through the language of 
interpretation that the peace constitution finds agency and activity. It is also through the 
language of interpretation that the peace constitution is (re)negotiated. Judicial review is not 
necessarily good but rather facilitates a language through which to assess the meaning of the 
political settlement and by which the political settlement can be (re)negotiated. The peace 
constitution is one arrangement represented in the broader political settlement that 
transitions a state from conflict to peace. The judiciary, and, as importantly, the legislature 
and executive, are also represented in the political settlement and have a role in its 
implementation. 
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Chapter One: Peace Agreements in Law 
 
 
 
 
 
DAVID HUNTER MILLER, a legal advisor to the American delegation at the 1919 Paris 
Peace Conference, wrote a decade after the drafting of the Covenant of the League of Nations, 
that ‘[t]he truth is that the Covenant, as a political document, has worked about as it was 
written, subject as any such Treaty, of necessity, must be, to the shifting political actualities 
of the times’.107 This, he accepts, ‘could not be otherwise in an imperfect world’, and that the 
correspondence of ‘George Washington as President discloses many similar doubts and 
hesitations in early American history’.108 This statement conveys, in many ways, the 
assumption made in this thesis that peace treaties are imperfect documents, drafted by 
negotiation and out of necessity. The Covenant of the League of Nations was a defining 
document in international law, and yet, was, as Miller recalls, an imperfect political document 
drafted to prevent the possible resumption of war that cost the lives of millions.  
 
The reality of the Covenant was subject to the politics of the time. It was as vulnerable to the 
political disputes between states, as all peace agreements are vulnerable to tensions between 
its parties, and ultimately, may very well be incapable of preventing a return to war. Miller, 
writing in 1928, could not have foreseen the collapse of the League or the start of the Second 
World War, but, even then, believing in the experiment of a peaceful international 
organisation, he accepted that on paper it was something different from practice, in much the 
same way, he says, as the American constitutional project. This light reference to the 
American constitution makes his insight particularly appropriate. Although Miller did not 
understand the Covenant as a constitution,109 his remarks hint at the similarity between peace 
agreements and constitutions, both imperfect texts, drafted out of necessity, and, so in writing 
and interpretation, subject to political reality.  
 
This chapter is concerned with the peace process and their agreements under the framework 
of international law.110 The laws of war and peace are necessary to think about in this 
discussion. First, to give clarity to the concept of peace, which becomes relevant later in this 
thesis when discussing the reasoning of the apex courts in Northern Ireland, Bosnia-
                                                 
107 Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant (1928), 551. 
108 Ibid, 551. 
109 For example, the global constitutionalism argument compares the UN Charter to a constitution. 
110 Databases of peace agreements have been complied by Conciliation Resources (Accord), the USIP, 
the United Nations Department of Political Affairs (Peacemaker), the Uppsala Conflict Database 
Program and the PA-X database hosted by the Political Settlements Research Programme at the 
University of Edinburgh (this database currently hosts agreements that reference women and gender, 
however it is an ongoing project). INCORE and the Transitional Justice Institute at the University of 
Ulster host the Peace Agreement Database.  Most agreements used in this thesis were found on the 
Peacemaker website (UNDPA). 
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Herzegovina and Colombia. Second, as peace agreements are negotiated and exist within the 
space between war and peace, the legal status of both, and the agreement itself, are important 
to understand the function and capacity of a peace agreement, and its relationship to the 
constitution and peace jurisprudence of the courts. In keeping with the international legal 
approach in this chapter, the first section includes a summary on the distinction between 
international armed conflict (IAC) and non-international armed conflict (NIAC), with 
particular regard to how international law applies to NIAC.111 This section then, briefly, looks 
to the emerging international norms (or laws) of peace-making, before turning to a discussion 
on the legal status of peace agreements. This includes a discussion of the status of peace 
agreements as international treaties. This chapter also touches on questions of self-
determination and power-sharing arrangements, relevant topics in many peace negotiations, 
including those in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Northern Ireland. International law, especially 
human rights law, has bearing on the negotiations of peace agreements and their 
implementation. Where these points of law are not covered directly in this chapter, it will be 
touched on later in the thesis.112 As Miller recognised, peace agreements are political 
documents and so are vulnerable to political action. The concluding section, therefore, turns 
to an evaluation of legal and political authority and the problem of legitimacy held by peace 
agreements.  
 
Laws of War and Peace 
 
Peace is a contested term and an ambiguous concept. In an unsophisticated narrative, war is 
nothing more than the absence of peace and peace the absence of war.113 Yet, the meaning of 
peace is ephemeral, moving with international political shifts, so that where a state of peace 
was once thought of as contrary to a state of war, the present understanding of peace is more 
complex. Peace requires the achievement of a certain level of development, satisfying the rule 
of law, and recognising and complying with basic human rights norms. Furthermore, peace 
                                                 
111 The terms international armed conflict (IAC) and non-international armed conflict (NIAC) are 
those used in the Geneva Convention (1948). I use them interchangeably with interstate conflict and 
intrastate conflict, respectively.  
112 For example, under the 1991 Colombian Constitution, the Court extended the ‘bloque de 
constitucionalidad’ (constitutional block) doctrine under Art 93, which allows the Court to ‘block’ a 
constitutional amendment if it conflicts with international law, which in accordance with this doctrine 
is incorporated into the constitution. However, in the cases considered below the Court found in 
favour of peace over principles of international law. Amnesties for the highest level of crimes are 
inconsistent under international humanitarian and human rights law, however, the Court found in 
favour of the ‘Legal Framework for Peace’ constitutional amendments, although they allowed for 
limited amnesties (see chapter four). For more on the block doctrine and its migration from Europe to 
Latin America see Góngora Mera, Inter-American Judicial Constitutionalism (2011), 167-198.  
113 Mac Ginty, No War, No Peace (2008), 18 and Richmond, ‘Understanding Peace’ (2005), in this 
paper, Richmond’s paper looks of the consequences of understanding peace as a ‘liberal peace’ (or 
negative peace). The paper predates some of his (and R Mac Ginty’s) later work on the critique of 
liberal peace.  
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must not be thought of as a momentary event but rather as a process, without a clearly defined 
(or definable) endpoint.114  
 
The ideological grounding of peace is also at issue. There are many who object to the 
imposing of a ‘liberal’ peace, suggesting that the high level of involvement by the 
international community has led to imposed, top-down (and, thus, often unstable) peace, 
rather than encouraging grassroots peace processes as a more suitable means to provide 
permanent peace.115 While the critique of liberal peace is broadly accepted in the literature, it 
can however, tend towards generalisations, and inflate the involvement and influence of the 
international community in peace processes and agreements.116 The UN, although without 
doubt an organisation with reach and influence in peace-making, the presence or participation 
of the UN in peace agreements is not commonplace.117 Empirically, the UN may have limited 
formal involvement in many peace processes, however, it (and other international 
organisations and actors) have broad influence in the peace and constitution-making 
processes. There is certainly scope to challenge this involvement on normative and 
practical.118 Nonetheless, the liberal peace critique literature is useful in combating the 
preconceived notions of what is required for negative peace; however, the approach adopted 
here shifts away from this perspective, in part, as it accepts a legal and constitutional point of 
view.119  
 
                                                 
114 The recognition that peace is a process is reflected in the idea of the political settlement, which 
conceives of the peace agreement, constitution and on-going political transition as a continuous 
negotiation process (Fritz and Menocal, Understanding State-Building (2007). So that even those 
states that are not engaged in violent conflict are based on a political settlement (Brown and 
Grävingholt, From Power Struggles (2011), 9). Many states (the US or Australia, for example) exist 
in a state of peace, however, there is also constant contestation in the political space that has the 
potential to trigger political violence or rupture (however mild). For example, there are have been past 
and ongoing racial tensions in the US and continuing discrimination against indigenous communities 
in Australia, which have implications on the constitution in both cases. There are also concerns with 
structural violence that exist long after the cessation of conflict. There is, however, more space and 
time for constitution drafting or amending where there is no violence or near-violence.  
115 See the work by Roger Mac Ginty (and others) on ‘hybrid peace’ (for example, Mac Ginty, 
‘Hybrid Peace’ (2010)). 
116 See discussion on the role of the international community in chapter two.  
117 Of the 585 agreements signed between 1 January 1990 and 1 May 2010, the UN was a signatory or 
mediator in only 196 agreements (33.5 percent), Bell and O’Rourke, ‘Peace Agreements or Pieces of 
Paper? (2010), 958. 
118 See Tushnet, ‘Some Skepticism’ (2008), who cautions against giving advice (Tushnet is speaking 
of constitutional advice in his argument, but the same case may be made of about peace agreements) 
as such ‘reflection and choice’ must be made on the ground, so that outside opinion is ‘pointless’. 
Again, see chapter two for more of a discussion on this point.  
119 For a very useful summary of the critique of liberal peace – including the arguments that have been 
made for and against, and the list of achievements that have emerged from the literature (along with a 
bibliography of relevant material) see Richmond and Mac Ginty, ‘Where Now for the Critique of 
Liberal Peace?’ (2015). 
 24 
 
There are assumptions in some of the literature (and in practice) that peace and democracy 
are synonymous, assumptions are challenged in this thesis. The argument that peace 
agreements always conform to a liberal framework, is likewise, over generalised. Power 
sharing arrangements allow for an illiberal organisation of government on the grounds of 
ethnicity (in the instance where ethnicity is the identity factor at stake in the conflict, opposed 
to political power sharing arrangements, which have different implications).120 Such 
consociational, or power-sharing arrangements, are common in peace agreements,121 
although they are often used alongside other arrangements. In making this case, it is not to 
dismiss the problems that come from the forced inclusion of liberal norms in peace agreements 
or the lack of legitimacy that arises from negotiations being held between elite stakeholders, 
often outside the country in which the conflict is taking place, making grassroots participation 
more difficult.  
 
The History of War and Peace 
 
War, in medieval thinking, was an aberration of the natural condition of peace, although it 
was the general and expected state of international life. This outlook was held until the 17th 
century when a new conception of the state of nature being in perpetual war became more 
widely believed. This conception of the international system regards each state as acting in 
perpetual competition and thus being in constant jeopardy of returning to war. The 19th 
century jurist conceived of war as a legitimate and rational state policy, rejecting previous 
convictions that this was in consequence of man’s natural state of being.  
 
Only in the 20th century was peace, not war, thought to be the natural condition of the 
international system. Within this paradigm, the League of Nations was established as an 
international collective security mechanism. War, under the League, was a permitted state 
policy, although only   in the case where all peaceful means of resolution had been exhausted. 
In accordance with Article 10: 
 
The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against 
external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence 
of all Members of the League.122  
 
The adoption of the phrase ‘external aggression’ is noteworthy. External was included to 
avoid the extension of the Covenant to intrastate wars and the concept of aggression was a 
contentious term. The Covenant set up a mechanism for potential collective enforcement, 
which up to then had not been present in the international legal system. This provision was 
included in Article 11, which reads as follows: 
 
Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members 
of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole 
                                                 
120 See, for example, Levitt, Illegal Peace in Africa (2012). 
121 Choudhry, ‘After the Rights Revolution’ (2010). 
122 Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 10. 
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League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and 
effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.123   
 
The Kellogg-Briand Pact (General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of 
National Policy, 1928) was the first international treaty to make war or the use of force 
unlawful outside of self-defence,124 allowing states to resort to war only for selfless reasons, 
that is, not in the pursuit of national interests.125 The start of WWII demonstrated the 
impossibility of holding states to account to this higher ideal of international relations. 
Acknowledging the failure of the League to maintain international peace, the victors of the 
Second World War made a second attempt to restrict the jus ad bellum under the UN Charter, 
prohibiting states from resorting to armed conflict, outside of an act of self-defence or 
sanction by the Security Council. The Charter, however, has no recourse to ban war within 
state borders. In fact, the Charter, under Article 1(7), prevents the UN from intervening ‘in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or [from 
requiring] the Members to submit such matters to settlement’.  
 
The laws of war were principally developed as categories under the law of nations (jus 
gentium). However, war between states has become gradually less frequent since the end of 
the Cold War. Although intrastate war often involves, in some capacity, international actors 
or third-party states, armed conflicts largely occurs within states between government forces 
and rebel groups.126 The application of international humanitarian law has been gradually, 
but not completely, applied to non-international armed conflicts. The Geneva Convention, 
under Common Article 3,127 is the first instance in international humanitarian law in which 
intrastate war was recognised. The law applicable in the case of non-international armed 
conflict was limited in the Geneva Conventions, however, in 1977 the Additional Protocol II 
                                                 
123 Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 11. 
124 That the Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawed war (or aggression) was argued at Nuremburg, however, 
whether this was the case continues to be disputed.  
125 The language of the Pact suggests that its terms were limited to relations between signatories, and 
thus, parties could use force against non-signatories without being in violation of the agreement (for 
example, Article I was limited to signatories ‘relations with one another’). 
126 Rebel and insurgent are often used interchangeably, and for the purposes of this discussion, I will 
continue to do so, while accepting that upon deeper exploration there may be differences in the 
definitions of each. 
127 In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of 
the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the 
following provisions:                                                                            
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid 
down their arms and those placed ' hors de combat ' by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other 
cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on 
race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria ... The Parties to the 
conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the 
other provisions of the present Convention. The application of the preceding provisions shall not 
affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict. 
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to the Geneva Convention, further extended the principle of humanitarian law applicable in 
conflict not of an international character.  
 
The Geneva Conventions, in addition to extending international humanitarian law to non-
international armed conflict under Common Article 3, formalised the custom concerning 
declarations of war, extending the application of the conventions to all armed conflict, 
irrespective of whether a state of war had been legally declared. From the late middle ages to 
the 20th century, the legal traditions on the declaration of war were well established. A state 
of war did not exist until a formal declaration had been proclaimed.128 The legal convention 
where a declaration of war formally moved two, or more parties, into a legal state of war 
declined after the official outlawing of war in the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) and the UN 
Charter (1945). Currently, there is no clear definitional line between existing in a state of war 
and a state of peace.  
 
In part for this reason, the application of the laws of war and peace have become tangled. The 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its advisory opinion of the Legality of the Threat or Use 
of Nuclear Weapons, determined that ‘the protection of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights129 does not cease in a time of war’.130 The Court again found that a 
situation may exist in which both humanitarian law and human rights law are applicable in 
its advisory opinion in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory.131 In the judgment of the Court, 
 
[a]s regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and 
human rights law, there are thus three possible situations: some rights may be 
exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be 
exclusively matters of human rights law; yet other may be matters of both these 
branches of international law.132  
 
Further, the Court determined that international human rights law is applicable to states in 
the exercise of their power outside their own territory.133 In a third case regarding the 
applicability of international humanitarian and human rights law, the Court, in the Armed 
                                                 
128 See, for example, Neff, Justice among Nations (2014) and Lesaffer ‘Peace Treaties and the 
Formation of International Law’, in The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law, edited 
by Fassbender and Peters (2012), 72. 
129 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is one half of the so called 
‘International Bill of Rights’. Human rights documents are categorised under the laws of peace. 
130 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 226, 
para 25. 
131 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 136. 
132 Ibid, p. 178, para. 106. 
133 The ECtHR has made similar judgments on the extraterritorial application of the Convention. 
Some notable decisions include: Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, Behrami and Behrami 
v. France and Bankovic et al. v. Belgium et al. For more, see Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application 
of Human Rights Treaties (2011).  
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Activities case, applied the reasoning from Legal Consequences, finding that both branches of law 
would have to be taken into consideration in determining the outcome of the case.134 In this 
case, the Court concluded that Uganda was responsible for the humanitarian law and human 
rights law violations committed by the Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF) on the 
territory of the DRC. The judgments of the Court illustrate the merging in the application of 
international human rights and international humanitarian law, and the confusion that 
remains in the applications of the laws of war and peace. 135 
 
Jus Post Bellum  
 
The law of peace is as old as the law of war, however, the laws after war (jus post bellum) have 
been given scant attention in comparison to the laws of war – jus ad bellum and jus in bello.136 
The laws after war ought to be applicable following the termination of the conflict and 
throughout the transition to peace. This proposed branch of law finds its philosophical 
origins137  in the writings of Alberico Gentili,138 Hugo Grotius139 and Emmerich de Vattel,140 
and in the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant.141 Finding its theoretical home within this 
tradition, the legal and philosophical literature of jus post bellum uses just war doctrine to argue 
for the establishment of a new body of law to be applied after conflicts. While much of the 
debate on this topic is normative, there is some legal evidence to suggest the existence of a 
jus post bellum. In the case that the law after conflict might be said to create obligations on 
peace-making, such obligations have principally emerged from a liberal, positivist concept of 
the law. In the same way that international human rights law is notionally universal, believed 
to go beyond the positivist, liberal international order, but is ‘fundamentally prone to 
becoming part of that very order’,142 jus post bellum may suffer the same fate. The suggestion 
of a jus post bellum has been related to transitional justice, defined as ‘the normative 
                                                 
134 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo [Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda], 
Judgement, ICJ Reports 2005, 168, p. 243, para. 216. 
135 Christine Bell refers to this idea as ‘regime merge’, Bell, On the Law of Peace (2008), ch 12.  
136 See Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum’ (2007) and Stahn, ‘Jus Post Bellum’ (2008). 
137 The just war tradition can, in fact, finds its natural home in medieval Christian thought. The legal 
and moral tradition that emerged in the 17th and 18th centuries increasingly moved away from this 
outlook, founded largely on principles of natural law, toward a conception of just war rooted in the 
law of nations (for more see Neff, War and the Law of Nations (2005), ch 3). It is this later outlook of 
just war that has relevance here, and in most present conceptions of just war theory, rather than the 
archaic sentiments of the Middle Ages (that said, many just war theorists refer to Augustine, Thomas 
Aquinas, Cicero and other eminent theologians and scholars of the era).  
138 Lesaffer, ‘Alberico Gentili’s ius post bellum’ in The Roman Foundations, edited by Kingsbury and 
Straumann (2010). 
139 Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, ed./annot. Neff, ([1625] 2012). 
140 de Vattel, The Law of Nations, ed./intro. by Kapossy and Whitmore, ([1758] 2008). 
141  ‘The Right of Nations in relation to the State of War may be divided into: 1. The Right of going to 
War; 2. Right during War; and 3. Right after War, the object of which is to constrain the nations 
mutually to pass from this state of war, and to found a common Constitution establishing Perpetual 
Peace’ (Kant, The Philosophy of Law, trans. Hastie (1887), 214). 
142 Mégret ‘The Apology of Utopia’ (2013). 
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considerations that apply to a society that is moving from a repressive, non-democratic 
society to one that is non-repressive and democratic’, 143 finding common points between 
both.144  
 
Christine Bell has advanced the concept of lex pacificatoria against the emerging arguments 
for a jus post bellum as a set of legal practices and customs that do not amount to codified 
international law.145 The lex pacificatoria is intended as more of a guide to peacemakers 
thereby according them the necessary movement needed in negotiation, while giving 
direction toward a general conception of peace building. While there may not be sufficient 
justification to support the established place of jus post bellum in international law, there is 
evidence of the internationalisation of public law. The emerging field of international 
constitutional law sees evidence of constitutional borrowing by domestic courts and the 
internationalisation of certain human rights, which may amount to an emerging province of 
law after conflict in constitution-making and design.  
 
Legal Status of the Peace Agreement 
 
While legal status often remains unclear,146 the peace agreement is both a legal and a political 
document, and as Bell argues ‘peace agreement solutions cannot be understood as a common 
set of conflict resolution techniques, but must be understood as a distinctive form of 
constitutionalism’.147 Agreements are only concluded when a new institutional and power 
arrangement is reached and this is often formalized in a renewed or altered constitution that 
recognises the post bellum political situation. Peace agreements as new constitutional 
arrangements however have the potential danger of solidifying the divisions that caused the 
conflict. The same discordant structures may be transferred to the constitution, which, in 
theory at least, is intended to be a permanent document.  
 
The way war concludes impacts the resulting peace. From 1945, negotiated settlements have 
been as commonplace as military victory in ending interstate war.148 From the close of the 
Cold War, a comparable trend has appeared in intrastate wars. Peace agreements are 
contractual arrangements concluded at a point in the conflict as a part of the negotiation 
stage. The agreement – arguably nothing more than a piece of paper149 – comes about as a 
part of a process that includes pre-negotiation, ceasefire,150 negotiation, implementation 
                                                 
143 May and Forcehimes, ‘Introduction’, in Morality, Jus Post Bellum, and International Law, edited 
by May and Forcehimes (2012), 1. 
144 See also May and Edenberg, eds., Jus Post Bellum and Transitional Justice (2013). 
145 Bell, On the Law of Peace (2008) argues that the lex pacificatoria relates to three areas of law – 
self-determination, transitional justice, and third party enforcement – in a process of ‘hybrid 
constitutionalism’. 
146 See Bell, ‘Peace Agreements’ (2006). 
147 Bell, On the Law of Peace (2008), 200. 
148 Walter, ‘The Critical Barrier’ (1997), 335.  
149 Bell and O’Rourke, ‘The People’s Peace?’ (2007). 
150 Page Fortna defines a ceasefire as ‘an end to or break in fighting, whether or not it represents the 
end of the war’ (Page Fortna, ‘Agreement and the Durability of Peace’ (2003), 349.) Page Fortna 
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agreements151 and constitution-making itself as a peace agreement. 152 A peace agreement is 
a negotiated settlement. The outcome of the negotiation process is often a compromised and 
messy document, which has been shaped by the context of the situation. This makes 
comparison between agreements from different conflicts difficult, however, there are certain 
international organisations and global norms which shape the agreements giving them some 
characteristics of similarity.  
 
Legality under International Law 
 
Peace agreements hold a unique status under international law. As agreements signed by 
state and non-state parties, peace agreements are sui generis under treaty law as codified by 
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The Vienna Convention – and customary 
international law – recognise only states as capable of concluding treaties under international 
law.153 Rather ambiguously as regards peace agreements, Article 3 of the Convention does 
accept that while ‘the present Convention does not apply to international agreements 
concluded between states and other subjects of international law or between such other 
subjects of international law… [this] shall not affect … the legal force of such agreements’.154 
This provision still leaves unclear what category of ‘subject’ may be considered applicable, 
but leaves open the possibility of recognizing peace agreements signed by non-state actors as 
having international legal force.  
 
There are three groups which are generally accepted to hold international personality and 
therefore the capacity to sign peace agreements155 – these are rebel/insurgent groups,156 
indigenous people,157 and minority groups. The international legal system is understood as a 
                                                 
quantitatively analysed ceasefire agreements and the frequency with which parties return to war, 
considering what she calls ‘situational or structural factors’ and ‘deliberate attempts to enhance the 
durability of peace’ (Page Fortna, Cease-fire Agreements (2004), 2). Her conclusions suggest that the 
mechanisms that are most effective in maintaining a ceasefire are: troop withdrawal, demilitarized 
zones, third-party guarantees, peacekeeping deployment, joint commissions and specificity of terms 
(210). Although her research is limited to interstate wars, some of the conclusions she draws may be 
applicable to intrastate conflict.  
151 Walter holds that the implementation phase of the peace process is the ‘most difficult to navigate 
and the reason why so many civil war negotiations have failed’ (Walter, ‘The Critical Barrier’ (1997), 
20). Walter rejects the ‘ripeness’ theory, which posits that peace agreement are only successful where 
the necessary conditions are met, see Zartman, Ripe for Resolution (1989).  
152 John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty divide peace processes into five phases - ‘preparing for peace, 
negotiations, violence, peace accords, and peacebuilding’ (Darby and Mac Ginty, ‘Introduction’, 
Contemporary Peacemaking, edited by Darby and Mac Ginty (2008), 1). Bell, on the other hand, 
distinguishes three types of agreement within the peace process: pre-negotiation, framework or 
substantive and implementation (Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights (2000), 20–29). 
153 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), Article 2. 
154 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), Article 3.  
155 Bell, ‘Peace Agreements’ (2006), 381-2. 
156 Cassese, ‘The Status of Rebels’ (1981). 
157 Anaya, Indigenous People in International Law, (2004), 189. 
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system of states, where non-state actors have limited international legal entitlement.158  An 
exception was raised in the 1977 II Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (1949) 
which elevated wars of national liberation – considered narrowly as wars against colonial 
domination, alien occupation or racist regimes159 – to the status of international conflict, 
thereby conferring legal personality onto parties in such conflicts. In the same tradition, the 
right of peoples to self-determination accords legal recognition to people – particularly 
indigenous peoples – through the UN Charter. The applicability of the law of self-
determination is not fully formed – having originally been conceived as applying to the 
process of decolonisation. While this branch of law is relevant to understanding the 
applicability of international law to post-conflict situations, it does not have the force to grant 
legal recognition to non-state actors on the international level. Self-determination law has, 
however, become very relevant in determining the appropriate institutional arrangements to 
be included in peace agreements. As an accepted, though not fully formed, branch of 
international law, the law of self-determination has constitutional implications for the 
existence of a jus post bellum.160 
 
Peace Agreements as International Treaties 
 
The international legal status of a domestic peace agreement was at issue before the ICJ in a 
case concerning the sovereignty and armed activity on the territory of the DRC.161 The Court 
heard arguments from both parties on the jurisdiction and admissibility of the claim brought 
by the DRC against Rwanda for violations of international humanitarian law and human 
rights in breach of the International Bill of Rights, other international instruments, and 
mandatory Security Council Resolutions. In its claim, the DRC argued that the Court held 
jurisdiction over the dispute in accordance with, inter alia, the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, which grants the Court jurisdiction over violations of peremptory norms of 
human rights as reflected in international instruments.162 Rwanda counter-claimed that none 
of the provisions cited by the DRC in its application or customary international law granted 
jurisdiction to the Court in this matter. The Court, having entertained the separate arguments 
put forward by the DRC, found that the Court held no jurisdiction in this case.  
 
                                                 
158 See Cassese, ‘The Status of Rebels’ (1981). 
159 Protocol Addition to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, Article 1, para. 4.  
160 See above. 
161 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) [Democratic Republic of 
the Congo v. Rwanda], Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, ICJ. Reports 2006, p. 6. 
162 The DRC also claimed that Court held jurisdiction in accordance with Article 22 of the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; Article 29, 
paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; 
Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; Article 75 
of the Constitution of the World Health Organization; Article XIV, paragraph 2, of the Constitution of 
UNESCO and Article 9 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized 
Agencies; Article 30, paragraph 1, of the Convention against Torture; and Article 14 of the Montreal 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against The Safety of Civil Aviation.  
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While the application was not heard on its merits, the relevance of this case stands on the 
legality of the peace agreement. The DRC claimed that Rwanda had violated the Genocide 
Convention. Under Article IX, the Court has jurisdiction over any dispute in respect to the 
Convention.163 When Rwanda acceded to the Convention in 1975, they placed a reservation 
on Article IX. The DRC claimed that the reservation was no longer in effect and so the Court 
had jurisdiction in this matter. In so doing, the DRC argued that the Arusha Peace Agreement 
had constitutional status. As a part of the peace process, Rwanda signed a Protocol, 
committing them to removing all reservations on human rights instruments.164 The DRC 
maintained that the government was adhering to the Protocol when it adopted an executive 
decree in February 1995.165 In support of their argument, the DRC observed that the Arusha 
Agreement (of which the Protocol formed a part) was more than a domestic political 
agreement between the parties, but a part of the “constitutional ensemble”.166 In contention, 
Rwanda argued that the Agreement did not amount to an international treaty and so did not 
create any obligations for Rwanda with other states or the international community.167 The 
Court held that the decree was not recognised under international law; however, it did not 
directly address the question of whether the Arusha Agreement could be recognised as an 
international treaty, thereby creating international obligations with other states. 
Nonetheless, this case is of relevance as both sides contested the international legal status of 
a peace agreement. This issue has since been dealt with by other international courts.  
 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) was required to consider the legal status of the 
Lomé Agreement. The Court accepted that insurgents are bound by Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions, however, the requirement to comply with international humanitarian 
law does not, in the opinion of the Chamber, convey international legal personality which 
prevents the party from entering into an internationally bound and recognised treaty.168 The 
issue before the Court concerned the amnesty provision of the Lomé Agreement (signed 
between the government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)), which 
raised the question as to whether the RUF had treaty-making capacity. To that end, the Court 
concluded that ‘[i]nternational law does not seem to have vested [the RUF] with such 
                                                 
163 Article IX reads: Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, 
application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a 
State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the 
International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute. 
164 The Broad-Based Transitional Government shall ratify all International Conventions, Agreements 
and Treaties on Human Rights, which Rwanda has not yet ratified. It shall waive all reservations 
entered by Rwanda when it adhered to some of those International instruments. 
165 See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) [Democratic Republic 
of the Congo v. Rwanda], Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, ICJ. Reports 2006, p. 6, para. 4 
which gives the text of the decree.  
166 Ibid, para. 31.  
167 Ibid, para. 34.  
168 Prosecutor v. Kallon, Kamara, Decision on Jurisdiction, Nos. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), SCSL-
2004-16-AR72(E) (Mar. 13, 2004). 
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capacity. The RUF has no treaty-making capacity as to make the Lomé Agreement an 
international agreement’.169 The Court continued, 
 
The conclusion seems to follow clearly that the Lomé Agreement is neither a 
treaty nor an agreement in the nature of a treaty. However, it does not need to 
have that character for it to be capable of creating binding obligations and 
rights between the parties to the agreement in municipal [domestic] law. The 
consequence of its not being a treaty or an agreement in the nature of a treaty 
is that it does not create an obligation in international law.170  
 
The decision of the Court concerning the legal validity of the Agreement had bearing on its 
determination in the case, as the Court was bid to determine the validity of Article IX 
(concerning pardon and amnesty) of the Agreement which fell under international and not 
domestic law.  
 
The Court’s ruling is important for two reasons; it sets a precedent for the legal validity of 
peace agreements and on what may be included in a peace agreement under existing 
international law. For instance, under international law, a treaty cannot derogate from a 
recognised peremptory norm (or principle of jus cogens). In accordance with the Vienna 
Convention of the Law of Treaties (1969): 
 
A treaty is void, if at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory 
norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, 
a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and 
recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from 
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.171 
 
In other words, a peace agreement must be considered a treaty under international law for 
international treaty law to apply. As the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) found in the 
Kallon Case, peace agreements may not hold such status under international law. The Court, 
in addition to determining the treaty-making capacity of the insurgent group and the legal 
form of the peace accords, was had to determine if the Court held jurisdiction in this case. The 
defendant’s counsel argued that Article 10 of the Statute of the SCSL, disallowing the use of 
an amnesty against prosecution under the Court, conflicted with the Lomé Agreement, which 
provided amnesties in some instances, thereby barring the Court from hearing the case. In 
their findings, the Court concluded that: ‘The Lomé Agreement is not a treaty or an 
agreement in the nature of a treaty. The rights and obligations it created are to be regulated 
by the domestic laws of Sierra Leone’.172 While the Court found the peace agreement under 
                                                 
169 Ibid, para. 48. 
170 Ibid, para. 49. 
171 UN Charter, Article 53. 
172 Prosecutor v. Kallon, Kamara, Decision on Jurisdiction, Nos. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), SCSL-
2004-16-AR72(E) (Mar. 13, 2004). 
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consideration in this case not to have standing as an international legal treaty, there are legal 
arguments which would make the opposite case. Peace agreements are fashioned as legal 
treaties between states to grant them international legal standing, while incorporating non-
state entities as parties. For example, the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the 
Cambodia Conflict (1991) was signed by the Supreme National Council on behalf of Cambodia 
and other state parties. The Dayton Peace Agreement (1995) was signed by the Republic of 
Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a state 
recognised by the peace agreement. Similarly, the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement (1998) 
between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and 
the Government of Ireland is a multiparty agreement between Northern Irish domestic 
parties and an interstate treaty between the UK and Ireland.173 
 
If the peace agreement is accepted as a treaty under international law, it raise questions as to 
whether the subsequent constitution has any obligation to follow international law. If this is 
the case, peace agreement and post-conflict constitutions would need to observe general 
principle of international law. However, whether international law places concrete 
requirements on peace constitutions is not clearly established in practice or law. Even if the 
legal status of a peace agreement is in dispute, all states hold certain obligations under 
international law, and a peace agreement, whether signed by state or non-state parties, must 
comply with general international law.  
 
The requirement to fulfil any commitments under international human rights law, 
particularly political rights, is far less certain. As an example, in the Armed Activities case, 
Uganda counter claimed that the Lusaka Agreement (1999) legally sanctioned the presence 
of Ugandan troops on the territory of the DRC for the duration of the period ending 180 days 
from the signing of the agreement. The Court, however, rejected the counter claim, stating: 
The provisions of the Lusaka Agreement thus represented an agreed modus operandi for the 
parties. They stipulated how the parties should move forward. They did not purport to qualify 
the Ugandan military presence in legal terms. In accepting this modus operandi, the DRC did 
not “consent” to the presence of Ugandan troops. It simply concurred that there should be a 
process to end that reality in an orderly fashion. The DRC was willing to proceed from the 
situation on the ground as it existed and in the manner agreed as most likely to secure the 
result of a withdrawal of foreign troops in a stable environment. But it did not thereby 
recognize the situation on the ground as legal, either before the Lusaka Agreement or in the 
period that would pass until the fulfilment of its terms.174 
 
In its judgement, the Court determined that Uganda was in breach of its obligations under 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and was in violation of 
the principles of non-intervention and non-use of force. While finding in this case that the 
peace agreement in question did not impose norms on a state contrary to international law, 
the Court did not go any further in evaluating the legal status of i) the Lusaka Agreements, 
                                                 
173 Bell, On the Law of Peace (2008), 146. 
174 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo [Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda], 
Judgement, ICJ Reports 2005, 168, p. 243, para. 99.  
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ii) the parties to the accord, or iii) whether either party was in violation of the terms of the 
ceasefire. In other words, the Court refrained from clarifying many of the legal ambiguity of 
peace agreements under international law. What the Court did confirm, however, was that 
peace agreements, like other international treaties, cannot contravene international law.  
Power-Sharing Arrangements and the Law of Self-Determination  
 
The principle of self-determination is significant in a post-conflict state – although the 
principle is far from clearly established. The principle of self-determination was initially 
championed by Woodrow Wilson and Vladimir Lenin in the early 20th century.175 The 
principle is, however, contested. Self-determinations of peoples was ultimately included in 
UN Charter in Article 1(2)176 and later in the two 1966 International Covenants on Human 
Rights in common Article 1(1).177 While the provision on self-determination inserted into the 
1966 Covenants is more far reaching than that included in the UN Charter, it falls far short 
of a clear and definite law on the rights of peoples. 
 
On the face of it, as Ivor Jennings contended, self-determination ‘seemed reasonable: let the 
people decide. [However, it] was in practice ridiculous because the people cannot decide until 
someone decides who are the people’.178 The ICJ has ruled on self-determination in four 
instances. The Court in the Namibia Case (1971)179 accepted, in obiter dictum, a substantive 
right to self-determination in positive international law. The issue came before the Court 
again in 1975 in the advisory opinion on the question of Western Sahara.180 In this instance, 
the Court departed from its earlier judgment, in recognising self-determination as procedural, 
rather than substantive; moreover, it termed self-determination a principle, rather than as a 
right. The ruling of the Court in the East Timor case was clearer on the status of the principle 
of self-determination, finding in support of Portugal that ‘the right of the peoples to self-
determination, as it evolved from the Charter and from the United Nations practice, has an 
erga omnes character’.181 
 
The Court referred to self-determination in the Frontier Dispute case – concerning a frontier 
dispute between Mali and Burkina Faso182 – although in this cases self-determination was 
peripheral to the issue before the Court, considering the right of peoples to self-determination 
                                                 
175 Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples (1998). 
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182 Frontier Dispute [Burkina Faso v. The Republic of Mali], Judgement, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 554, 
para. 20. 
 35 
 
against the legal principle of uti possidetis. The law of self-determination exists in tension with 
the recognised rule of uti possidetis – a legal principle which emerged during the process of 
decolonisation. The ICJ, reasoned that: 
 
the principle of uti possidetis seems to have been first invoked and applied in 
Spanish America, inasmuch as this was the continent which first witnessed the 
phenomenon of decolonization involving the formation of a number of 
sovereign States on territory formerly belonging to a single metropolitan State. 
Nevertheless, the principle is not a special rule which pertains solely to one 
specific system of international law. It is a general principle, which is logically 
connected with the phenomenon of the obtaining of independence, wherever it 
occurs. Its obvious purpose is to prevent the independence and stability of new 
States being endangered by fratricidal struggles provoked by the challenging 
of frontier following the withdrawal of the administering power.183 
 
The effect of this rule is that applications of self-determination that do not comply with the 
conservative requirements of colonial self-determination or constitutional self-
determination184 are not generally recognised in international law. There are, however, very 
limited examples of where the full self-determination of people has been recognised – the most 
recent being the case of South Sudan, but also Eritrea and East Timor - two cases that were 
in fact lingering decolonisation bids. The one prominent exception in which self-
determination was claimed out with constitutional or colonial self-determination was the 
independence of Bangladesh, which seceded from Pakistan only with the backing of India.185   
 
The legal meaning of self-determination has implications for constitution-making – for 
example, democratic participation in the constitution writing process and passage of the final 
document are possibly required depending on the reading of self-determination law. Vivien 
Hart and Thomas Franck both argue that there is a right of democracy in international law. 
Hart’s argument builds on the work of Franck’s 1992 article on the emerging right of 
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184 Constitutional self-determination differs from colonial self-determination as the latter is ‘based 
directly in international law, [while] the claim to [constitutional] self-determination is derived from a 
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democratic governance under international law.186 Franck’s argument rests on the principles 
of liberal democracy and is supportive of the ‘liberal peace’ that liberal democracy is favourable 
to peace. This position on the merits of liberal democracy has also been criticised for its impact 
on the use of force doctrine and intervention, as it has no clear framework for introducing 
liberal democracy. It did, however, address a paradigm shift on the constraints in 
international law – legal scholars would have previously understood domestic institutions to 
be beyond the scope of international law and in the realm of constitutional law.  
 
Hart’s case rests on the meaning of ‘democratic participation’ in the UN Declaration of 
Human Rights187 and Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
which reads, 
 
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the 
distinctions ... and without unreasonable restrictions: (a) To take part in the 
conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) 
To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by 
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the 
free expression of the will of the electors; (c) To have access, on general terms 
of equality, to public service in his country.  
 
The effect of Hart’s argument is that a constitution that is not inclusive is not legitimate, or 
legal under international law. Normatively, public participation in the constitution-drafting 
process lends the constitution authority and legitimacy, however, in what way, at what point, 
or to what extent the public should participate in the constitution-making process is not clear 
for its effect on violence or its influence on the type of constitution that is negotiated. The 
principle of self-determination is far from clear legally or politically, and currently is not able 
to address questions on participation in constitutional politics and drafting.  
 
Self-determination is also relevant to the form of institutional arrangements that are put into 
place in the final agreement and the constitution. Power-sharing is a commonly used form of 
institutional arrangement in post-conflict settings, which grants recognition to certain 
groups. Power-sharing provisions may also allow for the creation of partially autonomous 
regions, reflecting the restricted self-determination of a people. The evidence emerging from 
such institutions is mixed, with the rights of self-determination potentially in tension with 
the provision of the peace agreements maintaining the territorial unity of the state. The 
benefits of power-sharing arrangement are highly contested for many reasons beyond this 
                                                 
186 Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’ (1992) Franck’s argument rests on the 
principles of liberal democracy and is supportive of the ‘liberal peace’ that liberal democracy is 
favourable to peace. This position on the merits of liberal democracy has also been criticised for its 
impact on the use of force doctrine and intervention, as it has no clear framework for introducing 
liberal democracy. It did, however, address a paradigm shift on the constraints in international law – 
legal scholars would have previously understood domestic institutions to be beyond their scope and in 
the realm of constitutional law (this shift has impacted on the fusion between the two branches of 
law).  
187 Article 21 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights.  
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immediate tension.188 Power-sharing arrangements, on the other hand, may also be the most 
reasonable approach to allow access to state institutions for minority groups. Consociational 
or federal power sharing arrangements grant some limited self-determination to groups, 
while maintaining territorial unity and upholding the principle of uti possidetis. The 
international legal norm of uti possidetis is evidence of the strength international law holds 
over political outcomes of non-international armed conflict.  
 
Political and Legal Authority and Legitimacy 
 
Legal and political authority of a peace agreement have no enforcement mechanism. All 
parties must equally accept the authority of the agreement for it to have any real effect, so 
that authority of the agreement is secondary to its enforcement, which is often weak or non-
existent. Further, peace agreements may bring into existence governments or institutions 
that did not previously exist, thereby establishing the authority that would hold the right to 
grant legitimacy to the agreement. Then again, where the legal authority of a peace 
agreement is contentious, the force of authority relies on political authority, as, in most 
instances, there is no legal enforcement mechanism. The institutional arrangements 
determined in the peace accord are temporary and functionally dependent upon the ability of 
the parties to the settlement to cooperate.  
 
Peace processes are intensely political acts that create political and legal documents. Not 
unlike the source of authority of a revolutionary constitution, peace agreements locate 
authority by the act of creation and the action of making peace. The force of the agreement is 
in each signature, the signatories being those who are party to the conflict, rather than third 
party actors, mutually undertaking to bind, impose and promise to perform or refrain from 
certain acts. In signing the agreement, they are consenting to its authority.  
 
Although there are many obstacles to the implementation of the agreement and the 
commitment by the parties may not be genuine, the text of the agreement is drafted with the 
belief it is final and binding. The moment a peace agreement is signed it can only hold the 
intention for peace, as it, in itself, cannot, in that act of signing, bring peace. Peace is, in the 
action of drafting and signing a peace agreement, nothing more than a promise. A promise 
that, like the Declaration of Independence, finds in the imagination the authority to constitute 
the peace agreement and, then, the new or revised constitution. Taking the argument Arendt 
developed in On Revolution further, a peace agreement may hold authority, not simply through 
its constitutional foundation, but through the later augmentation and amendment to that 
constitution, arguably, by way of judicial review.189    
                                                 
188 Sisk, ‘Power Sharing in Civil Wars’ in Contemporary Peacemaking, edited by Darby and Mac 
Ginty (2008), who argues that power sharing is only successful in the short term. 
189 ‘The very concept of Roman authority suggests that the act of foundation inevitably developed its 
own stability and permanence, and authority in this context is nothing more or less than a kind of 
necessary “augmentation” by virtue of which all innovations and changes remained tied back to the 
foundation which, at the same time, they augment and increase…the very authority of the American 
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Peace agreements are negotiated outside the domestic law of the state, still, in being 
implemented they are required in some way to fit into the domestic legal apparatus. Linking 
the agreement to a constitution is one such way of introducing binding domestic legal 
authority. Legal authority may also be acquired if the peace agreement obtains status as a 
constitutional document, and, in this way, gains ex post facto legal standing under the domestic 
law of the state.190 A peace agreement process is an instrument of conflict resolution, designed 
to find a compromised settlement between previously warring parties that differs in some 
form from the status quo ante, and which operates as a constitutional (re)arrangement.191 Peace 
agreements are, therefore, in substance and form constitutive documents, which may confer 
authority and legitimacy.192 The constitution also find authority in the peace agreement, 
making the peace agreement and constitution mutually constitutive. There is, however, a 
danger is subscribing constitutional status to the peace agreement, rather than undertaking 
a separate constitutional process (that may include legitimating factors as public 
participation).  
 
The other place authority can be located is in third party enforcement; either by a third-party 
state, an international peacekeeping force, or by international legal authority. For this reason, 
this chapter gives over much space to the concept of international legal authority. 
International legal authority may be externally imposed by the passing of a Security Council 
resolution giving force to the agreement.193 The UN Security Council has also authorised 
missions to oversee the implementation of a peace agreement, thereby underwriting the 
agreement, yet acting and existing outside and apart from the status of the agreement.194 
                                                 
Constitution resides in its inherent capacity to be amended and augmented’ Arendt, On Revolution 
([1963] 2006), 194. 
190 However, this may not always be the case – for example, the Dayton Peace Agreement and the 
Constitution for Bosnia and Herzegovina, included as annex 4 to the agreement, were not ratified by a 
domestic legislative body of BiH as the agreement itself brought into being the new state and its 
institutions. This quandary highlights the problem raised by Jacques Derrida in his essay on the 
Declaration of Independence: ‘The “we” of the declaration speaks “in the name of the people”. But 
this people does not yet exist. They do not exist as an entity, it does not exist, before this declaration, 
not as such. If it gives birth to itself, as free and independent subject, as possible signed [of the 
declaration], this can hold only in the act of the signature. The signature invents the signer. This 
signer can only authorize him- or herself to sign once he or she has come to the end, if one can say 
this, of his or her own signature, in a sort of fabulous retroactivity’. Derrida, ‘Declarations of 
Independence’ (1986), 10 quoted in Honig, ‘Declarations of Independence (1991), 104. 
191 Bell, ‘Peace Agreements’ (2006), 374 and Lesaffer ‘Peace Treaties and the Formation of 
International Law’, in The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law, edited by 
Fassbender and Peters (2012), 92. 
192 Raz, ‘On the Authority and Interpretations’ in Between Authority and Interpretation edited by 
Raz (2009). 
193 For example, UN SC Res 1023 (1995) concerning the Croatian Erdut Agreement of 1995 and UN 
SC Res 1244 (1999) concerning the situation in Kosovo and the Rambouillet Accords (see Bell, On 
the Law of Peace (2008), 156-157).  
194 For example, UN SC Res 745 (1992) which established the UN Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC) to ensure and oversee the implementation of the 1991 Comprehensive Peace 
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Peace agreements may also be categorised as treaties under international law resting their 
authority (and legitimacy) on this branch of law.195 These categories of legalization196 are 
limited, however, as none provide force. 
 
The discussion of authority raises the analogous question on legitimacy. In practical terms, 
the legitimacy of peace agreements is suspect, as many are negotiated, drafted, and 
implemented by parties that hold power through violence rather than authority. Although 
not democratic, the act of making written promises may be sufficient as a source of 
legitimacy.197 Legitimacy is also granted through the involvement of the people (although in 
what form this participation occurs will also have implications of the legitimacy of the 
agreement). The outside intervention of third parties, for example, the UN acting as the voice 
of the international community and representative of its normative beliefs, may also bring 
legitimacy to the agreement. Finally, in the act of violence, the legitimacy of authority is 
uncertain, by restoring peace, the agreement may find own self-fulfilling legitimacy.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Peace agreements, as much as the peace they are aiming for, are elusive. Peace agreements 
are written documents agreed by the parties to a conflict with the intention of ending that 
conflict. Peace is, in the action of drafting and signing a peace agreement, nothing more than 
a promissory act, but by the very action of making it, grants authority for its implementation 
and authorizes the constitution that follows it. A constitution, or any law, may also be thought 
of as an act of promise. All laws are a promise, or contract, between the people and the state. 
A constitution is a higher form of that promise, one that is intergenerational and temporal. It 
is a promise by the drafters to the present and the future, and to the future, those not yet even 
born, to the past. It is a promise across people of a state to hold to the aspirations and intent 
of the constitution, and to abandon a state of violence for that of peace.  
 
The distinction between war and peace is legally vague, yet the laws of war and peace have a 
long legal standing.  The purpose of this brief review of the laws of war and peace is to 
untangle the legal ambiguity between states of war and states of peace, a distinction that 
informs the legal status of a peace agreement. Paradoxically, international law is critical to 
                                                 
Agreement, which under Annex 5 set out principles of the constitution. UNTAC concluded its 
mission following the adoption of the new constitution and formation of the new government in 
September 1993. A similar example is Timor Leste, where the UN established the UN Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) following the peace agreement between Indonesia and 
Portugal on the self-determination of Timor Leste which took administrative responsibility over the 
territory for its transition (UN SC Res 1272). UN involvement in post-conflict Afghanistan followed a 
similar process (ibid).  
195 This status is more complicated as both state and non-state actors are parties to the treaties, and 
some non-state actors are not recognised under the Law of Treaties (see section on the legality of 
peace agreements under international law). However, UN Security Council Resolutions have the force 
of law, so that treaties may become recognised under international law through this process.  
196 See Abbott et al., ‘The Concept of Legalisaization’ (2000). 
197 Honig, ‘Declarations of Independence’ (1991), 103. 
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the formation of peace agreements while, on the other hand, peace agreements have been an 
‘informative and constitutive source’ of international law.  International treaty law established 
obligations between states only, and as such sits in awkward tension with peace agreements 
negotiated in intrastate conflicts – the form of conflict now more common than interstate 
wars. Thus, the ambiguous status of peace agreements under international law raises 
questions as to their legitimacy and authority.  
 
Peace agreements are hybrid international and domestic legal treaties. As international legal 
treaties, with both international, domestic state and non-state actors, negotiated outside the 
domestic law of the state, they may be hold legal status under international law and in 
accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and customary law (as upheld 
by international law courts). As legal documents binding domestic actors to a resolution of a 
conflict, they are also required in some way to fit into the domestic legal system. It is by 
incorporating the peace agreement into the constitution, or in the action of the peace 
agreement and constitution being mutually constitutive, that the agreement finds authority 
in the domestic legal structure. The next chapter turns to defining the peace constitution. 
The intention of the chapter is to consider the dilemmas that are attached to drafting such 
constitutional arrangements, including, questioning the role of the international community, 
political and military, the sequencing of the political settlement, and issues of participation 
and inclusion.  
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Chapter Two: The Peace Constitution 
 
 
 
 
 
CONSTITUTIONS ARE OFTEN promulgated in moments of political crisis198 or violence, 
be it a revolution, a transition to democratic rule, a rebellion against colonial occupation to 
self-rule, or at the end of war. The constitutions adopted by post-colonial states were greatly 
influenced by the system of their former colonial power. British colonial states often adopted 
systems of parliamentary sovereignty, exported by legal jurists such as Sir Ivor Jennings. 
The constitutions in many of these newly independent states were quickly replaced after the 
(violent) overthrow of the first post-colonial government or following civil war. 
Constitutions, for example, were also drafted as a response to the Arab Spring revolutions 
and the fall of the old dictatorial regimes. The transitions in Iraq199 and Afghanistan,200 
following the international-led interventions, included constitution-making processes to lend 
legitimacy to the new governing regimes and to introduce stability to the war-torn states. 
New constitutions were also necessary in transitioning post-Communist Eastern European 
states.  
 
A compromise constitution cannot be understood as an end-point if it is to function in a deeply 
divided state emerging from high-level conflict. To view the constitution as a process (a 
‘means’) rather than a codified set of rules (an ‘end’), perhaps requiring several iterations, 
breaks with the traditional understanding of the constitution as an entrenched and lasting 
document. An enduring constitution has value by promising stability and democracy. 
However, it may also have the harmful effect of holding the constitutional settlement to a 
moment of time, one constrained by necessary compromise. Constitution-making in a divided 
society may allow for an intermission, an occasion to craft some sort of national identity – or 
at the very least, civility. Beyond the functionality of the constitution-making process, Sujit 
Choudhry suggests that ‘against the backdrop of division and a lack of trust, the process of 
debating and negotiating a constitution can also help to create the political community on 
whose existence the constitutional order which results from that process depends’.201 While 
a constitution may be intended to create and capture the emerging political settlement that is 
                                                 
198 Ackerman, ‘The Storrs Lectures’ (1984) on the ‘constitutional moment’. The archetypical 
examples of constitutions written following a resolution are the French and American cases in the 
18th century. The Arab Spring revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia, as more recent examples, would also 
be included in this category. 
199 Ginsburg et al., ‘Baghdad, Tokyo, Kabul’ (2008), 1139 suggest that the 2005 Iraqi Constitution 
‘has not been able to ameliorate, and may even have exacerbated, a problem of instability and 
political disintegration’. Iraq is a case where the constitution is tied to violence, an issue that is 
addressed in this thesis.     
200 Their, ‘The Making of the Constitution in Afghanistan’ (2007). 
201 Choudhry, ‘Introduction’, in Constitutional Design for Divided Societies, edited by Choudhry 
(2008), 6. 
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the result of a peace process, and in so doing, to find a (re)newed commitment to the political 
pact, a peace constitution is, by necessity, a compromised and imperfect document, more of a 
‘dirty deal than a commitment to the political right.’202 The drafting process may not be one 
of high-minded negotiation but a continuation of the conflict through other means,203 which 
may not allow for the national healing that many hope it could be.  
 
Constitutions are very rarely (if ever) drafted under ideal conditions. As Jon Elster wrote, ’the 
task of constitution-making generally emerges in conditions that are likely to work against 
good constitution-making.’204 Peace constitution must balance against competing time 
pressures, between the need to find a resolution to the conflict, and the space required to find 
compromise. Adding to these pressures is the international community, which often imposes 
deadlines on parties at both the peace-making and constitution-making stages. The 
requirements made by the international community are often tied to financial and strategic 
support. While the international community frequently becomes involved in the political 
settlement process in some capacity, it is without any accountability. The role of the 
international community brings normative benefits and can lend some legitimacy to the 
process; however, they also hold to certain normative requirements, such as participation, 
which may be harmful to the process. These three dilemmas, timing and sequencing, the role 
of the international community and participation and inclusion, are each considered in this 
chapter.205 
 
Since 1990, twenty-three cases of peace and constitution-building would recognizably be 
defined as ‘peace constitutions’. These are: Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burundi, 
Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Comoros, the DRC, El Salvador, East 
Timor, Egypt, Guinea, Iraq, Kenya, Kosovo, Madagascar, Mozambique, Nepal, Bougainville 
(Papua New Guinea), Rwanda, South Africa and Zimbabwe.206 There are also cases where 
constitutions are currently being drafted alongside a peace process, these are Yemen, Somalia, 
and Libya. This chapter will refer to several of these processes in addressing the dilemmas 
that are present in the political settlement and peace constitution-making process. 
 
However, attention will be given to three of these examples, Burundi, the DRC and Nepal, in 
the last section to illustrate the importance of continued violence for peace constitutions. 
Violence and peace are always in tension, and where peace does exist (even in its most basic 
                                                 
202 Bell ‘Bargaining on Constitutions’ (2017), 21. 
203 A peace constitution and the constitutionalization of conflict is ‘a language and a set of 
institutional arrangements contrived to deliver the continuation of the conflict through politics’ or 
‘Clausewitz in reverse’ (Bell, On the Law of Peace 2008, 200).  
204 Elster, ‘Forces and Mechanisms’ (1995), 394. 
205 This section (and conclusions of the thesis) are influenced by the outcome of a workshop held by 
International IDEA on political settlements in December 2015. See Sapiano et. al., ‘Constitution-
Building in Political Settlement Processes’ (2016). The report identifies the same three themes in the 
political settlement process (timing and sequencing; participation and inclusion; and the role of the 
international community).  
206 There are the twenty-three cases identified by the authors if the International IDEA policy paper, 
‘Bell and Zulueta-Fülsher, ‘Sequencing Peace Agreements’ (2016). 
 43 
 
form) it is at risk of collapsing in violence, especially in a place where conflict is recent or 
systemic. A peace constitution, as a part of the political settlement, is intended to bring an 
end to the physical violence of conflict, and to capture the underlying political settlement. 
Nepal and the DRC, particularly, have had heavy outside involvement, from both the UN, 
regional states, and the wider international community. Further, Burundi and the DRC are 
examples of where incumbent leaders are attempting ‘constitutional coups’ (the President of 
Burundi has been more successful in this than his counterpart in the DRC). Finally, Burundi 
is a strong example of where constitutional courts can be used by the government to 
undermine the political settlement, by acting against the purpose of the peace constitution. 
The background of the three cases is considered briefly to provide context, before turning to 
dilemmas that are distinct to peace constitutions: process and timing; the international 
community; and participation and inclusion.  
 
The Peace Agreement as a Constitution  
 
The authority of the peace constitution is valid, in part, because the previous constitutional 
order lacked authority. However, if the violent (and then peaceful) replacement of the old 
constitution held authority, and if the peace agreement framed itself as existing beyond that 
constitutional order, then locating authority for the new constitution may lack the necessary 
grounding. Bell makes this argument: 
 
Framing peace agreements as constitutions can also be counter-productive in 
terms of compliance. Constitutional status gives rise to questions about the 
relationship of the peace agreement constitution to the past constitutional 
order. Peace agreement constitutions tend to supplant existing constitutions 
outside their established processes for revision or replacement. The 
constitution of the [Dayton Peace Agreement], for example, did not refer to or 
acknowledge the previous Bosnian constitution, or attempt to work within its 
legal framework. Peace agreements in Liberia explicitly provided that they 
were ‘extra-constitutional’, while agreements in Sierra Leone framed 
themselves as outside the pre-existing constitutional order more implicitly. A 
peace agreement's claim to constitutional validity lies in the lack of legitimacy 
of the previous constitution (and by implication the state), and the need to 
negotiate an end to the violence which reflects the question-mark over the 
state's legitimacy.207 
 
The granting of authority to the new constitution, however, may also provide legitimacy to 
the new political leaders, who under the previous order were rebels or warlords.208 So that 
while a new constitution may be a break from the past, unless there is a complete destruction 
                                                 
207 Bell, On the Law of Peace (2008), 152. 
208 Again, Gathii, ‘Popular Authorship and Constitution Making’ (2008), 1111 makes this point, citing 
Uganda and the DRC as examples where the new constitution legitimised former warlords through 
elections. 
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of the old order, something of the past must be brought into the new settlement.209 A peace 
constitution can never fully disentangle itself from its violent origin or the political power 
structure that existed as part of the conflict. Still, a constitution may find authority (and 
legitimacy) if it is able to constrain the power of the former warlords and rebels, that is, if the 
constitution becomes self-enforcing.210 This may be the peace constitutions most likely route 
to legitimacy – however, if it is unable to constrain violence as it was intended to do, it may 
quickly loose that legitimacy, putting the whole of the political settlement in jeopardy.  
 
A peace constitution is intended to be an actual as well as a symbolic rejection of violent 
politics and way of doing business in the past. The promises in a new constitution may break 
the authority of the past constitution.  The South African Constitutional Court made this 
point in a judgment on the constitutionality of the death penalty:  
 
The South African Constitution ... represents a decisive break from and a 
ringing rejection of, that part of the past which is disgracefully racist, 
authoritarian, insular, and repressive and a vigorous identification of and 
commitment to a democratic, universalistic, caring and aspirationally 
egalitarian ethos, expressly articulated in the Constitution. The contrast 
between the past which it repudiates and the future to which it seeks to commit 
the nation is stark and dramatic. 211 
 
A peace constitution is, potentially, a mechanism of conflict resolutions; however, there is 
equal cause to warm against seeing the peace constitution in this way, as constitutions 
negotiated during violence or the continued threat of a return to violence, will have ‘heavily 
negotiated outcome[s], often involving an exchange of incommensurables rather than a 
                                                 
209 See Ginsburg et al., ‘Baghdad, Tokyo, Kabul’ (2008), 1143 on constitution making in occupied 
states, comparing the experiences of Japan in the 1940s and Iraq in 2003-5. 
210 Ibid. 
211 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 262. This case is particularly relevant in the context 
of this thesis. First, the issue of the death penalty was an example of where it was generally thought to 
be supported by public opinion, however, the Court determined in this case that the use of the death 
penalty (under the Criminal Procedures act 1971) violated the Constitution (right to life and cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment). The use of the death penalty was not included in the 
new 1993 Constitution – this is an example where the commitment to public participation in 
constitution-making can be at odds with international liberal norms (see Sapiano et. al., ‘Constitution-
Building in Political Settlement Processes’ (2016), 17) – however, the Court determined that they held 
jurisdiction (rather than leaving the issue to Parliament) – see para 87-89. In so doing, the Court 
referred to the first case before the newly established Constitutional Court (S v Zuma and Two Others 
1995 (2) SA 642 (CC)) in which the judgment referred to R v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. [1985] 1 S.C. R. 
295, p. 34 in support of the position that the purpose of the constitution (and context in which it is 
drafted) is relevant. This case is also relevant for referring to the aspirations of the Constitution – a 
topic discussed below. Finally, the judgment of this case refers to foreign jurisprudence and law, and 
international law, as a clear example of constitutional borrowing.  
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coherent plan for conflict reduction’212 which may include ‘partial or even conflicting 
innovations’.213  
 
Process and Timing 
 
A peace constitution is a constitution that is, in some way, attached to the peace-making 
process; however, the sequence of the peace agreement and constitution are not necessarily 
linear. Still, the concept is in some ways conditioned on a peace agreement having been 
drafted before the constitution, for without the institutional and transitional arrangements of 
the peace agreement settled, the foundation of the constitution is hard to locate, and the 
structure of the post bellum state is impossible to know. Nonetheless, the process does not 
necessarily follow this sequence. The ideal political settlement process would be mapped out 
and contingent on the requirements of the situation and the capacity of the parties (especially, 
the level of engagement from the international community). The intention of the process often 
is to be logical; however, the always moving situation on the ground, and the continuing 
tensions between ending violence and establishing longer term peace, the demands of 
inclusion against those of the political and military elite, the potentially damaging impact of 
spoilers, the pressures of time and the engagement, financially, militarily (peacekeeping) and 
politically, of the international community will influence the sequencing of events. 
  
Broadly, there are four categories of sequencing within which most political settlement 
processes would fit.214 A partial peace agreement (or ceasefire) may require a new constitution 
(or the amendment of an old constitution). A transitional political arrangement may also be 
put in place which will be followed by a new constitution. An interim constitution may act as 
a peace agreement, and followed by a final constitution. Finally, a combination of a 
transitional constitutional arrangement and then an interim constitution may precede a final 
constitution.   
 
The usefulness of the political settlement process is that it allows for a space to be established 
that is distinct and separate from the violence and conflict.215 This space, possibly facilitated 
by the international community, or a third-party actor, allows for the development of trust 
and cooperation to develop between parties. This consensus-building however requires time, 
which may not be available because of the more immediate demands of ending the conflict. 
The timing, and the imposition of deadlines, is a constant trade-off that needs to be based on 
the context of the situation.  
 
                                                 
212 Horowitz, ‘Conciliatory Institutions’ (2008), 1230. 
213 Ibid, 1226-7. 
214 Bell and Zulueta-Fülsher, ‘Sequencing Peace Agreements’ (2016). The four categories listed in the 
report were based on the analysis of the twenty-three cases listed.  
215 While the political settlement process is intended to promote trust between parties, this is almost 
immediately put to the test with elections where parties must then engage in ‘friendly’ elections. I owe 
this point to Charmaine Rodrigues (2015 ICON-S Conference, NYU Law School). 
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There is uncertainty as to what point in the process the parties should turn to constitution-
drafting. Premature constitution-drafting processes are being held in Libya, Yemen and 
Somalia, while the conflict is each of these states is not yet settled; consequently, there are 
concurrent processes of constitution-making and peace-building in these three states. This 
now also seems to be the strategy in Syria. The timeline for the peace process set out by 
International Syria Support Group (ISSG) in the Vienna communique of 14 November 2015 
and in United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254 was that an inclusive national 
dialogue would be set up following the cessation of conflict and the establishment of a 
transitional government. However, in March 2016, it was announced that Russia and the 
United States would cooperate with Syria to produce a new constitution by August 2016. A 
constitution has yet to be produced. Current peace talks are also stalemated.  
 
Protracted conflicts, like that is Syria, may take years to settle. For example, the sixty-year 
civil war in Colombia has broken down over time. The Movimiento 19 de Abril (April 19 
Movement, M-19), and other rebel groups, moved into politics as part of the 1991 
constitution-writing process, which were boycotted by the FARC and Ejército de Liberación 
Nacional (National Liberation Army, ELN). The peace process with the FARC was resumed 
in 2012, under the current government, and finalised in a deal (rejected in the October 2016 
referendum) in September 2016. Negotiations with the ELN are currently taking place in 
Havana.   
 
As an example of a temporary constitutional measure, an interim constitution was adopted in 
Nepal following the signing of the peace agreement. The interim constitution was completed 
by a 15-member commission over July and August 2006, based largely on the 1990 
Constitution, was passed on 15 January 2007. The interim constitution was silent on some 
key issues because of a lack of agreement, including the role of the monarchy. The decision to 
remove the monarchy was eventually voted on at the first meeting of the elected Constituent 
Assembly. Significantly, the 2007 Constitution (and the 2015 Constitution) reworded the 
preamble, towards more inclusive language that gave authority to the people. 
 
The International Community 
 
The role and impact (both in the short and long term) of external actors in the political 
settlement process needs to be better understood. Engagement with and management of the 
parties involved in a conflict and the civilians who have been its victims, is an involved process 
and requires highly skilled mediator(s). 216  For example, a necessary consideration for those 
managing a peace process is which parties should be allowed to sit at the negotiation table.217  
There is a lingering fear that one or more parties may disrupt or destroy the process once a 
compromise has been reached for their own gains. Parties may also choose to manipulate the 
process. Ceasefire agreements, as an example, are as much a tactic of war as they are a means 
                                                 
216 Several scholars have written on this matter, to name but a few, IW Zartman, J Bercovitch, and TD 
Sisk. 
217 See Stedman, ‘Spoiler Problems’ (1997). 
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of halting fighting.218 Another consideration, politically and legally, is the granting of 
amnesties to those alleged to have committed atrocities219 in the broader interest of bringing 
all parties to the negotiating table.220 The impact of these decisions bares heavily on the final 
agreement and the success of the peace.  
 
The UN is the principal international legal and administrate institution in managing conflict 
resolution and post-conflict recovery; it and other international actors and states have become 
increasingly involved in the these previously sovereign processes. The management of a peace 
process is not a simple exercise, and often draws in third-party actors and interlocutors. The 
UN, as an assuming neutral party, frequently holds this place. As a project, the UN was 
founded to use peaceful means to prevent the eruption of war, requiring all members to do so 
under Article 2(3).221 The Charter further requests that: 
 
[t]he parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution 
by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, 
resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their 
own choice.222 
 
In its first decades, the activity of the UN, in the context of the Cold War, was, if not 
gridlocked, chiefly reactive. In its efforts to stave off war, the UN moved further from its 
target of international peacemaker toward attempts to affect the peace through Chapter VII 
missions (although rare) and the improvised institution of peacekeeping.  
 
The UN, however, is inching in the direction of its early raison d’etre, having launched the 
Department of Political Affairs (DPA) as its pioneering unit of preventative diplomacy and 
                                                 
218 As one example, the parties to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (1999) were not genuinely 
committed to end the hostilities but rather a deliberate strategy to realign the military and political 
balance so that within months the Agreement became irrelevant, Roessler and Prendergast, 
‘Democratic Republic of the Congo’, in Twenty-Frist Century Peace Operations, edited by Durch 
(2006), 223.  
219 This issue was given some consideration in this thesis, albeit tangentially, as it concerned the 
Kallon Case before the Special Court for Sierra Leone. The purpose of addressing the case in this 
context is the reasoning of the decision on the international legal validity of the Lomé Agreement; 
however, the case was also concerned with the legality of the amnesties included in the agreement. 
220 There is a continuing and ardent academic and practical disagreement on the value of ‘peace vs 
justice’ (see, as one example, Lekha Sriram, Confronting Past Human Rights Violations (2004.). The 
literature in this debate is considerable and is not engaged with here; however, the narrative will come 
up again in evaluating the possible existence of a jus post bellum. If such a body of international law 
exists (and if the granting or not of amnesties is legally proscribed) the appeal of the law becomes 
normative.   
221 ‘All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that 
international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered’. (Article 2(3), UN Charter, 1945) 
222 Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) Article 33(1).  
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peace-making.223 The DPA is now the face of the Secretary-General ‘good offices’ initiatives 
and contains the Policy and Mediation Division (PMD). The Mediation Support Unit (MSU) 
is under the organisation structure of the PMD. The Unit is the ‘central hub for mediation 
support’, providing three key services: ‘(1) technical and operation support for peace 
processes; (2) strengthening of mediation capacity of the United Nations, its partners, and 
parties to a conflict; and (3) development and dissemination of mediation guidance,224 lessons 
learned and best practices’.225 The Unit is also home to the Standby Team of Mediation 
Experts, established in 2008, which is set to intervene in a peace process with a set stock of 
competencies to aid the parties through the negotiations. On the stand-by team, there is an 
expert in constitution-making, alongside specialists in process design, gender and social 
inclusion, natural resources, security arrangements, and power-sharing.226 The first General 
Assembly Resolution on peace mediation was passed in June 2011,227 which called on the 
Secretary General to develop guidance on this issue. In 2012, the UN published, as an annex 
to the Secretary General’s report ‘Strengthening the role of mediation in the peaceful settlement of 
disputes, conflict prevention and resolution’228 and the United Nations Guidance for Effective 
Mediation handbook ‘to support professional and credible mediation efforts around the world’. 
Added to the recent efforts of the UN in pushing mediation as a mechanism of conflict 
resolution, the Peacebuilding Commission was formed in 2005 by mandate of the Security 
Council229 and the General Assembly230 to coordinate resources and to advise on post conflict 
recovery. All this activity is in addition to the UN’s more long-established231 role in 
international peacekeeping. 
 
The United Nations Development Programme has separate staff and offices for the peace-
making and constitution-making programmes. However, the UN232 is beginning to 
                                                 
223 ‘Role of the Department of Political Affairs’, UN Department for Political Affairs website, 
http://www.un.org/undpa/overview 
224 United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation, issued as an annex to the Secretary-General 
Report, Strengthening the Role of Mediation in the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Conflict 
Prevention and Resolution (A/66/811, 25 June 2012). 
225 ‘Mediation Support Activities and Services’, UN Peacemaker website, 
<http://peacemaker.un.org/mediation-support/activities-and-services>. 
226 See UN Peacemaker website <http://peacemaker.un.org/mediation-support/stand-by-team> for a 
list of the 2016 standby team, including specialities and bibliographies.  
227 General Assembly Resolution 65/283.  
228 Secretary-General Report, Strengthening the Role of Mediation in the Peaceful Settlement of 
Disputes, Conflict Prevention and Resolution (A/66/811, 25 June 2012).  
229 Resolution 1645 (2005), 20 December 2005. 
230 General Assembly Resolution 60/180, 20 December 2005.  
231 Peacekeeping is an improvised institution having been originally shaped as a solution to a specific 
political problem; however, the deployment of peacekeeping missions in regular practice by the 
Security Council, often following a ceasefire or peace accord between the parties. For this reason, 
peacekeeping is viewed as an accepted practice of the UN.  
232 Includes: Department of Political Affairs (DPA); Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(DPKO); 
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concentrate resources on constitution-building projects, as part of their comprehensive peace 
building program.233 The inclusion of international actors in the peace process has allowed 
for more international involvement in the constitution-drafting process. There is, however, a 
danger of the international community taking on too large a role in this process, raising 
questions of authority and legitimacy of the constitution. 234 
 
But the UN Charter is not the only international organisation that includes a reference to the 
peaceful resolution of conflicts in its charter. There are similar provisions in the Constitutive 
Act of the African Union,235 the Charter of the Arab League,236 and the Charter of the 
Organisation of American States.237 These organisations, along with the Organisation of 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),238 the European Union (EU),239 and the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)240 have also acted as mediators in 
the resolution of civil and international conflicts.  
 
There has been renewed attention in the past few years on military interventions (for 
example, the case of Libya under NATO). Despite the best efforts of the UN, there continues 
                                                 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); UN Development Programme 
(UNDP); UN Children's Fund (UNICEF); and UN Women. Together these six entitles produce the 
UN Constitutional (a newsletter on UN constitutional support), 
<http://peacemaker.un.org/Constitutions/Newsletter>.  
233 Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations Assistance to Constitution-making 
Processes. 
234 This topic has been looked at quite widely (although not in the context of a peace constitution). 
See, for example, al Ali and Thiruvengadam, ‘The Competing Effect of National Uniqueness’ in 
Routledge Handbook of Constitutional Law, edited by Tushnet, Fleiner and Saunders (2013), 46; al 
Ali, ‘Constitution Drafting and External Influence’, in Comparative Constitutional Law, edited by 
Ginsburg and Dixon (2011). 
235 Article 4(e): ‘peaceful resolution of conflicts among Member States of the Union through such 
appropriate means as may be decided upon by the Assembly’. The Constitutive Act of the African 
Union also condemns and rejects unconstitutional changes of government (Article 4(p)). 
236 Article V: ‘Any resort to force in order to resolve disputes between two or more member-states of 
the League is prohibited. If there should arise among them a difference which does not concern a 
state's independence, sovereignty, or territorial integrity, and if the parties to the dispute have recourse 
to the Council for the settlement of this difference, the decision of the Council shall then be 
enforceable and obligatory… The Council shall mediate in all differences which threaten to lead to 
war between two member-states, or a member-state and a third state, with a view to bringing about 
their reconciliation’. 
237 Article 25: ‘The following are peaceful procedures: direct negotiation, good offices, mediation, 
investigation and conciliation, judicial settlement, arbitration, and those which the parties to the 
dispute may especially agree upon at any time’. 
238 The OSCE has been involved in the peace processes in the South Caucuses. 
239 The EU, for example, mediated the conflict between Georgia and Russia in 2008. 
240 ECOWAS participated in the peacekeeping, mediation and/or preventative diplomacy efforts in 
Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Niger, Côte D’Ivoire, Togo, Guinea and Mali. ECOWAS 
established the Mediation Facilitation Division in June 2015, on the back of a 2012 Assessment 
Workshop. For more see Odigie, ‘The Institutionalisation of Mediation Support’ (2016). 
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to be a global need to rethink how to better resolve conflict, to find more productive methods 
of resolving war, and to explore more likely ways to prevent conflicts from emerging. 
International intervention in conflict has adopted the terminology of ‘Responsibility to 
Protect’, however, the conflicts where the doctrine was used as justification for military 
intervention have not been settled. This has left Libya, where the doctrine was used to support 
UN sanctioned airstrikes against the Qaddafi regime,241 in a state of conflict while there are 
efforts to draft a new constitution.  
 
There is a consensus that human rights and democratic norms are legally binding on states, 
and that they are, therefore, required to introduce those norms into their domestic 
constitution.242 However, there is some tension between the demands made by international 
law and the international community on the content of the constitution and the normative 
belief that the constitution ought to be drafted by the people and for the people. That is not 
to suggest that the two should be in tension, but rather that the foundation of the constitution 
is uncertain when the source of its authority is in question. There are also necessary questions 
that must be asked about the role of the international ‘expert’. Again, there is a tension 
between the generalizable advice that such an outside participate can provide and the local 
context that must be brought into the constitution to speak to both the past and the future.243  
How these tensions can be reconciled is a critical area of continuing research that sits 
alongside issues on comparative methodology and the ability to account for both the 
commonalities and the differences.244 
 
Participation and Inclusion 
 
In peace processes and agreements, like constitutions, the inclusion of ‘the people’ is (or ought 
to be) necessary. Peace agreements are often conducted behind closed doors, which may be 
required for the success of the outcome. However, the secrecy in which these documents are 
negotiated and drafted may have a deleterious effect on their perceived legitimacy and 
implementation. That said, a peace agreement, even if negotiated in closed sessions, may 
acquire broader acceptance if it is implemented. 
 
                                                 
241 Pattison, in his introduction to a special issue on Libya and Responsibility to Protect in Ethics and 
International Affairs, suggests that ‘[t]he RtoP doctrine was invoked in Security Council Resolutions 
1970 and 1973 and, more generally, in the political and public debates on the crisis and the 
subsequent intervention. Libya, then, is likely to be perceived as the first major case—and perhaps the 
test case—of the doctrine’. Pattison, ‘Introduction’ (2011), 2. However, in his contribution to the 
issue, Pattison is apprehensive of the ethics of the NATO-led intervention.  
242 See Franck ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’ (1992) and Hart, ‘Constitution-
Making and the Right to Take Part’ in Framing the State, edited by Miller (2010) and Hart, 
‘Constitution-Making’ (2001). See also Franck and Thiruvengadam, ‘Norms of International Law’, in 
Framing the State, edited by Miller (2010) and Saunders, ‘The Impact of Internationalisation on 
National Constitution’, in Constitutionalism in Asia, edited by Chen (2014). 
243 See al Ali, ‘Constitutional Legitimacy in Iraq’ in Constitutionalism in Islamic Countries, edited by 
Grote and Röder (2012). 
244 See Saunders, ‘Towards a Global Constitutional Gene Pool’ (2009). 
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There is, however, concern that inclusion in the political settlement process may introduce 
instability and prevent a settlement from being agreed. There are also concerns as to who 
should be included. For example, which civil society groups can claim to be representative 
and how is that claim to be assessed. Where the constituent assembly (or legislature) is 
elected, can civil society make a claim to be more representative than those that have been 
elected? There is danger that those who are included are the ones with the most power or 
authority. Further, the presence at the table does not necessarily result in access to power or 
a voice in the process.245 
 
However, there has been a move towards increased participation and inclusivity since the 
post-apartheid South African constitution-making process. For this reason, the same 
measures that were imposed on the Bosnian peace process, the holding of the negotiations on 
a US military base with no participation by the population, could not be replicated.246 Nicolas 
‘Fink’ Haysom, currently the Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan (previously the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the UN Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan (from 2014, and Deputy from 2012); Director for Political, Peacekeeping and 
Humanitarian Affairs in the Executive Office of the UN Secretary-General from 2007 to 2012; 
and Head of the Office of Constitutional Support for the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq 
(UNAMI) from 2005 to 2007) noted in an interview with UN Constitutional Newsletter:  
 
If the object of a constitution is an inclusive, democratic society, then the 
process must also encourage broad ownership and participation. The notion of 
a few wise “men” drafting a good constitution has been broadly rejected – no 
matter how technically sound the result... [I]n regard to both design and 
substance, constitution-making can be a profoundly disaggregating, 
fragmenting experience. This is especially so in post-conflict countries, the ones 
most likely to relapse into conflict. Divisions will manifest and indeed be 
brought out sharply - as they must be. For this reason, one should approach 
constitution-making with the twin obligations of: (1) transparent and candid 
engagement of the country’s divisive problems; (2) but also of maximizing the 
nationbuilding moment of constitutionmaking, the celebration of shared and 
common values247  
 
The constitution-drafting process in Tunisia was participatory and inclusive, and the 
resulting constitution has so far been considered a success. The Tunisian National Dialogue 
Quartet (a coalition including the union federation UGTT, the employers’ institute, the 
Tunisian human rights league and the order of lawyers) was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize 
                                                 
245 See, for example, some of the feminist literature on political settlements, such as Ní Aoláin, ‘The 
Relationship of Political Settlement’ (2016). 
246 The US attempted to do this in Iraq in 2005 by moving the negotiations to the US embassy in 
Bagdad, allowing them to control who (physically) participated in the negotiations. Although this 
strategy worked for Bosnia (as well as in Japan and Germany after the Second World War), it failed in 
Iraq. See Haysom et al. History of the Iraqi Constitution-Making Process (2005). 
247 available at  
<http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/UNConstitutional-Issue1.pdf> 
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in 2015 for its work in facilitating dialogue that lead to the adoption of the 2014 Constitution. 
The new Constitution has created a strong Constitutional Court, with guardianship over the 
constitution.248 On the other hand, the process in Egypt has been more fraught.249 A second 
constitution was adopted in 2014 following the ousting of Mohamed Morsi in July 2013. A 
new constitution for Morocco was passed in 2011. The new constitution is tentative in its 
reforms, preserving the authority and place of the monarchy and holding to a notion of 
‘national sovereignty’ rather than ‘popular sovereignty’. However, the constitution was 
approved in a referendum and enshrines a set of human rights norms that were not recognised 
in the previous document.  Syria is a very different case. Protests began in Syria in March 
2011. The protests (unlike the other states experiencing Arab Spring revolutions) led to a 
violent backlash from the state, leading to what is now a six-year civil war. Having refused 
to leave office al-Assad appointed a constitution drafting committee in November 2011, 
adopting a new constitution (following a referendum) on 27 February 2012 to replace the 
1973 Constitution. The new constitution allows the president to be elected for seven-year 
terms, renewable once (this means that Al-Assad may stay in power constitutionally until 
2028 as he was last elected in 2007 and will be able to run for a second term). The constitution 
also makes no mention of the current conflict.250  
 
The most recent peace agreement reached between the Colombian government and the FARC 
must first be approved in a referendum, which is to be held on 2 October 2016. Early in the 
peace negotiation President Santos announced that the process would include ‘a mechanism 
for citizen endorsement’. This later became a point of disagreement between the government 
and the FARC. The government proposed a referendum, while the FARC endorsed the 
setting up of a constitutional assembly in accordance with Article 376 of the Constitution251 
to redraft the constitution to incorporate the peace agreement. There was no mechanism 
under existing law to fulfil the legal and political challenge of introducing a participatory 
mechanism. Congress, therefore, amended the constitution to allow for a ‘special plebiscite on 
peace’. The peace agreement will be voted on in its entirely in a ‘yes or no’ question. To 
succeed the yes votes must outnumber the no votes, and be at least 13% of registered voters 
(or 4.4 million of 33 million eligible voters). The amendment was, by process, referred to the 
Constitutional Court (both sides having agreed to commit to its ruling), which was upheld, 
with some conditions. For example, the decision of the referendum would be binding only on 
the executive and not on other branches of government, and the agreement, if approved, 
would not automatically be incorporated into the constitution or law.252 In June 2016, 
Congress passed temporary constitutional amendments to allow them to expedite the 
                                                 
248 See Mekki, ‘The Tunisian Constitutional Court’ (2016).  
249 See Lang Jr., ‘From Revolutions to Constitutions’ (2013) which covers the constitutional history of 
Egypt, with the focus on the (first) post-Arab Spring constitution of 2012. 
250 For more on the 2012 Syrian Constitution see ConstitutionNet.org, ‘The New Syrian Constitution’ 
(2012).   
251 ‘By means of a law approved by the members of both chambers, Congress may direct that the 
voters participating in the popular balloting decide if a Constituent Assembly should be called with 
the jurisdiction, term, and makeup as set forth by said law’. 
252 For more on the ‘special plebiscite’ and the Constitutional Court decision see Maya, ‘Analysis: 
Colombian Peace Hangs on a Very Special Plebiscite’ (2016.). 
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approval procedure for the agreement and to grant the President powers to issue a decree to 
enforce the agreement.253 Although there was great hope for the agreement, it was rejected 
in the referendum on 2 October 2016.  
 
Public participation efforts can also be conducted through a constituent assembly. In Nepal, 
the parties signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 22 November 2006. In 
accordance with the terms of the peace agreements, a Constituent Assembly (CA) was elected 
to draft a new constitution on 10 April 2008. The Assembly also acted as the Interim 
Legislature and included representatives from twenty-five political parties. A mixed system 
of first-past-the-post and proportional representation was used to elect the 601-member 
assembly (which included 26 nominated members) including a wide representation of castes, 
ethnic groups and women.254 The CA was replaced in a second election in November 2013, 
having been dissolved for failing to produce a working draft in June 2012, having already 
extended the deadline four times. This second CA, elected through the same process as the 
first in November 2013, was less representative than the previous body, for example, it did 
not include the required number of women members. Although the second CA faced political 
deadlock it agreed on a draft constitution in July 2015 following the negotiation of the 16-
point Agreement between the major political parties, including the Madhesi party, on 
substantive issues concerning the establishment of a federal state, institutional arrangements, 
the judiciary and electoral systems. The final constitution of Nepal was promulgated on 20 
September 2015.  
 
The groups that tend to be marginalised the most in such processes are women and 
indigenous groups. Indigenous groups have standing as ‘subjects of international law’255 and 
recognised as peoples under the law of self-determination. The legal status of indigenous 
groups is not well defined, in part, because there is no general agreement as to its meaning or 
the process by which such status can be conferred.256 A peace agreement signed by an 
                                                 
253 Although the referendum failed to pass, it is useful to clarify, for future processes, how the 
outcome of the referendum, as the participatory element of the process, was to be implemented. The 
amendment designated that the agreement (once passed in the ‘special plebiscite’ and implemented) 
would be a ‘special agreement’ in line with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention and that it is 
to be incorporated into the ‘constitutional block’. (A ‘constitutional block’ is the granting of 
constitutional status to international human rights treaties. The Colombian Court has understood Art 
93 as creating a ‘constitutional block’ (Constitutional Court of Colombia, Decision C-488 de 2009)). 
Again, had the referendum passed, these amendments would have been subject to review by the 
Constitutional Court. Had the Court had the opportunity to respond, it may have gone some way to 
shoring up its role as the guardian of the peace, reinforcing this function that the Court has already 
taken on itself.  
254 In accordance with the Interim Constitution, one third of the members of the CA were women.  
255 See Anaya, Indigenous People in International Law, (2004), 189. Convention concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (No 169) 1989, 28 ILM 1382 (1989); United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous peoples, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 7 
September 2007, UN Doc A/61/L.67 
256 See Kingsbury, ‘“Indigenous Peoples” in International Law’ (1998) who distinguishes between 
positivist and constructivist definitions of ‘indigenous peoples’.   
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indigenous group has the effect of concurrently recognising the group’s status under 
international law (which includes the right to self-determination) and protecting their legal 
rights within the state.257  
 
Modern constitution must also incorporate human rights standards accepted at the 
international level. This includes the gender based rights set out in article 27 of the Geneva 
Conventions, which extends protection to women in armed conflict, the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the 1995 Beijing 
Platform for Action, UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), and UN General Assembly 
Resolution on Women’s Political Participation. The UN, in Security Council Resolution 1325 
(2000),258 addressed the issues of women’s inclusion into the peace process and agreement, 
calling on, 
 
actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to 
adopt a gender perspective, including, inter alia … during repatriation and 
resettlement … in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace 
agreements, [and in the] protection of and respect for human rights of women 
and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution.259  
 
The Security Council has since passed seven resolutions, and the General Assembly has 
passed three resolutions calling for more effective participation of women in peace-making.260 
There is also a push by the UN to include more women in the mediation and negotiation 
processes.261 However, despite the passage of Resolution 1325, the inclusion of women into 
the peace process, both before and after its adoption, continues to be minimal.262  
                                                 
257 Example of treaties between governments and indigenous people in the context of conflict are 
between the Mexican government and the Zapatista National Liberation Army (the Chiapas peoples); 
the government of Bangladesh and the indigenous people of the Chittagong Hill Tract; the Indian 
government and the tribal groups of the Northeast; the government of France and the Kanaks of New 
Caledonia; and the Guatemalan government and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca 
(URNG).  
258 Paragraph 8 of Security Council Resolution 1325 also calls on actors to include ‘measures that 
ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to 
the constitution’. 
259 Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000). 
260 Security Council Resolution 1820 (2008), Security Council Resolution 1888 (2009), Security 
Council Resolution 1889 (2009). There are also other international agreements/documents that 
promote gender equality in peace-building, such as, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, 
Chapter IV, Strategic Objectives and Actions, 1995; Women and Armed Conflict, adopted at the 
Fourth World Conference on Women 1995; and the Outcome Documents of the Twenty-Third Special 
Session of the General Assembly, ‘Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the 
Twenty-First Century’. 
261 UN Guidance on Gender and Inclusive Mediation Strategies. This builds on the UN Guidance for 
Effective Mediation (2012).  
262 There are several publications on the inclusion of women in the peace process, for example, Bell 
and Rourke ‘Peace Agreements or Pieces of Paper?’ (2010), UN Women, Preventing Conflict, 
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Peace processes in which women participate tend to be more stable and enduring. Yet, despite 
efforts such as Resolution 1325, women’s participation in formal peace negotiations is under 
represented. Women’s inclusion in the peace and constitution-making processes, as a 
population affected by the violence and as agents in the conflict, is both empirically and 
normatively necessary for the sustainability of the peace constitution. A gender sensitive 
constitution is: 
 
a constitution resulting from a process in which relatively equal numbers of 
women and men, drawn from many sectors of life and many classes, together 
and on terms of equality, discuss, draft, and agree on basic provisions to express 
the foundational idea of equality of women and men and to create a workable 
government that will enable men and women to lead good and meaningful 
lives.263  
 
Gender equality provisions are more frequently included in new constitutions, however, 
women continue to be underrepresented (or even unrepresented) in most countries in the 
constitution-making process and in positions of political and legal authority. Nevertheless, a 
gender sensitive constitution, in process, language, and design can be a mechanism through 
which to address gender inequality and to promote women’s agency – although for the 
constitution to have impact, it must also be implemented and interpreted in a gender sensitive 
way.  
 
A constitution cannot make claims to be democratic (although not all constitutions 
necessarily do so) if it fails to adequately represent women – and in fact all people – in the 
constitution-making process.  An emerging global consensus on human rights and democracy 
have trickled down into domestic constitution making, especially since the successful and 
inclusive constitution-making process in post-apartheid South Africa. Now, constitution-
making that does not include some form of participatory process will lack legitimacy.  The 
method of popular participation can be a referendum (as was the case in Kenya) or a 
consultation process (as in Zimbabwe and South Africa). Women (and minority groups) must 
also be sufficiently represented in constitution-drafting commissions and/or constituent 
assemblies.  
 
Issues concerning women’s daily lives are often disregarded as part of the ‘private’ or 
traditional sphere, and therefore can be excluded from the constitution. Constitutions protect 
a range of human rights, including gender equality and non-discrimination on the grounds of 
                                                 
Transforming Justice, Securing Peace (2015). For more on the inclusion of women in peace processes 
see Bell, Unsettling Bargains (2015), Bell, Text and Context (2015), McWilliams, ‘Women at the 
Peace Table’ in Gender and Peacebuilding, edited by Flaherty et al. (2015) and Ellerby, ‘A Seat at 
the Table is Not Enough’ (2016). It is necessary to make a distinction between the inclusion of 
women in the peace process as representatives of women as a social group and individual women 
working as mediators or political actors. However, in both cases women are underrepresented. See 
UN Women, Women’s Participation in Peace Negotiation (2009).  
263 Jackson, ‘Feminism and Constitutions’ in The Public Law of Gender, edited by Rubenstein and 
Young (2016), 43. 
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sex264 (which should be explicitly listed), however, they often tend to be silent on issues that 
have direct impact on women, such as questions of reproductive rights and sexual autonomy 
and violence (where these decisions are left to the legislatures or courts). In comparison, a 
gender sensitive constitution recognizes the distinct positions of women and men in society, 
going beyond the standard inclusion of non-discrimination clauses.  In some measure, a 
constitution must include positive measure to promote gender equality and agency, in 
response to historic and social inequalities.  For example, the Canadian Constitution requires 
that gender equality protected by the constitution be implemented:  
 
(1) Every individual is equal before the and under the law and has the right to 
the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in 
particular, without discrimination based on ... sex ... (2) Subsection (1) does not 
preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the amelioration of 
conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are 
disadvantaged because of ... sex ...’ (Art 15).  
 
The language used in the constitution must also reflect the objectives of gender equality. It 
should not be assumed that pronouns (such as men/man) are gender-neutral. Where 
pronouns can be avoided, they must instead be substituted with words such as ‘person’ or 
‘individual’. The use of non-gendered language is always useful in moving towards the 
recognition of cisgender persons.  
 
The language of a constitution must also be clear to avoid ambiguity and the possibility of 
gender protections being unravelled by constitutional interpretation. The first draft of the 
Tunisian constitution used language that was open to suggestion that women were not equal 
to men, for example, that women are ‘true partners to men in the building of the nation and 
as having a role complementary thereto within the family’. In the final draft the language was 
changed so that the article committed the State ‘to protect women’s accursed rights and to 
work to strengthen and develop those rights’ (Art 46).  
 
Another mechanism to promote the inclusion of women as active participants in politics is the 
inclusion of legislative quotas. For example, the Rwanda constitution includes such a 
provision:  
 
The State of Rwanda commits itself to upholding the following fundamental 
principles and ensuring their respect: (4) building a state governed by the rule 
of law, a pluralistic democratic Government, equality of all Rwandans and 
between men and women which is affirmed by women occupying at least thirty 
percent (30%) of positions in decision-making organs’ (Art 10 (4)) 
 
The constitution also makes similar (although not numerically specified) requirements of 
political organisations (Art 56). 
                                                 
264 Constitutions often use the term sex when enumerating categories of rights. I have used the term 
gender throughout this piece, however, I use the terms sex and gender to have the same meaning. 
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Continuing Violence under the Peace Constitution  
 
Constitutions are being looked to by development and peace building agencies as a potential 
solution for fragile states.265 The DRC and Nepal are two such cases that ‘appear to defy all 
attempts to promote transition’, while, Burundi, initially categorised as a success, is now 
backtracking.266 As Christine Bell warns, the traditional understanding of the constitutions 
as a ‘social contract’ that ‘create[s] both the vertical relationship of restraint between the 
individual and the state necessary to democratic practice, but also the potential for a wider 
horizontal relationship for civic trust necessary to minimising violent conflict’,267 is limited 
in its state building capacity. Although faith is being put into constitution-making to provide 
a solution for political transitions, violence in post-conflict states has continued even after the 
implementation of the peace constitution.  
 
The Democratic Republic of Congo 
 
First, the constitution in the DRC was negotiated as part of the peace process, that began in 
1999 with the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.268 The Lusaka Agreement committed the parties 
to the establishment a political process under the Inter-Congolese Dialogue within forty-five 
days from its signing. The Inter-Congolese Dialogue was intended to be a transitional 
arrangement, aimed at integrating a new national army (to include the armed opposition 
groups that signed the ceasefire), the agreement on new political institutions to advance good 
governance, the holding of national elections, and the drafting of a new constitution to be 
implemented after the elections. The ceasefire also committed the parties to adopt all the 
resolutions agreed to as part of the dialogue, and to hold equal status in the negotiations. 
Negotiations, however, did not begin in earnest until February 2002 in Sun City, South 
Africa269 which did not result in a settlement. The delay in the start of the Inter-Congolese 
Dialogue was caused, in part, by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, who did not want to see an end to 
his political rule. The process moved forward only after Kabila was replaced by his son, Joseph 
Kabila.270 The second round of negotiations began in 2002 in Pretoria, South Africa. In 
                                                 
265 Bell, ‘Bargaining on Constitutions’ (2017), 15.   
266 Ibid, 16-7. Bell also identifies Bosnia-Herzegovina and Northern Ireland as ‘’stuck’ with ‘their 
apparently liberal democratic institutions in an uneasy relationship to still tense power-sharing 
governments’. Colombia has also become ‘stuck’ since the failed referendum on the peace agreement 
with the FARC in September 2016.  
267 Ibid, 19. 
268 In accordance with the Agreement, the UN deployed a peacekeeping mission to the DRC to oversee 
its implementation. The Agreement stipulated that: ‘The United Nations Security Council, acting under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter and in collaboration with the [Organisation of African Unity], shall be 
requested to constitute, facilitate and deploy an appropriate peacekeeping force in the DRC to ensure 
implementation of this Agreement.’ The Security Council passed UNSC Res 1258 on 6 August 1998, 
followed by UNSC Res 1279, 30 November 1999, establishing the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC). 
The successor to that mission, the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), continues to 
operate as one of the largest ever deployed peacekeeping missions. 
269 Forty out of 340 delegates in Sun City were women.  
270 Laurent-Désiré Kabila was assassinated by his bodyguard in January 2001.  
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December that year, the government of the DRC, and several armed and unarmed opposition 
groups271 signed The Global and Inclusive Agreement agreeing to the cessation of hostilities, 
the establishment of a transitional government, the creation of a restructured national army 
and the organisation of free and transparent national elections. The final accord to emerge 
from the multi-lateral peace negotiations was The Final Act, signed in April 2003, in which 
the parties accepted the resolutions made during the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, reaffirmed 
their commitment to the Global and Inclusive Agreement and accepted the Constitution of 
the Transition, which was previously agreed on 1 April 2003.272 On 4 February 2014, the 
parliament approved a bill granting amnesties covering acts of insurgency or war (excluding 
genocide or war crimes) from 2006. Continued efforts to end the conflict in eastern Congo led 
to joint military operations between the FARDC (Congolese national military) and the UN 
peacekeeping mission. The UN mission established an ‘intervention brigade’ in March 2013 
which held the ‘responsibility of neutralizing armed groups’ and the ‘objective of contributing 
to reducing the threat posed by armed groups to state authority and civilian security’.273 
 
In post-conflict states such as the DRC the constitution has been manipulated by long-term 
rulers who are vying to stay in power, making the constitution central to the outbreak of 
violence. In accordance with the post-conflict 2005 constitution, the current President of the 
DRC, Joseph Kabila, will not be able run in the next presidential election in November 2016, 
as he has already served two five-year terms. The first multiparty elections since 
independence in 1960 were held in July 2006, following the passage of the final constitution 
in a referendum in the previous December, and was won by Joseph Kabila. This election was 
widely held to be free and fair by the UN and other international observers. The constitution 
was amended in January 2011, to allow for the President to be elected by a simple majority, 
rather than a system of absolute majority that required a second election to be held in the 
instance that a candidate did not receive over 50% of the vote, a first-past-the-post system 
that favours the incumbent. Elections were again held in November 2011, which were won 
by Kabila.  The results of the election were questioned by opposition leader Etienne 
Tshisekedi. International observers also noted that there were irregularities, a lack of 
transparency, and electoral violence, however, the outcome of the voting was accepted.  
 
In the run-up to the next round of elections, Kabila was making overtures to extend his tenure 
as president past 19 December 2016, when his term expires. In the 2014-2015 extraordinary 
session of parliament, the government attempted to alter to the electoral law. The draft law 
proposed to connect the electoral register to the national census. This change would have 
caused severe delays to the holding of an election, as an updated census would take years to 
complete,274 in effect, extending the term of President Kabila. The law passed through the 
                                                 
271 The parties to The Sun City Agreement included the same parties to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, 
plus the RCD-N and the Mayi-Mayi. 
272 For a history of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, see Rogier, 
‘Democratic Republic of Congo’ (2006). 
273 UNSC Resolution 2098, 28 March 2013, para 9. 
274 The government’s spokesperson, Lambert Mende, suggested that the delay would result in the 
election being postponed until 2017.  
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National Assembly on 17 January 2015. This was met with widespread protesting. The bill 
was amended by the Senate, removing the link between the voter roll and the census, and 
including a provision that the voter roll must comply with all legal and constitutional 
requirements. In response, the National Assembly removed the entire section of the bill.275  
Concern that Kabila still intends to remain in power pasts his term continue. In May 2016, 
the Constitutional Court, clarifying the meaning of the Constitution, ruled that the president 
could remain in power until a new president could be elected.276 The timetable to hold these 
elections on schedule is now impossible. A political dialogue was agreed in early September 
to determine a timetable for elections, however, protests have again erupted in the capital, 
Kinshasa, on 19 September 2016.  
 
Burundi  
 
The Constitutional Court of Burundi has a history of becoming involved in the conflict.277 In 
the wave of democratisation that was happening, elections were held in Burundi in 1993, 
which were won by the FRODEBU candidate (a predominately Hutu party). Shortly after, 
the military orchestrated a coup. This prompted widespread violence that left tens of 
thousands dead. The military claimed that it was justified in its actions, while undermining 
the election and the legitimacy of FRODEBU (‘the acquis de juin 1993 (the electoral victory) 
is counterbalanced by the acquis d'octobre (the genocidal plan allegedly concocted by 
FRODEBU’). 278 The constitution called for the Speaker of the National Assembly (and then 
the Deputy Speaker) to replace the president if he dies in office, however, both were killed in 
the coup. As it was also impossible to call elections, the National Assembly amended the 
Constitution to allow it to appoint a new President. The National Assembly elected a member 
of FRODEBU. The Constitutional Court, however, exercised its authority to block the 
election. The Court, like the state, was divided by the ethnicity of its judges.  The (majority) 
Tutsi judges – who would likely have found the amendment (and therefore the election) 
unconstitutional – were dismissed, which allowed the new President to be appointed. 
Reyntjens calls this ‘constitutional guerrilla warfare’.  A second constitutional impasse was 
triggered after the death of the FRODEBU president in April 1994 (when the President of 
Rwanda’s plane was shot down). The reinstated Constitutional Court ruled on 12 April that 
there was a vacancy for presidency, however, on 18 April (by only the Tutsi judges) ruled 
that the original constitutional amendment appointing the president after the coup was not 
valid. This second decision increased the already high tensions in the country. 
 
                                                 
275 See ICG, ‘Congo: Is Democratic Change Possible?’ (2015).  
276 The relevant constitutional articles are Art 70 which reads: The President of the Republic is elected 
by direct universal suffrage for a mandate of five years renewable a single time. At the end of his 
mandate, the President of the Republic remains in [his] functions until the effective installation of the 
newly elected President.’ However, under the Constitution, the Electoral Commission must hold an 
election 90 days before the end of the President’s term (Article 73). 
277 See Reyntjens, ‘Constitution-Making in Situations of Extreme Crisis (1996). 
278 Ibid, 240 
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The attempt to amend the constitution to remain in power has become a commonplace tactic 
of regional leaders. The President in neighbouring Republic of Congo, Denis Sassou-
Nguesso, in a bid to extend his presidency held a constitutional referendum in October 2015, 
to allow for a third-term. In a similar attempt, Burkina Faso’s president Blaise Compare was 
ousted by popular uprisings in November 2014. Constitutional change to remove or amend 
presidential term limits were successful in Uganda in the 1980s, which has made President 
Yoweri Museveni effective president for life, with his having won his fifth term in February 
2016.279 Rwanda has also had a successful referendum to remove the two-term limit in the 
constitution. Such moves amount to an effective ‘constitutional coup’.280  
 
The ‘constitutional coup’ that was effected in Burundi was, in part, facilitated through the 
constitutional court, which sided with the President in his bid for a third term. Burundi, like 
all the cases considered in this thesis, was effected by a civil war (with similar dynamics to 
Rwanda). The Arusha Peace Agreement was signed in 2000, and introduced a power-sharing 
arrangement. While it was not without serious shortcomings – including the fact that several 
parties placed reservations on signing – it was applauded as a success. The constitution was 
adopted in March 2005, following the adoption on an interim constitution by parliament on 
20 October 2004. The interim constitution was passed through a referendum in February 
2005, being adopted as the final constitution the following month. The adoption of the peace 
agreement in 2000 and constitution in 2005 was heavily indebted to the pressure put on the 
parties by the international community, in particular South Africa.  
 
In following a constitution trend, the Burundian Constitution introduced presidential term 
limits to check the authority and power of the executive: ‘The President of the Republic is 
elected by direct universal suffrage for five years renewable once’.281 However, as a transitional 
constitution, it included a provision on the first government to operate under the new 
constitutional order: 
 
Exceptionally, the first President of the Republic of the post-transition period is 
elected by the [elected] National Assembly and the elected Senate meeting in Congress, 
                                                 
279 The Ugandan parliament voted in a constitutional amendment (alongside a constitutional 
referendum on multipartyism) to remove presidential term limits. Museveni became president 
following a coup in 1986. He won his first democratic presidential election in 1996. 
280 Similar ‘constitutional coups’ have taken place in Ukraine and Hungary. There has been marked 
violence in the former since the ousting of President Viktor Yanukovych during the Euromaidan 
protests in November 2014. The violence in Ukraine after the change in government is heighted by 
the accusations of Russian interference in Ukraine and the effective civil conflict in the east that has 
since broken out. The situation in Hungary has deteriorated over the past few years, despite initial 
high hopes for the country following its democratisation process in the early 1990s. See Scheppele et 
al., ‘Disabling the Constitution’ (2012). The ruling party (elected with a majority in the 2010 general 
election) could pass amendments to the Constitution which required a 2/3 majority in parliament. 
They could dismantle the constitutional court, limit the separation of powers, and amend the 
constitution to allow them to draft a new document. The new Constitution of Hungary was passed 
with no public participation and with the support of only the ruling party.  
281 Section 96, emphasis added. 
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with a majority of two thirds of the members. If this majority is not obtained 
on the first two ballots, it immediately proceeds to other ballots until a 
candidate obtains the suffrage equal to two-thirds of the members of the 
Parliament. In the case of vacancy of the first President of the Republic of the 
post-transition period, his successor is elected according to the same modalities 
specified in the preceding paragraph. The President elected for the first post-
transition period may not dissolve the Parliament.282 
 
In May 2015, despite having served two terms as President, Pierre Nkurunziza was 
nominated by his party, the National Council for the Defense of Democracy — Forces for the 
Defense of Democracy, to run for a third term. Supports of the President argued that his first 
term in office was by election of the National Assembly and Senate, rather than by universal 
suffrage (as per article 96) and was therefore allowed to run for a third term. His opponents 
contested this reading of the Constitution as it contravened the spirit of the Arusha peace 
agreements. The question of whether the President Nkurunziza could run for a third-term 
was put to the Constitution Court.283 The Court, in its judgment, stressed the importance and 
status of the peace agreement in the constitutional order of the state: 
 
Considering that, though the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement is 
not supra constitutional, it is nonetheless the Constitution’s bedrock 
particularly the sections relating to constitutional principles... That whosoever 
violates the main constitutional principles of the Arusha Agreement cannot 
claim to respect the Constitution.284    
 
However, in their interpretation of section 96 and 302 of the Constitution, and considering 
the reading of the Arusha Agreement, the Court found: 
 
That though the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement had 
recommended that no President serves two terms, the vague nature of Article 
302 of the Constitution made a third term possible for a president who headed 
the first post-transition period.285  
 
The Court could have applied the principle of peace jurisprudence to rule against the 
President rather than in favour of his running for a third term, which would have held to the 
principles and values of the peace agreement. While the Constitution could have been read to 
allow for the current president to run for a third-term, the decision of the Court undermined 
the intentions of the peace agreement. It had been suggested that the ‘changes in Burundi’s 
                                                 
282 Section 302, emphasis added.  
283 The case was brought to the Court by 14 of the 41 Senators. In accordance with the Constitution, 
the Court must decide on a matter if one-quarter (or 11) Senators refer it to the Court. In its 
judgement, the Court ruled on its jurisdiction and competence on the question.  
284 Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Burundi in Case Number RCCB 303, 4 
May 2015.  
285 Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Burundi in Case Number RCCB 303, 4 
May 2015.  
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constitutional design have helped to buffer the shock of democratic elections, thereby 
contributing to a sharp reduction in ethnic violence.’286  
 
President Nkurunziza was elected in July 2015, following an attempted coup in May 2015. 
Tensions between the ethnic Hutu and Tutsi, thought to have been resolved with the Arusha 
Accord, have been begun to re-emerge. The government suspended the opposition party, the 
Movement for Solidarity and Democracy, in April 2017, claiming it has acted against the 
constitution by forming a rebel group. As political tension continues, cracks have also begun 
to show in the Burundi army, which was integrated under the Arusha Accords, and which 
was a primary achievement of the peace agreement.287 
 
Nepal  
 
Nepal is valuable as a case study to consider the merits and purpose of interim constitutions, 
which is relevant to considerations of sequencing and timing as well as to assess the role of 
the international community in the peace agreement and constitution making processes. The 
2015 Constitution was the outcome of a lengthy process that was begun following the signing 
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in November 2006, between the Communist 
Part of Nepal (Maoists) and the Nepali government, ending a decade long civil war.  
 
The constitutional history of Nepal is a principal factor in explaining the conflict and the 
current tensions since the adoption of the latest constitution.288 The 1948 post-colonial 
constitution remained in place until 1990, when the Jan Āndolan (People’s Movement) pushed 
for a return to democratic government, which lead to a constitution-making process. The 
King appointed Constitution Recommendation Commission (CRC) produced a draft 
constitution based on the 1959 Constitution fashioned on the Westminster model of 
parliamentary democracy and constitutional monarchy. The new constitution 
institutionalised a Hindu,289 linguistically Nepali290 nationalist identity that protected the 
Hindu Shah monarchy.291 As Mara Malagodi argues, ‘[c]onstitutional reform in Nepal has 
acquired a central place in the discourse about socio-political change in the country since 1990 
                                                 
286 Reyntjens, ‘Burundi’ in Constitutions and Conflict, edited by Kuperman (2015). Reyntjens’ 
conclusions were, however, premature as violence has since broken out in Burundi. Still, the current 
conflict, while underscored by long-standing tensions, may be considered a separate conflict because 
of the ‘constitutional coup’ rather than because of ethnic violence.  
287 ICG, ‘Burundi: The Army in Crisis’ (2017). 
288 For a good overview of the history of Nepal leading up to the adoption of the 1990 Constitution 
and for a throughout analysis of the constitution from 1990 to 2007, see Malagodi, Constitutional 
Nationalism and Legal Exclusion (2012).  
289 Art 4(1): Nepal is a multiethnic, multilingual, democratic, independent, indivisible, sovereign, Hindu 
and Constitutional Monarchical Kingdom. 
290 Art 6(1): The Nepali language in the Devanagari script is the language of the nation of Nepal. The 
Nepali language shall be the official language. 
291 Art 27(1): In this Constitution, the words "His Majesty" mean His Majesty the King for the time 
being reigning, being a descendant of the Great King Prithvi Narayan Shah and an adherent of Aryan 
Culture and the Hindu Religion. 
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… One of the significant aspects of the Nepali case study is the primacy that has been given 
to institutional reform as a tool for conflict resolutions, anchored in the belief that significant 
and durable socio-political change can be achieved primarily by legal means’.292 The social and 
legal exclusion written into the constitution293 reflected levels of exclusion already present in 
Nepal, which had been expressed in the Jan Āndolan of April 1990. The entrenched exclusion 
of the constitution was also a cause for the conflict that began in 1996 between the Maoists 
and the Nepali government. The Maoists put forward a 40-point demand in February 1996 
before launching their insurgency,294 that included a demand for a new, democratic and 
republican constitution to be drafted by elected representatives. 
 
The Seven Party Alliance (a coalition of those political parties elected to the House of 
Representatives in the 1999 election) and the Maoists negotiated and signed a 25-point 
ceasefire on 26 May 2006. This was followed by the 8-point agreement signed on 16 June, in 
which the parties agreed to dissolve parliament and form an interim legislature to include the 
Maoists and to request the assistance of the UN to monitor and manage the arms and armies 
of both parties.295 A civilian peacekeeping mission was established by the Security Council on 
23 January 2007. The UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) was mandated with monitoring the 
management of arms and armed personnel as set out by the peace process; to monitor the 
ceasefire; and assisting with the planning and preparation of an election for the constituent 
assembly.296   
 
Like other cases discussed in this thesis, the Supreme Court of Nepal has been an activist 
court, which like India, introduced a basic structure doctrine under the 1990 Constitution, 
protecting the spirit of the Preamble.297 The 2007 Constitution replicated the 1990 strong 
form judicial review sections. Although, as a temporary document, without a strong constituent 
power to provide authority, the 2007 Constitution did not hold to the basic structure doctrine 
as it did under Article 116 of the 1990 Constitution. Malagodi argues that the inclusion of 
                                                 
292 Malagodi, ‘Constitutional Change’ in Rights in Divided Societies, edited by Harvey and Schwartz 
(2012),171-172. 
293 See Malagodi, Constitutional Nationalism and Legal Exclusion (2012), ch 4. Malagodi considered 
case law from the Supreme Court on issues of religion, language and gender.  
294 Available in an annex in Hutt, ed., Himalayan ‘People’s War’ (2004). See points 10, 16, 18 and 22 
as those mentioned here.  
295 The process at this stage was very contentious, especially around the question of the disarmament 
and cantonment of the Maoists army. For more on this period see reports from International Crisis 
Group, in particular, ICG, ‘Nepal: From People Power to Peace?’ (2006) and ICG, ‘Nepal’s Peace 
Agreement’ (2006). 
296 The mission to Nepal is a unique peacekeeping mission as it was made up of active and former 
military officers, unarmed and in civilian dress. Nepal is one of the largest contributors to UN 
peacekeeping, which made it reluctant to have a full peacekeeping mission deployed on its territory. 
India, which shares an open boarder with Nepal, was also hesitant about a peacekeeping mission in 
Nepal. See Martin, ‘The United Nations and Support to Nepal's Peace Process’, in Nepal in Transition, 
edited by von Einsiedel, et al. (2012).  
297 For more on the import of the basic structure doctrine, see Malagodi, Constitutional Nationalism 
and Legal Exclusion (2012), 172-173.  
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this article on constitutional amendments in the 1990 Constitution was to protect the 
multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy that was central to the political 
settlement. The Maoists and other left parties, however, were suspicious of the court having 
such a role, holding to more popular notions of sovereignty.298 Article 116 of the 1990 
Constitution has been replaced in the 2015 Constitution in Article 274 protecting ‘the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence of Nepal and sovereignty vested in the 
people.’ 
 
In Nepal, the new 2015 constitutional arrangement, particularly the inclusion of federalism, 
has caused violence to breakout along the border with India. While the 2015 Constitution is 
more progressive on some issues than the 1990 Constitution, it has backtracked in other areas 
compared to the 2007 Interim Constitution. In the end, the final constitution was pushed 
through by conservative sections of the CA, who took advantage of the destruction and 
diverted attention caused by the April 2015 earthquake. While the constitution includes some 
provisions that are quite progressive – including the recognition of sexual minorities in the 
list of protected groups under its right to quality provision299, as well as adopting quotas for 
women and minorities groups in the legislature – its passage caused protests in the mostly 
the Terai region, which runs along Nepal’s southern border with India, that caused the death 
of 45 people, both police officers and civilians, in August and September 2015.300  
 
Protests from the Madhesi,301 beginning in January 2007, were concerned with inclusion in 
the constituent assembly. Their demands were met by proportionally allocating seats in the 
constituent assembly and inserting a commitment to federalism into the interim constitution. 
However, after the passage of the constitution in September 2015, the Madhesi, Tharu and 
Janajati people protested against continued structural discrimination in the constitution, 
which include the proposed regional boundaries of the new federal state and to the clause in 
the constitution that does not allow women who are married to a non-Nepali to pass on their 
citizenship to their children.302 Protests left over 50 people dead and to a 135-day blockade 
                                                 
298 Email exchange with M Malagodi, 8 September 2016, on file with author.  
299 See Art 18(3). In a case brought before the Supreme Court, Sunil Babu Pant and Others v. Nepal 
Government and Others, Supreme Court of Nepal (21 December 2007), sexual minorities were 
granted legal recognition under the Interim Constitution. The decision, which was brought until Art 
107(2) of the Interim Constitution granting to Court jurisdiction over Public Interest Litigation cases, 
also required the government to recognise a third gender. The protection of sexual minorities was 
brought forward into the 2015 Constitution. 
300 Human Rights Watch, ‘“Like We Are Not Nepali”’ (2015)  
301 The Madhesi are the indigenous people of the Terai region, also known as the ‘plain-dwellers’. The 
people of Madhesi includes many religious, linguistic, caste, and ethnic groups. They do, however, 
have a common identity as non-Pahari (‘hill-dwellers’), who have been excluded by the government, 
and in this regard, are also like the Janajati. See Malagodi, Constitutional Nationalism and Legal 
Exclusion (2012), 235-6, ICG, ‘Nepal: From People Power to Peace?’ (2006) and ICG, ‘Nepal’s 
Peace Agreement’ (2006). 
302 The discriminatory citizenship clause on basis of gender was in the 1990 Constitution (see Art 
9(1)), but removed from the 2007 Interim Constitution (see Art 8(7)). While the article in the 2015 
Constitution is not overtly discriminatory, it makes it more difficult for a Nepali woman who is 
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(partially supported by India) along the Indian border, preventing the transportation of fuel 
and medicine. 
 
The government has now agreed to implement amendments to the Constitution to address 
these concerns. The leader of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist-Centre), Pushpa Kamal 
Dahal (known as ‘Prachanda’) became Prime Minister in August 2016 – replacing Khadga 
Prasad Sharma Oli of the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Maxist-Leninists) who held the 
position since October 2015 – after the Maoist-Centre and Nepali Congress signed a three-
point agreement with the United Democratic Madhesi Front. The proposed amendments are 
to address federal boundaries and inclusion.303 
 
Conclusion 
 
There is often tension between short term provisions contained in a peace agreement, 
necessary to end the conflict, and the longer-term need for stability. The attempt to locate 
stability and endurance in a document that, in its moment of founding and in its design, is 
compromised by a greater need for peace, risks entrenching the divisions of the conflict. Peace 
agreements risk fostering the very divisions that led to conflict in the first place. If that risk 
materializes, the same discordant structures are then transferred to the constitution, a 
document intended to be permanent. There are certain gains and setbacks in associating the 
peace and constitution-making processes. Mary Kaldor, for example, argues that peace-
making and constitution drafting need to be kept separate in the context of ‘new wars’. 
Although, as this thesis points out, there can be tensions in linking these two processes, I do 
not agree with this (dated) argument. In practice, peace-making and constitution drafting 
often cannot be separated. 304.  In the short-term, however, merging the peace and 
constitution-making processes as a tool of state-building can increase tension by introducing 
dilemmas and exasperating those tensions that ordinarily accompany all constitutional 
decision-making processes. These include choosing between short and long-term objectives, 
ceasing on-going violence and determining who will get a seat at the negotiating table. In the 
context of a peace agreement settlement and a post-conflict transition, tensions that are 
normally present in any constitution-making process become more acute and heightened. The 
ideal-type constitutional moment is one that is somehow elevated above normal politics, day-
to-day political infighting and civil unrest. This moment, of course, never truly arises, and 
outside of imagining such an ideal moment, constitutional theory has little to say about 
violence in constitution-making and interpretation.  
 
                                                 
married to a non-Nepali man to pass on Nepali citizenship to their children than it does for men under 
like circumstances (see Art 11). The Madhesi have objected to this article in part as there are a high 
number of marriages between Nepali and Indian citizens.  
303 This is current as of September 2016.  
304 Kaldor, ‘How Peace Agreements Undermine the Rule of Law’ (2016). See also Brandt et al., 
Constitution-making and Reform (2011) 257-258 which lists both risks and opportunities of linking 
conflict resolution and constitution-making and Widner, ‘Constitution Writing and Conflict 
Resolution’ (2005) who looks at the relationship between constitution-writing and violence. 
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A peace constitution must find some balance between the elite bargain and the will of the 
people; local initiatives and international consensus on human rights and liberal democracy; 
and between the past, present and future. While such a claim in hard to empirically resolve, 
Kim Lane Scheppele makes the case that ‘[c]onstitutions in their moments of creation cannot 
be inspired solely by imagined futures. Perhaps even more crucially, they encode imagined 
pasts.’ This, she contends, is not considered in constitutional theory, something her paper 
goes some way to resolving. Like the argument made in the following chapter on 
constitutional theory, Scheppele uses Hannah Arendt as ‘both inspiration and foil’.305  
  
                                                 
305 Scheppele, ‘A Constitution Between Past and Future’ (2008), 1380. 
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Chapter Three: Constitutional Law and Theory 
 
 
 
 
 
A CONSTITUTION ENSHRINES the legal and political powers of the government.   Yet, 
it is more than a legal and political treatise. A constitution articulates the idea of what a state 
is and how it should be. It writes a story of a state’s future that is not only political and legal, 
but also symbolic. Constitutions enable and constrain the mechanisms of state, grant rights 
to individuals and shape the identity of a people and a state. However, a compromise 
constitution cannot be understood as an end-point if it is to function in a deeply divided state 
emerging from high-level conflict. To view the constitution as a process (a ‘means’) rather 
than a codified set of rules (an ‘end’), perhaps requiring several iterations, breaks with the 
traditional understanding of the constitution as an entrenched and lasting document. An 
enduring constitution has value by promising stability and democracy. However, it may also 
have the harmful effect of holding the constitutional settlement to a moment of time, one 
constrained by necessary compromise. 
 
The definition of a ‘constitution’ is unsettled, 306  although it is a document that is regularly 
spoken of in political discourse and daily conversation, however, at its most basic, a 
constitution is a legal and political document that intended to restrain the power of the state. 
In law, a constitution is superior to other legislation and is, in intention, stable and 
enduring.307 Constitutionalism is then the normative principles that surround and are 
entrenched in the written document. A constitution is intended to set out the role of the 
government, to entrench the separation of powers, and to connect the government to the 
people, and the people to the government. 308 Constitutionalism, so says Charles McIlwain, 
                                                 
306 Several authors have considered this in depth, often tracing the changing historical meaning of the 
constitution, from the ancient to the modern. See Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law (2010), 276. 
307 Although, in fact, constitutions in most cases are fleeting. In one of the few quantitative studies in 
comparative constitutional law, Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg and James Melton determined that in 
the period since the drafting of the US Constitution to 2009 - the year the study was completed - the 
average lifespan of a written constitution has been nineteen years, Elkins et. al., The Endurance of 
National Constitutions (2009). 
308 While it may be the intention for a constitution to limit the powers of government, this may not be 
the effect it has in practice. Mark Tushnet, who has written on unstable and illiberal constitutions, 
makes the point that ‘[c]onstitutions as maps of power may be somewhat inaccurate [as] the realities 
of power may not be fully reflected’. As an example, he gives the ‘sham’ Stalin Constitution of 1936 
(Tushnet, Advanced Introduction to Comparative Constitutional Law (2014), 11). This is as true a 
statement on peace constitutions, where informal networks of power may operate outside of the 
constitutional structure. There is (as discussed below) the potential for or the actual occurrence of 
violence in the constitution-making process and after its implementation. Violence is the violent 
representation of politics, and while Arendt (who is referenced in this chapter and other sections of 
this thesis) thought of violence and power as being distinct, the use of violence against or in reaction 
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‘is a legal limitation on government; it is the antithesis of arbitrary rule; its opposite is 
despotic government, the government of will, instead of law’.309 This very understanding of 
constitution is grounded in a normative assumption of democratic values, in the concept of 
legitimacy and the consent of the people. While having different characteristics, the 
constitution, in its most elementary sense, was present in the ancient Greek and Roman 
empires.310 The first (or at least one of the first) versions of a constitution as a written 
document is Magna Carta311, signed by King John I in 1215 and fully incorporated into English 
law later in the 13th century.312 Magna Carta, as is typical of constitutions, limited the 
authority of the monarchy and granted rights to (free) persons. The scope of Magna Carta 
was narrow; however, its impact was broad, as articles of Magna Carta were reproduced, in 
part, in the American Declaration of Independence (which influenced the American 
Constitution), and which continue to be present in modern British constitutional law. 
 
The modern understanding of the constitution emerged in the late eighteenth century with 
the French and American Revolutions, which broke with the ancient notion of the 
constitution as being external to the people. The rupture from this earlier concept of the 
constitution was, in part, the foundation of the revolutions. The modern constitution takes its 
authority from and is bound to and by the will of the people, rather than the people being, in 
Alexander Hamilton’s phrase, ‘forever destined to depend for their political constitution on 
accident and force’.313 This is the foundational argument upon which the authority of the 
American constitution was grounded. It was a constitution connected to the people, who were 
real and were held sovereignty, unlike the constitutional order from which they were 
separating, where sovereignty was held by the Commons (and before that the Monarchy). 
Thomas Paine, in his treatise, The Rights of Man, rebuffed Edmund Burke’s justification of the 
British constitution on these grounds. Paine argued that,  
 
 A constitution is not a thing in name only, but in fact. It has not an ideal, but 
a real existence; and wherever it cannot be produced in a visible form, there is 
none. A constitution is a thing antecedent to a government, and a government 
is only the creature of a constitution. The constitution of a country is not the 
act of its government, but of the people constituting its government. It is the 
body of elements, to which you can refer, and quote article by article; and which 
contains the principles on which the government shall be established, the 
manner in which it shall be organised, the powers it shall have, the mode of 
elections, the duration of Parliaments, or by what other name such bodies may 
be called; the powers which the executive part of the government shall have; 
                                                 
to the constitution (which represents a higher – or extraordinary – category of politics) is an 
expression of power being unconstrained by the constitution.  
309 McIlwain, Constitutionalism, Ancient and Modern (1940), 21.  
310 Ibid. 
311 Although I want to be cautious in overextending the scope of my argument, the Magna Carta was 
a peace settlement between the Barons and the King, and so fits nicely into the argument of my thesis.  
312 See Hazell and Melton, eds., Magna Carta and Its Modern Legacy (2015).  
313 Hamilton, Federalist No. 1 ([1788] 2009). 
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and in fine, everything that relates to the complete organisation of a civil 
government, and the principles on which it shall act, and by which it shall be 
bound.314 
 
This understanding of a constitution is generally accepted. However, even such an accepted 
definition on the attributes of a constitution does not satisfy the ambiguities of authority or 
legitimacy, nor does it reconcile the temporal and authoritative tension of the constitutional 
moment and constitutional interpretation. On the question of constitutional authority, legal 
theory tends to presuppose a break from a prior source of legal authority. Authority is created 
in, and in some way linked to, the ‘constitutional moment’ of the founding, through the 
authority of the constitution maker or from the consent of the people. This new constitution 
is often enacted in the name of the people, either as a collective or through the actions of the 
constitution makers. For example, the US Constitution is often presented in a manner that 
denies or underplays the prior authority of the Articles of Confederation to play up the 
‘Founders’ or ‘the People’ as themselves the only source of authority.  
 
The question of authority is necessary to consider, as ‘the grounds for the authority of the 
law help to determine how it ought to be interpreted’,315 which has bearing on this thesis and 
will be considered below. The questions on constitutional authority sit within the theory on 
the nature of law. Philosophical questions on the nature of law also inform the debate on 
constitutional interpretation. The theory of law, further, looks to power and morality for a 
source of justification. However, there is no consensus from what source the authority, and 
thus legitimacy, of law can be located.  
 
Although the full debate is far beyond the scope of this thesis, as the history of legal theory 
has some bearing on questions of constitutional authority, a very short introduction will be 
given. Early Christian legal theories looked to the divine as the source and authority of law. 
It was from God, so they held, that all laws derived. In the 17th century, there was a paradigm 
shift in understanding the source of the law. In 1651, Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan broke from 
the Aristotelean conception of law as being in pursuit of the ‘good life’ which was commonly 
held to be the same by all under nature and God.316 Hobbes, seeing the natural state of man 
as bad, accepted the law as a command of the authority, be it just or not, and not derived from 
the divine. Hobbes was not the only philosopher to break with the natural law tradition. Hugo 
Grotius in similar, although not exact ways, began to develop positivist theories on the 
authority of the law.  
 
The utilitarian legal philosophers, Jeremy Bentham and John Austin, writing two centuries 
later, pushed the understanding of the law further from that of morality. The law, they 
believed was a question of what the law is, rather than what the law ought to be. Law for 
Bentham, Austin and many that followed in their legal doctrine, was not void of morality, but 
                                                 
314 Paine, The Rights of Man, ed./intro by Philp (1995) 158. 
315 Raz, ‘On the Authority and Interpretations’ in Between Authority and Interpretation edited by Raz 
(2009), 332. 
316 Coyle, Modern Jurisprudence (2014) 53. 
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was only that which had been posited. So that ‘ in the absence of an expressed constitutional 
or legal provision, it could not follow from the mere fact that a rule violated standards of 
morality that it was not a rule of law; and conversely, it could not follow from the mere fact 
that a rule was morally desirable that is was a rule of law’.317 H.L.A Hart and Lon Fuller 
engaged in an academic debate concerning the influence of morality in law, using in their 
exchange the legal validity of the laws of Nazi Germany and their status after the defeat of 
the Germans and the instituting of The Basic Law.318  
 
Constitutions and Democracy  
 
The modern variation of a constitution is based on the revolutionary ideas that came out of 
(and were the motivation for) the French and American revolutions. These revolutionary 
constitutional moments removed the authority of the constitution and the state (or 
government) from above and placed it in ‘the people’. For this, the modern constitution is 
often associated with democracy. However, constitutions can disagree with the requirements 
of democracy, for example, in what David Landau has termed ‘abusive constitutionalism’,319 
a mechanism by which the state uses constitutional replacement and amendment to weaken 
or remove democratic institutions and standards. There is also the suggestion that 
constitutionalism can exist under authoritarianism.320 Some liberal freedoms and reasonably 
free and fair elections are protected under authoritarian constitutionalism. The acceptance of 
an ‘authoritarian constitutionalism’ is in tension with Charles McIlwain’s definition of 
constitutionalism as ‘a legal limitation on government’.321 There is absolutist 
constitutionalism (with an absolute monarchy) and mere rule-of-law constitutionalism (which 
fulfils rule of law requirements but does not fully satisfy the normative understanding of 
constitutionalism). Absolutist and rule-of-law constitutionalism hold to some characteristics 
of McIlwain’s definition, but not all. There has been a turn in the comparative constitutional 
law literature on authoritarian constitutionalism (including judicial review under 
authoritarian constitutionalism).322  
 
The law is constitutional, not because it is democratic or legitimate, or morally superior, but 
because it can be interpreted in the text of the constitution. Lawrence Tribe, in an article 
critical of Bruce Ackerman’s theory of ‘constitutional moments’, writes that ‘[i]f the 
                                                 
317 Hart, ‘Separation of Law and Morals’ (1958), 599. 
318 Ibid, 593 and Fuller, ‘Positivism and Fidelity to Law’ (1958). 
319 Landau defines abusive constitutionalism as ‘the use of the mechanisms of constitutional change – 
constitutional amendment and constitutional replacement – to undermine democracy.’ This form of 
constitutionalism is increasingly common. Landau point out that ‘[w]hile traditional methods of 
democratic overthrow such as the military coup have been on the decline for decades, the use of 
constitutional tools to create authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes is increasingly prevalent’. 
Landau, ‘Abusive Constitutionalism’ (2013). 
320 See Thio, ‘Constitutionalism in Illiberal Polities’, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Constitutional Law, edited by Rosenfeld and Sajó (2012).  
321McIlwain, Constitutionalism, Ancient and Modern (1940), 21 quoted in Tushnet, ‘Authoritarian 
Constitutionalism’ (2015), 394.  
322 See Ginsburg and Moustafa, eds., Rule by Law (2008).   
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constitution is law, and if we are trying to interpret that law, then the claim that a particular 
governmental practice, domestic or international, is efficacious, is consistent with democratic 
theory, and is in some popular or moral sense “legitimate” just doesn’t cut much ice when the 
question before us is whether that practice is constitutional.’323 The balance between what is 
constitutional and what is right or legitimate is always changing, and so the constitution must 
somehow change to respond to the shifting morals and politics of society. This is the tension 
that is ever present – the endurability of the constitution against the moving will of the people 
expressed in a democracy. The assumption that constitutionalism and democracy are 
synonymous or easily combatable is fallacious, as the term ‘constitutional democracy’ would 
suggest. Democracy is assumed under a constitutional order, which as Mark Tushnet and 
others have argued, may discount the place of constitutions under authoritarian regimes. 
Constitutional courts, it is also suggested, may act, not just as guardians of the constitution, 
but active participants in the consolidation of democracies.324 There are concerns, related to 
the arguments made by the political constitutionalist, about courts taking on this political 
purpose. This concern is particularly salient in evaluating the role of courts in democracy 
consolidation.  
 
As a part of the phenomenon of the judicialization of politics, court have also become more 
common under authoritarian constitutions.325 This again suggests that there is not a 
necessary connection between constitutions and democracy. A court can act to uphold the 
constitution, even if that constitution is non-democratic. Courts can then act to protect the 
foundation of peace in a constitution, even if that is counter to or at the expense of democracy.  
Even with the close connection between peace agreements and constitutionalism, evaluation 
of judicial review and the role of courts in transitional constitutional orders have focused on 
democratisation rather than peace. In this thesis, I suggest that a distinctive set of peace 
constitutions exist and that when we examine cases arising post transition from conflict 
rather than authoritarianism, ‘peace’ is the foundation of the constitution and so becomes the 
concern of courts in ways which produce distinct jurisprudential needs and responses. 
 
In post-conflict cases, such as Northern Ireland, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Colombia, peace is 
at much at stake as democracy. However, the demands of peace and the demand of democracy 
may be in tension, as much as they can be mutually dependant. Democracy is hard to achieve 
without peace, but the ending of conflict can require limits to be placed on democracy in the 
interest of finding a resolution. The tensions between peace and democracy and the higher 
order difficulty of maintaining both, means that traditional approaches of both political and 
legal constitutionalists are incomplete. 
 
                                                 
323 Tribe, ‘Taking Text and Structure Seriously’ (1995), 1302.  
324 For more on this argument see Daly, Judging Democratisation (2015) and Issacharoff, Fragile 
Democracies (2015). 
325 Although there has been a general turn in the comparative constitutional literature towards courts 
and as well as constitutions under non-democratic regimes, there has been little work on courts in 
authoritarian regimes. As Ginsburg and Moustafa point out this omission is odd, especially as those 
who are sceptical of judicial review believe it to be undemocratic Ginsburg and Moustafa, 
‘Introduction’ in Ginsburg and Moustafa. 
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Legal and Political Constitutionalism 
 
In the context of the disagreement between political and legal constitutionalist, there is an 
assumption that all citizens are equal. For the political constitutionalist, Bellamy whose bases 
his theory on republicanism, no one citizen should be given higher authority to determine 
constitutional disagreement. However, judges hold such a position and therefore have a 
higher status than the individual citizen,326 and so this model is not legitimate, or democratic. 
But the assumption that this reasoning relies on, that all citizens are equal in status, and that 
the ordinary citizen does not view themselves are different from the politician. However, in 
post-conflict-state, the politician may be a former military commander who is not trusted by 
the citizen. The very foundations of constitutionalism are unique after peace.  It is therefore 
necessary to conceive of a different normative basis through which to evaluate the arguments 
of political and legal constitutionalism. 
 
There are broad concerns of the ‘judicialization of politics’327 which has moved political 
decision making out of the power of the legislature and executive and into the courts. 
However, as Hannah Arendt attests to, courts may have authority but they do not hold any 
power.328 Nevertheless, there is reasonable disagreement on the legitimacy of courts to 
practice strong-form judicial review329 and on the democratic legitimacy of courts to rule on 
political questions. This disagreement is played out between the legal and political 
constitutionalists. I suggest that the disagreement between the two camps is unable to 
address the particular concerns of judicial review of peace constitutions, as courts are often 
asked to rule on ‘first-order questions about the structure of government’330 and on questions 
of peace. Peace constitutions attempt to achieve elite pacts that are more inclusive than before, 
but risk becoming limited deals. Courts often must both acknowledge and protect the elite 
pact while recognising its limited nature and the need to ultimately move beyond it. This 
involves a difficult type of balancing act which arises directly at the political interface between 
opposing elites with opposing constitutional preferences. 
                                                 
326 Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism (2007), 166. See also Mac Amhlaigh, ‘Putting Political 
Constitutionalism in its Place’ (2016) who critiques the positions of Jeremy Waldron and Richard 
Bellamy, proposing that a ‘minimal theory of legitimacy’ ought to be incorporated in Waldron’s and 
Bellamy’s political constitutionalism to salvage it. 
327 See Shapiro and Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics and Judicialization (2002). 
328 Arendt, The Human Condition (1958). 
329 I borrow Mark Tushnet’s definition of strong-form judicial review: ‘the courts have general 
authority to determine what the Constitution means… [w]hatever limits there are on that authority, 
such as those imposed by the political question doctrine or interpretive approaches counselling 
deference to the policy judgments of the other branches, originate from the courts themselves’.  
Tushnet, ‘Alternative Forms of Judicial Review’ (2003), 2784. 
330 I use Samuel Issacharoff’s phrase to draw attention to his argument that while ‘it is becoming 
commonplace for courts to confront questions that were long deemed beyond the realm of possible 
judicial competence [there are] difficulties in confronting an area without clear markers in either legal 
or political theory’ (Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies (2015), 266). Issacharoff is sceptical of courts 
engaging with such first-order question, reserving the situations in which courts should ‘override local 
political arrangements’ (263).  
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There are many who are sceptical of the excessive faith placed in courts in new democracies 
and suggests that the view of courts as central engines of successful democratisation rests on 
rather slim evidence.331 However, regardless of any academic hesitations as to the expected 
task of a constitutional court, courts with strong-form judicial review are commonplace in 
new constitutions, including those drafted as a part of a peace process.332  In negotiating a 
political settlement, elite actors bargain intensely to protect their political positions, and in 
agreeing to the inclusion of strong constitutional courts may be motivated by self-interest. 
Ran Hirschl333 and Tom Ginsburg334 argue that parties contending for power make pragmatic 
decisions in the course of negotiating the constitutional settlement. It may also be that the 
internationalisation of many peace and constitution making processes has led to the 
‘constitutional migration’335 of strong judiciaries. International actors may also push for 
robust courts with judicial review of rights, as a rule of law ‘safeguard’ that is particularly 
necessary in cases where the power-arrangements constitute a tightly scripted ‘elite pact’.  
 
No matter what the motivation for the adoption of strong courts into peace constitutions, the 
current discourse on the legitimacy of judicial review is measured against democratic values, 
and is unable to assess the place of courts in balancing the demands of peace in holding 
together the political settlement. Political constitutionalists see democracy as being facilitated 
primarily through representative, elected legislatures and governments, and so are cautious 
about the authority and oversight of courts.336 Legal constitutionalists, in contrast, have 
understood rule of law and rights-based judicial review as central to democracy.337 The 
argument between political and legal constitutionalists is concerned with the sense and 
functions of democracy. Political constitutionalists ground their position in a majoritarian 
model of democracy, holding that legislatures are the more legitimate institution to protect 
and interpret the constitution and are sceptical that judges can, or should, hold strong 
interpretive powers. Legal constitutionalists, on the other hand, look to courts to secure the 
constitution as a legal document that ascribes authority to other political institutions. 
Political and legal constitutionalists also disagree on the equality of citizens. Where political 
constitutionalists look to the democratic process and the will of the majority to provide 
equality through the electoral system, legal constitutionalists believe that constitutionalism, 
through judicial review, protects the equality of all citizens by preventing the tyranny of the 
majority.338 
 
                                                 
331 See for example, Daly, ‘The Alchemists’ (2017).  
332 Ginsburg, ‘The Global Spread of Constitutional Review’ in Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics, 
edited by Whittington and Keleman, (2008). This trend is also present in constitutions written as part 
of democratic transitions. 
333 Hirschl, ‘The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment’ (2000).  
334 Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies (2003), 21–34. 
335 See Choudhry, ed., The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (2007). 
336 See, for example, Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case against Judicial Review’ (2006), Tushnet Taking 
the Constitution Away from the Court (2000) and Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism (2007). 
337 See, for example, Dworkin Law’s Empire ([1986] 1998) and Ely Hart, Democracy and Distrust 
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338 Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism (2007), 5. 
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Advocates and opponents of judicial review look to the American and British constitutional 
systems, respectively, in support of their arguments. Both positions, however, assume a 
‘reasonably well-functioning’ liberal democracy.339 These arguments may need to be 
evaluated differently in post-authoritarian periods of democratic consolidation. I go further 
to suggest that the political and legal constitutionalism literature arguments on judicial 
review is unable to assess constitutional courts and peace constitutions, as the demands of 
peace may be different from (and, possibly, opposite to) the demands of democracy. That is 
not to say, however, that the demands of both may not also be the same in many ways.  
 
Peace Constitutions as a Distinct Type of Constitution  
 
Peace constitutions are not just transitional constitutions (as, for example, are transitional 
constitutions from authoritarian to democratic rule) but are constitutions that follow on from 
a period of protracted and wide-spread conflict. For this reason, peace is the underlying 
requirement of the peace constitution. The foundations of the constitution rest with the peace 
agreement, and so, hold a distinctive type of authority that may be linked to traditional forms 
of authority stemming from the processes through which they are made - the author, or the 
previous legal regime - but rather by their goal of peace, in whatever compromised form that 
may take because of the peace process.  In the same way, constituent power is not present in 
peace constitutions in the same way as traditional constitutions. Constituent power derives 
from the collective desire for peace and the avoidance of the return to war. It is this that 
grounds the constitution and that which captures and creates constituent power, in a way that 
is like the revolutionary language of equality and independence in the Declaration of 
Independence is reflected and underpins the language and authority of the American 
Constitution. 
 
Authority 
 
A constitution may possess authority if it is the case that the authors of the constitution 
possessed such authority. The authors of the constitution must further be seen to be acting 
as the representative of the collective unity. Joseph Raz contends that ‘if new constitutions 
may derive their authority from the authority of their makers, old constitutions, if morally 
valid at all, must derive their authority from other sources’ as ‘no human institution has 
authority to make laws which last forever, or for a very long time’.340 If the authority of the 
constitution cannot rest on the legitimate authority of the author boundlessly, it may acquire 
authority, which emerges in time, rather than at the source. The American Constitution is 
                                                 
339 I borrow Mark Tushnet’s definition of ‘reasonably well-functioning’: ‘Reasonably-well 
functioning institutions are imperfect but not systematically so, nor to a large degree. Such institutions 
will make mistakes identifying and protecting rights, but those mistakes will be ransom (with respect 
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downwards spiral of rights-protection’ M Tushnet, ‘How Different are Waldron’s and Fallon’s Core 
Cases For and Against Judicial Review’ (2010) 30 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 49, fn 10. 
340 Lindahl, ‘Constituent Power’ in Paradox of Constitutionalism, edited by Loughlin and Walker 
(2008), 343. 
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perhaps one such case, for as Bruce Ackerman has argued, there can be no ‘doubt that these 
gentlemen [convened at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia] were acting beyond 
their legal authority – especially in claiming the right to ignore both the Articles of 
Confederation and the state legislatures’.341 Although this position is contested342, it still 
follows that the legal authority of the Convention, and thus the source of authority for the 
Constitution, is questionable. The collective authors of The Federalist Papers, writing under 
the moniker Publius, made compelling arguments, again as argued by Bruce Ackerman, ‘to 
solve the problem of revolutionary legitimacy’.343 The solution given in The Federalist Papers, 
one which challenges the Jeffersonian and Montesquieuian positions on the need for constant 
constitutional revival, is to remove daily politics to that of normal politics rather than 
constitutional politics, exercised through the representative of the people. The Constitution 
is semiotic of the people; the people cannot be a constant source of authority. The constitution 
itself, as the highest source of law, becomes the authority. The ‘framers of the American 
constitutions’, as Hannah Arendt writes, ‘were never tempted to derive law and power from 
the same origin. The seat of power for them was the people, but the source of law was to 
become the Constitution, a written document, an endurable objective thing’.344 
 
The question of endurance, as an empirical fact and a normative possibility, is as contested 
now as it was in the late 18th century. Thomas Jefferson considered that those who thought 
the constitution was sacred were misguided and that a constitution must be redrafted for each 
generation, which he suggested ought to be nineteen years.345 Yet, the American case is an 
exception in that it has survived over two centuries, unlike the 1791 French Constitution 
(from where Jefferson, acting as US ambassador, was writing and reflecting on the concept of 
constitutional longevity) that lasted only a year, and the global constitutional average of no 
more than two decades.346 It is, as the authors of the first quantitative study on the endurance 
of constitutions, put it, similar to the case of an old woman who spent her life eating poorly, 
drinking excessively, and smoking, yet living to be over one hundred years old.347 The 
American example is a fascinating case of constitutional theory and practice – for the 
constitution, although amended, is the oldest, and even survived political collapse in the 
American Civil War. Legal theorists are for these reasons drawn to the American model, a 
tradition which is followed here. However, there is danger in overextending its usefulness as 
a case study. The international context in which the American Revolution occurred is now 
sui generis, the late 18th century world had little of the internationalisation that influences 
more modern constitution making.348 The source of constitutional authority – the authors 
and the people – at the moment of American constitution making were in violent uprising 
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against the British colonial authority, and so could not take authority from this external 
source.  
 
Grounding the authority of the constitution in the authority of the authors or in consent (the 
people) is vulnerable to the same argument, that the living generation ought not to be ruled 
by those of the past. This was the position of Thomas Jefferson, who in 1789 wrote: 
 
It may be proved that no society can make a perpetual constitution, or even a 
perpetual law. The earth belongs always to the living generation: they may 
manage it, then, and what proceeds from it, as they please during their usufruct 
… Every constitution, then, and every law, naturally expires at the end of 
thirty-four years. If it be enforced longer, it is an act of force, and not of right.349
  
The principle that those who are living ought not to be ruled by the dead lessens the 
legitimacy of authority by consent. Although a generation today lives longer today than the 
mere thirty-four years given by Jefferson, renewing constitutional consent for every new 
generation would remove the stability needed of a constitutional order. Stability, however 
necessary it may be, does not provide legitimacy.  
 
Legal authority of a constitution can also be externally sought, and is perhaps required by 
international norms, if not by international law, and that authority is withheld if the 
constitution making process excluded public participation350 – so that, authority, in the case 
of a constitutional convention or referendum, for example, is granted from above, by the 
international, and from below by the people. The authority of a constitution may rest in legal 
authority if it can locate that authority in another legal body that already holds authority to 
enact such a constitution. In some cases, the new constitution may base its authority on that 
of an external legal authority, such as the colonial power. Take for example the constitutions 
of Kenya, Malaysia, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, which are modelled on the common law 
system of Britain, and which were crafted by the exiting British authorities.351 Former French 
colonies tended, likewise, to adopt civil law codes and French style institutional systems.352  
Constitutions written as part of the post-Second World War decolonization process 
replicated the institutions and law of their formal colonizer, in most cases, which was the 
source of legal authority for the new constitution. 
                                                 
349 Quoted in Graber, A New Introduction to American Constitutionalism (2013), 154. 
350 Tushnet, Advanced Introduction to Comparative Constitutional Law (2014). 
351 In the case of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Ghana, Kenya, 
Uganda, Tanganyika (Tanzania) and the Commonwealth Caribbean States, the British first granted 
dominion status (with dominion constitutions), before full independence. This was the topic of 
discussion at a conference (‘Dominion Status at the Twilight of the British Empire’) I attended at The 
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352 In the case of French West Africa, the colonial style constitutional arrangements that were 
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‘Models of Constitutional Jurisdiction’, in Constitutional Courts, edited by Harding and Leyland 
(2009)). 
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 Even if the constitution finds its principal authority in morality, rather than law, the 
authority must be genuine, and accepted, for if the constitutions lacks authority, the laws and 
institutions established under it, are also without authority.353  For H.L.A. Hart a legal system 
rest not on morality or the authority of its source, but on it popular acceptance. A constitution 
is accepted and followed if is it believed to hold authority and legitimacy, regardless of its 
provenance.  
 
Peace constitutions are not autonomous, but are tied together with the peace agreement that 
enabled them and which provided legal and moral authority for their enactment. The 
constitution does not become dissociated from the authority of the peace agreement after its 
implementation. Peace agreements may continue to be binding alongside constitutions and 
hold independent, and reinforcing, authority to the constitution. The peace constitution may 
not, unlike that ideal constitutional document, find a source of authority in a collective agency 
or a united constitution maker. 
 
The legal authority of a peace constitution is grounded in the authority of the peace 
agreement, which derives its authority in part from international law and from the 
participation of external actors. The peace agreement, also, in a circular way, acquires 
legitimacy and authority from the promulgation of a constitution, particularly in the case 
where there is public participation in that process. The foundation of authority and legitimacy 
of such documents, however, is normative. The authority of peace agreements and 
constitutions in post-conflict states is tenuous, as they lack the legitimacy of a constituent 
power, which is often internally fractious. In fact, a peace constitution is needed to establish 
a demos. This inconsistency is referred to as the ‘paradox of constituent power’.354 This 
paradox highlights the most significant challenges of crafting a peace constitution; that is, 
negotiating a settlement to a civil war by (re)structuring or (re)defining the members of a 
state as a single community.  
 
Constituent Power 
 
Constitutions are, in creation and design, political and legal contracts, that bind ‘the people’ 
to each other and the state and the state to ‘the people’.355 Even as this may be the case, the 
authority of the people to enact a constitution is ephemeral, as the foundation of authority is 
circular: ‘[i]t may be claimed that [authority] cannot derive from that of their makers, for 
their makers, standing at the birth of their states, cannot have authority themselves ... [as 
a]ll authority derives from the constitution that they themselves made without prior 
authority to do so’.356 Authority may then derive, not from the authors of the constitution, 
but from ‘the people’ who hold a constituent power.  
                                                 
353 Green, ‘Introduction’ in Hart, A Concept of Law ([1961] 2012), xix. 
354 See Loughlin and Walker, eds., Paradox of Constitutionalism (2008).  
355 For a more complete consideration of the different definitions of constitutions see Loughlin, 
‘Constitutional Theory’ (2005). 
356 Raz, ‘On the Authority and Interpretations’ in Between Authority and Interpretation edited by Raz 
(2009), 330. 
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The ideal-type constitutional document finds authority in ‘the people’; the people being a 
source of authority for a constitution that is intended to be enduring.357 However, the moment 
of constitutional founding is limited in time;358 beyond that moment, ‘the people’ become an 
abstraction rather than a continuous source of authority. In the same way, peace agreements 
are negotiated and signed by certain people in a moment of time, but the ‘peace’ they bring 
must be developed and tied to new constitutional arrangements that embody a new political 
settlement. Peace constitutions, like many constitutional documents (regardless of their 
origin), are typically elite brokered pacts, often negotiated and signed at the exclusion of 
broader participation.359 
 
As Thomas Paine said: ‘A constitution is not the act of a government, but of a people 
constituting a government’.360 However, it is unresolved in constitutional theory who ‘the 
people’ may be and if their act of constituting a government must be real or if it may be 
‘hypothetical’. The constitution may locate authority from the consent of the people. The 
people as a source of authority is, as an abstract concept, what constitutions often proclaim to 
rest upon, in the iconic words ‘We the People’. The idea of the ‘the people’ as the constitutional 
authority was a consequence of the move away from the divine as the source of original 
authority. The ephemeral nature of the people meant that ‘[a]s opposed to the apparent 
eternity of the sovereign power mirroring that of God (‘the King is dead, long live the King’), 
by becoming constitutional, time became finite’.361 It was in the authority of ‘the people’ that 
the American and French revolutionaries grounded their constitutional moment.362 The 
people as a mortal source of authority for a constitution that is meant to be enduring, makes 
‘the people’ as a source limited to a moment of time, so in the time beyond that moment, ‘the 
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people’ becomes an abstraction rather than an ever present source of authority. The people as 
a source of authority is temporally abstract and paradoxical. This paradox is described by 
Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker: 
 
Modern constitutionalism is underpinned by two fundamental though 
antagonistic imperatives: that governmental power ultimately is generated 
from the ‘consent of the people’ and that, to be sustained and effective, such 
power must be divided, constrained, and exercised through distinctive 
institutional forms. The people, in Maistre's words, ‘are a sovereign that cannot 
exercise sovereignty’; the power they possess, it would appear, can only be 
exercised through constitutional forms already established or in the process of 
being established. This indicates what, in its most elementary formulation, 
might be called the paradox of constitutionalism. 363 
 
The idea of the constituent people also finds symbolic meaning. ‘The people’ in ‘We the People’ 
is an abstraction, the idea is possibly identity creating.  Although ‘the people’ may not be a 
unit at the time when the constitution is written, that abstract idea of a collective, expressed 
in a document that creates a body of supreme and permanent law, may create that very unit 
that the document at once pretends to exist and vests with authority, and which is bound 
together under a legal order. The founding of a constitutional order cannot itself create a 
people, it can, however, define a constitutional identity amongst those bound, horizontally 
and vertically, to the legal order that the constitution establishes.  
 
The notion of the people is again symbolic as a representational idea rather than a true 
reflection of the people (whomever they may be) as a unit. The attribution of a constitution 
to the people in using the first-person plural, ‘we’ is normative, as ‘[t]here can be no 
attribution without the retrojection of an inaugural act into the past, but there is also no 
attribution without the projection of community into the future, such that what is held to 
have already taken place is what is yet to come’.364 What exists before the constitutional 
moment may only have been believed that have existed after the constitutional moment takes 
place.  
 
The idea of ‘the people’, inserted into the constitutional document in the language of the first 
person plural pronoun, ‘we’, is present in the concept of constituent power.  The authority held 
by the people is absolute in the philosophy of Carl Schmitt365, who saw the power of the people 
                                                 
363 Loughlin and Walker, ‘Introduction’ in Paradox of Constitutionalism, edited by Loughlin and 
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now, Schmitt’s categories lead inexorable to a politics that rests either on a blind hatred of the other 
or, perhaps even worse, to a cynical instumentalization and manipulation of the fear of the other in 
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to be held outside the authority of the constitutions; so that the people could at any moment 
remove their consent and authority to the constitution. This conviction that the people are 
superior to the constitution was also held by James Wilson:  
 
The truth is, that in our governments, the supreme, absolute, and 
uncontrollable power remains in the people. As our constitutions are superior 
to our legislatures, so the people are superior to our constitutions. Indeed the 
superiority, in this last instance, is much greater; for the people possess over 
our constitution, control in act, as well as right. The consequence is, the people 
may change constitutions whenever and however they please. This is a right of 
which no positive institution can ever deprive them.366 
 
Hannah Arendt, on the other hand, imagined the authority of the people to be limited within 
the law. The implications of Schmitt’s case that the people are the absolute and unlimited 
authority is the potential for the revolutionary moment to turn to one of mob-rule and 
repression. The people are ‘ever-changing by definition [so that] … a structure built on it as 
its foundation is built on quicksand.’367 Yet, Arendt sees in the people’s capacity to act in 
concert an expression of political freedom. The implications of this understanding of freedom, 
as one author argues, ‘is that during extraordinary politics individuals see themselves as the 
agents and the originators of their own political world. They become lucid and conscious 
historical actors’.368 Freedom, as Arendt defined it, is expressed in revolution, as ‘the 
distinctions, limitations, and inequalities that separate citizens and prevent them from acting 
in concert are transcended as the community participates in the deliberations and activities 
aiming at the genuine generation of power and the making of new fundamental constitutional 
essentials’.369 It is in this act of political freedom that the constitutional founding is grounded. 
But for this act to free it must be unconstrained by all that came before; however, in 
performing the political act of freedom, a justification must be found to ground the act. It is 
this paradox in the performance of constitutionality that sits at the heart of constitutional 
theory. A constitution granted authority by the people, must give to the people the necessary 
authority to hold such standing: 
 
Those who get together to constitute a new government are themselves 
unconstitutional, that is, they have no authority to do what they have set out 
                                                 
order to blame that other, whoever it might be, for all society’s social and political problems’.  It is 
particularly striking to consider Schmitt in the context of constitutional theory in divided societies, 
nonetheless, it is necessary to give some room to his position, particularly in contrast to Kelsen, and in 
order to understand the function of law and politics in the constitution. (Dyzenhaus, Carl Schmitt, 
Hans Kelsen (1997), 101). 
366 Quoted in Jonathan Elliot, Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the 
Federal Constitution as Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia in 1787, ed. by 
McClellan and Bradford (1989), 2:432, quoted in A Kalyvas, Democracy and the Politics of the 
Extraordinary (2008), 79-80. 
367 Arendt, On Revolution ([1963] 2006), 163. 
368 A Kalyvas, Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary (2008), 204. 
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to achieve. The vicious circle in legislating is present not in ordinary 
lawmaking, but in laying down the fundamental law, the law of the land or the 
constitution, which from then on, is supposed to incarnate the “higher law” from 
which all laws ultimately derive their authority.370  
 
Hans Kelsen, as a legal positivist, contends that only the law may hold the authority to be a 
constituent power, and that the people under a constitution can only be a constituted authority. 
For Kelsen there is no collective unity that can possess the power to constitute a new legal 
order, nor can a legal order establish a collective unity, as ‘only in a normative sense can one 
speak of a unity... the unity of the state’s legal order, which rules the behaviour of the human 
being subject to its norms’.371 Where prior legal authority is not present, which would be 
absent if the constitution were an originating constitution, Kelsen turns to a presupposed 
norm, the Grundnorm, which is external to the closed normative constitutional order. The 
reliance on a norm exterior to the constitutional system has found criticism in not 
acknowledging the agency of the actor, as an individual or collective, that holds political 
power to act, and begin the constitutional moment.372  
 
Carl Schmitt’s thesis is opposite to Kelsen’s. Schmitt finds ultimate authority in politics, not 
law. For Schmitt, Kelsen’s trust in the law as the source of authority for the state, ignores 
that the sovereign may enact any law, even if it is contrary to the original source of law-
making.373 Schmitt holds that true authority is to be found in the political, not the legal, act, 
but that the source of that authority would only become clear when the system was in 
jeopardy.374 Kelsen, in placing authority in the law, does not conceive of a prior political 
existence of a people, which Schmitt is critical of for confusing the political and legal. Schmitt 
accepts as true that ‘the concrete existence of the politically unified people is prior to every 
norm’.375 Kelsen, on the other hand, believes ‘that unity is—according to sociological 
findings—more a bundle of groups than a coherent mass of one and the same aggregate 
state’.376 This understanding of the state may better explain most societies, especially, divided 
societies. There must exist a political unit before a legal constitution can exist, that is there 
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must be an expression of constituent power at the centre of the constitution, according to 
Schmitt.  
 
This debate sits at the heart of the discussion on constituent power and the authority of the 
constitution. There is little that can be added to that literature in this thesis, rather the 
purpose of giving space to this debate is to acknowledge the long ongoing disagreement on 
the place of authority, legitimacy and power in constitutional theory, including on the very 
basic notion of the role of ‘the people’ in the normative constitutional order.  
 
The exact meaning and purpose of this phrase is contested, nonetheless, however it is 
conceived it is not synonymous with democracy. Democracy assumes some level of 
disagreement while constituent power assumes action as a unit. Martin Loughlin, whose 
explanation of constituent power is appropriate here, accepts that,  
 
Democracy is not easily reconciled to law. It is an expression of an expansive 
or innovative movement that asserts the capacity of the people to decide for 
themselves the type of ordering under which they might live. As the primary 
legitimating principle of modern political order, democracy fixes on the present 
and is orientated to the future. Democracy reflects a principle of openness. Law, 
by contrast, seeks to control, regulate and divide this expansive force. Although 
addressing the concerns of the present, law is orientated to the past. Law seeks 
the closure of that which democracy tries to keep open … This difficult 
relationship between democracy and law helps us to understand constituent 
power as the concept through which such pressures are mediated. Constituent 
power is the generative principle of modern constitutional arrangements. It 
gives juristic expression to those forces that constantly irritate the formal 
constitution, thereby ensuring it is able to perform its political function.377  
 
In accepting that constituent power is distinct from democracy, it logically following that it is 
also not synonymous with participation, which is now argued to be necessary for the 
legitimacy (and international recognition) of a constitution. Constituent power is a theoretical 
construct, rather than an exact expression of the demands of the people, which nonetheless, 
is a useful concept in considering the sources of constitutional authority. 
 
Violence 
 
Violence, like peace, is distinct to every context, yet to comprehend violence within a 
constitutional order, it is useful to turn to theory. The necessity of theory to make sense of 
practice, irrespective of its complexity, as Martha Nassbamn says, is that theory ‘involves the 
systematization and critical scrutiny of thoughts and perceptions that in daily life are 
frequently jumbled and unexamined.’378 Violence is very often considered in understanding 
how new constitutions come to be required – through revolution or the violent overthrow of 
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the government, as was the case in the archetypical examples of the French and American 
revolutions. However, violence is often not considered in constitutional theory, as 
constitutions are understood to be beyond normal political activity, and violence is outside 
politics. The faith that constitutions are somehow immune from violence is grounded in the 
belief that they are unaffected by the daily or the normal, until they are overthrown and 
replaced by a new document that is given the same elevated status. The belief that the 
constitution in some way sits above and out of reach of ordinary politics is to deny the daily 
impact the constitutional arrangement has on all people. The ideal-type constitution ends 
violence (both the actual occurrence of violence and the possibility of violence: 
 
Constitutionalism is rooted in the fundamental rejection of violence as a means 
to settle political disputes. The use of violence to inaugurate a constitutional 
regime contradicts the very point of what a constitutional order is supposed to 
achieve … A basic ambition of constitutionalism is for institutional decisions to 
produce political settlements. To do so, institutions and their decision-making 
procedures must be viewed by political actors as standing outside the terrain of 
politics, as constituting and regulating political life and not forming part of it, 
and as being indifferent among the competing political positions on the 
table’.379  
 
Peace constitutions, in the same way, are intended to move contestation out of violence into 
ordinary politics. A constitution drafted as part of the peace process is intended to end conflict. 
However, the potential for and the occurrence of violence has a bearing on peace constitution 
drafting and implementation. Violence can be a part of the process as well as the reason for 
the drafting of a new constitution. The threat of violence remains throughout the peace 
process and constitution drafting phases, and often continues into the implementation and 
post-transition periods. The requirements for peace are vague, and the potential for renewed 
violence lingers beyond the enactment of the peace constitution. 
 
Although there are many obstacles to the implementation of peace agreements, including the 
genuine commitment of the parties, the text of the agreement is drafted in the belief that it 
ought to be final and binding. The moment a peace agreement is signed, it can only evidence 
the intention for peace, but cannot, in the signing of it, bring about peace. Peace is, in the 
action of drafting and signing a peace agreement, nothing more than a promissory act, but by 
the very action of making it, grants authority for its implementation and authorizes the 
constitution that follows it. A constitution, or any law, may also be thought of as an act of 
promise. All laws are a promise, or contract, between the people and the state. A constitution 
is a higher form of that promise, one that is intergenerational and temporal. It is a promise 
by the drafters to the present and the future, and to the future, those not yet even born, to the 
past. It is a promise across people of a state to hold to the aspirations and intent of the 
constitution, and to abandon a state of violence for that of peace.  
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Traditional concerns of constitutional theory – the source of constitutional authority and 
legitimacy, and the idea of constituent power – are present in theory on peace constitutions, 
however, the distinct concerns and foundations of peace constitutions are not yet fully 
understood or considered in the legal or political literature. Peace is the foundation of the 
constitution and the grounding of its authority. Constitutional theory has a long tradition of 
measuring constitutions against democracy and as the outcomes of revolutions, but 
constitutional theory does not engage sufficiently with the concerns of peace or violence. As 
a corollary to peace as the authority of constitutions, the place of violence in constitutions 
needs to be further understood.  
 
Imagery and faith in peace is as important as the written words of the constitution. The 
narrative of peace as an Arendtian fable may provide declarative authority to peace 
agreements; peace (or at least the promise of peace) may also find expression in the constituent 
power, represented by the will of the people as a unit. War, as the political expression of 
violence, is normatively and empirically, harmful. Peace, as the antithesis of violence, is 
instead, widely desired and valued. A political unit may hold to the promise or fable of peace, 
exercising their authority as a constituent power. If violence occurs, however, that promise 
of or aspiration for peace is broken, which then breaks the grounding of the constitution. 
Without this grounding, the constitution holds no authority, and so no meaning. Violence, 
however, is not unlikely or uncommon in these circumstances. It is only consequential if it 
crosses a certain threshold. Its impact, therefore, is a matter of degree. If the type or level of 
violence is enough to weigh against the peaceful foundation of the constitution, it will destroy 
the fable. 
 
The belief is that a constitution sits above ordinary law and politics, and so is protected from 
violence which, according to some understandings of political violence, also sits outside of 
ordinary politics. These assumptions are grounded on a false premise that constitutions are 
immune from politics and politics from violence. In his The Idea of Public Law, Martin 
Loughlin, reminds us that: 
 
politics is rooted in human conflict … [and that conflict] may lie at the root of 
the political … [so that] politics as a set of practices within a state, is as much 
concerned with devising forms of co-operation as with conflict over them’. This 
first level of politics ‘conjures an image of struggle for security or for material 
gain, [while] the second order is played out primarily in terms of opinion and 
belief. … If the first order of the political concerns struggle and the second 
order revolves around beliefs, then the third order—the order of constitutional 
law—is driven primarily by prudential considerations.380 
 
The authority held by the people is absolute in the philosophy of Carl Schmitt, who saw the 
power of the people as existing outside the authority of the constitutions; so that the people 
could at any moment remove their consent and authority to the constitution. Hannah Arendt, 
on the other hand, imagined the authority of the people to be limited within the law. The 
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implications of Schmitt’s case that the people are the absolute and unlimited authority is the 
potential for the revolutionary moment to turn to one of mob-rule and repression. Violence 
sits along a spectrum between all-out war and peace, so that even those states that experience 
relative peace, are not immune from violence, whether in the form of structural or daily 
criminal violence.  The constitution may not actively cause violence; however, it may not act 
as a sufficient remedy to (structural or direct) violence. Constitutions bring order and process 
that allows for contestation in a non-violent way, however, structural and direct forms of 
violence effect those in the minority or without power. If the constitution is intended to 
constrain power – even if the Madisonian idea of minority protection is not included – then 
for violence to be present in society in a way that is widespread or entrenched, diminishes the 
authority of the constitution. A constitution without authority is then in danger of violent 
resistance.  
 
Arendt’s understanding of political action and her equal interest in violence and revolution, 
politics and law makes her work relevant to the theory on constitutional violence. Arendt’s 
understanding of violence is unlike that of other constitutional theorist who assume a 
necessary association between power and violence. For Arendt, violence and power are 
opposite, so that ‘violence appears where power is in jeopardy’.381 Power, as Arendt conceives 
it, is the province of the many, not the individual, unlike violence which is a tool of political 
action.   
 
Arendt conceives of violence as a tool that sits outside of political action. Violence, in her 
understanding, can be justified but can never be legitimate. Power, unlike violence, must find 
legitimacy but does not require justification being a normal human activity.  Arendt’s position 
on violence is in response to others writing around the same time who link violence and 
power.382 Violence does not have the authority, in Arendt’s account, to create institutions, 
rather, for this, power is necessary. It is for this reasoning, that Arendt sees violence as sitting 
outside of the ideal-type political activity which is realised through public deliberation.  
  
Frantz Fanon, in contrast to Arendt, believed that violence is able to destroy (colonial) 
authority, which could then be replaced by a new legitimate authority. For Fanon, violence 
would vest the people with knowledge and power. Violence is revolution and freedom.383 
Arendt thought violence created violence. Violence may, for Arendt, be in opposition to 
power, as those who hold power have no recourse to use violence.  
 
Yet, if power resides in the constitution (as it ought to, as an objective authority that exists 
beyond the realm of daily politics) the process of constitution-making is one that grants 
authority through the constitution to government institutions. The actors participating in 
the process have an interest in preserving or increasing the power granted to them in the 
constitution. The founding principle of the American Constitution, was not, as many would 
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think, individual rights and liberty, but the balance and separation of power between the 
executive, judiciary and legislature. Taking from the work of Montesquieu, the Constitution 
protected, in equal balance, power and freedom, on the conviction that only ‘power arrests 
power’. Power can be destroyed by violence, for ‘this is what happens in tyrannies, where the 
violence of one destroys the power of the many, and which therefore, according to 
Montesquieu are destroyed from within: they perish because they engender impotence instead 
of power’. Violence has command over power, which cannot be limited by the law, ‘for the so-
called power of the ruler which is checked in constitutional, limited, lawful government is in 
fact not power but violence, it is the mutiplied [sic] strength of the one who has monopolized 
the power of the many’.384 Violence is then ever present in the power of the ruler, for the ruler 
to exist, it must be at the exclusion of others. If power can be constrained only by power, what 
is to constrain violence, which can destroy power?  For Arendt,  
 
politically speaking, it is not enough to say that power and violence are not the 
same. Power and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the 
other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own 
course its end is the disappearance of power. This implies that it is not correct 
to say that the opposite of violence is nonviolence: to speak of nonviolent power 
is actually redundant. Violence can destroy power; it is utterly incapable of 
creating it.385 
 
Violence may also be understood as existing in law. Walter Benjamin believed that law is 
necessarily coercive, that law-making imposes constraints on political life, so it must be 
violent. The constitution as the extraordinary law that conditions all other law, must also be 
violent. Perhaps extremely so, given its level of authority. Legal interpretation also reveals 
political violence in law:  
 
Great issues of constitutional interpretation that reflect fundamental questions 
of political allegiance - [such as] the American Revolution ... - clearly carry the 
seeds of violence (pain and death) at least from the moment that the 
understanding of the political texts becomes embedded in the institutional 
capacity to take collective action. But it is precisely this embedding of an 
understanding of political text in institutional modes of action that 
distinguishes legal interpretation from the interpretation of literature, from 
political philosophy, and from constitutional criticism. Legal interpretation is 
either played out on the field of pain and death or it is something less (or more) 
than law.386 
 
Constitutional interpretation, like all legal interpretation, have consequences that go beyond 
the clarification or reading of the legal text. The judge must make determinations on the law 
that have impact on people, singularly or collectively. The level of impact of the judge’s 
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decision will depends on the context of the case. Robert Cover argues that ‘[i]nterpretations 
in law also constitute justifications for violence which has already occurred or which is about 
to occur’ so that ‘[n]either legal interpretation nor the violence it occasions may be properly 
understood apart from one another.’387 The interpretation of a peace constitution has capacity 
to cause (and prevent) violence so that the action of interpretation can be thought of as a 
(possible) act of political violence. Violence is not considered in constitutional theory, either 
in its connection to authority or as a part of a theory of interpretation. The judge is required 
to interpret the constitution, which can be understood as a violent act according to Cover. 
The law (and the constitution) is contestable, and in that contest, there is a potential ‘winner’ 
and ‘loser’. The action of interpreting the law necessarily creates some harm on the ‘loser’. 
Further the act of constitutional interpretation is an extension of the constitution, which itself 
is (often) the product of violence. So, while the law is interpreted, its interpretation, cannot 
be simply understood as the interpretation of literature, as the decision of the judge is a 
politically violent action.  
 
Benjamin also locates violence in the act of myth-making. Peace and the constitutional 
identity it is intended to advance is based on a promise or a fable. For example, Arendt’s 
concept of a fable suggests that authority may be located in the narrative of peace.388 The 
authority of the constitution can be located in the performative power of the peace agreement, 
in the same way that Arendt finds that the Declaration of Independence, as an action that 
arose out of nothing except the belief that all men are created equal, was the source of 
authority for the American Constitution and Republic. In the case of a peace constitution, 
following the same logic, all that is necessary to find authority is the fable of peace itself. If 
the authority of the constitution is based on a fable, and the action of creating a myth is 
violent, as Benjamin believes, a peace constitution is violent both in its act of creation, but 
also in its source of authority.  
 
Violence is ever present or lurking in even the most organised and stable of countries, and 
while constitutions are often violently overthrown, it is violence out of the ordinary that puts 
the peace constitution in jeopardy. However, violence is the breaking down of order, so even 
a peaceful revolution in which ‘the people’ reassert their constituent power, is an act of 
political violence; however, not one that amounts to violence as harm. A peace constitution 
may ultimately rest its authority on peace, however, if that authority is violent than its 
foundations are at odds.  A peace constitution holds peace and violence in equal tension: the 
peace constitution constrains and enables violence as violence constrains and enables the 
peace constitution.389 Violence, however, is a neglected concept in the current understanding 
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of constitutions. Violence as a fact is evident in constitution making and implementation, but 
the implications of this violence on the efficacy of the constitution is not fully understood.  
 
Even as violence is better explored in political theory than it is in legal or constitutional 
theory, violence sits awkwardly with ideas of liberal democracy. It is assumed that the 
expressions that give rise to violence have another avenue for release through the democratic 
process.  This unease between violence and democracy is a condition of the association 
between violence and authority, which is explore by Arendt and others. Notions of authority 
are based on conservative historical religious ideas, and are ‘incompatible with reason, for 
reason requires that one should always act on the balance of reasons of which one is aware. It 
is of the nature of authority that it requires submission even when one thinks that what is 
required is against reason.’390  
 
Although there are strong normative arguments in support a democratic constitution-making 
process, public participation and inclusion has relevance in the context of violence and 
constitutions. There is no clear consensus on the effect of inclusion on violence, while 
normatively public participation is beneficial to the process, it is unclear how participation is 
best executed and what inclusion adds to the elite level bargain that is necessary for a deal to 
be agreed. There is disagreement as to the benefits of inclusion in constitution drafting. There 
is a ‘belief that the process used to develop a new constitution exercises both an indirect effect 
on violence, by shaping who has a voice in choosing the substantive terms, and a direct effect, 
by influencing senses of inclusiveness or levels of compromise’.391  
 
Interpretation  
 
Constitutional courts are now commonplace under new constitutions, such as those drafted 
for post-War and post-Communist Europe, ‘third wave’392 democratising states and states 
emerging from conflict. The reasons for the move to the inclusion of strong-form 
constitutional courts are, for example: 
 
first, to ensure adherence to a new constitution and its protection against 
legislative majorities; second, to ensure unity and finality in interpretation, 
avoiding the possibility of different courts adopting different interpretations of 
the constitution; third, to provide a visible symbol of constitutional progress; 
and forth, to ensure that judicial deferentialism, which may have characterized 
previous regimes of judicial review, does not undermine the constitution.393 
 
                                                 
390 Raz, The Authority of Law (1979) quoted in Lang Jr., Violence and International Political Theory’ 
(forthcoming). 
391 Widner, ‘Constitution Writing and Conflict Resolution’ (2005), 503.  
392 Huntington, The Third Wave (1991). 
393 Harding, Leyland and Groppi ‘Constitutional Courts’ in Constitutional Courts: A Comparative 
Study, edited by Harding and Leyland (2009), 4-5. 
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A clear trend may be obvious, however, ‘[o]ne of the many paradoxes about constitutional 
courts is that, while their creation is usually the result of a perception that they have 
succeeded in other jurisdictions, their activity … is in fact peculiarly subject to the political 
tensions of the jurisdiction in which they are introduced’.394 
 
A constitution is transcribed text, conceived of in a constitutional moment that, through the 
act of judicial review and political amendment, moves from the settlement articulated in a 
plain text reading, into a broader constitutional idea. As an example, in a case contesting the 
meaning of ‘persons’ in section 24 of Canada’s Constitution Act, 1982 (known originally as the 
British North America Act, 1867), Lord Sankey delivered a judgement in which he reflected on 
the nature of constitutional change:  
 
The British North America Act planted in Canada a living tree capable of growth 
and expansion within its natural limits … Like all written constitutions it has 
been subject to development through usage and convention.395 
 
The metaphor for constitutions as ‘living trees’ that evolve over time and become something  
new, is fundamental to constitutionalism. However, it is not the well-worn metaphor of the 
living tree, which grows yet is always rooted to its foundations that best captures the meaning 
of the peace constitution. A better symbol would be that of a cloud, existing in a bounded 
ecosystem that finds its originating and sustaining source of existence (or authority) from the 
water below. In this meteorological image, the constitution can only continue to exist if it is 
allowed to do so by that which sustains it, or by those over whom the constitution exists. The 
constitution, or cloud in this image, continues to exist so long as it is believed to have the 
authority to do so, and upholds the legitimate political and legal order. The water can be 
symbolic of the source of authority, whether it is the constitution maker, an earlier or external 
legal body, or the consent of the people; the constitution takes from these sources, but is 
separate and superior to them all. The cloud, or constitution, in both metaphor and reality, 
takes on its own shape. The constitution is at once connected and part of those over whom it 
holds authority, but separate and distinct from that authority.  
 
A compromised constitution cannot be understood as an end-point if it is to function in a 
deeply divided state emerging from high-level conflict. To understand the constitution as an 
activity breaks with the more accepted understanding of the constitution as an entrenched 
and lasting document. A peace constitution must always be (re)negotiated through continual 
(re)interpretation so that it can break from its compromised founding and move beyond the 
divisions that were held at the moment of its signing. The symbolism of a cloud is a better 
illustration of how a constitution ought to be detached from its origins, rather than that of 
the living tree that calls to mind a document bound to its roots.  
 
                                                 
394 Ibid. 
395 Edwards v. A.-G. Canada [1930] A.C. 124, 217. 
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A constitution has no true396 or correct397 interpretation, it is for courts to navigate those 
political tensions that exist within the language of the constitution and the jurisdiction under 
which they sit. The grounds for constitutional interpretation are more than a theoretical 
preoccupation, the authority of the constitutional court’s reasoning and the legitimacy of the 
court and the constitution is found in the justification for interpretation. The rules of 
interpretation are, as HLA Hart calls them ‘secondary rules’ (including his ‘rule of 
recognition’) which are ‘concerned with the primary rules themselves’.398 In the constitutional 
cases considered in this thesis, the reasoning of the court relied on general and abstract 
principles of law, not on precedent and rules alone. The legitimacy of these decisions is 
grounded in the legitimacy of the reasoning and rules of interpretation adopted by the court 
and as understood in legal theory. The decisions in the cases (and as made clear in the example 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina where the Constitutional Court came to a different conclusion to the 
European Court of Human Rights in considering the same set of circumstances and applying 
the same laws), did not rest on a technical reading of the text, and so there is reason to argue 
that the court in these cases ‘made’ law rather than apply or interpret the law. This would 
certainly have been the position of the legal realist who believes that the judge has ultimate 
discretion in applying the law and is unable to be bound by rules or principles of 
interpretation.  
 
There are two main categories of judicial review: first, is the specialised and centralised 
category based on the Kelsen’s theory of hierarchy of norms. The first of this type of 
constitutional court was set up under the 1920 Austrian Constitution and is typical under 
European constitutions (since the Second World War). The second, generalist and dispersed 
style of judicial review, is characteristic of the United States and the United Kingdom, which 
is further grouped into strong- and weak-form systems.399 I borrow M Tushnet’s definition 
of strong-form judicial review: ‘the courts have general authority to determine what the 
Constitution means… [w]hatever limits there are on that authority, such as those imposed 
by the political question doctrine or interpretive approaches counselling deference to the 
policy judgments of the other branches, originate from the courts themselves’.400 There are 
also mixed constitutional systems which provide for both abstract (Kelsenian system) and 
concrete (‘American’ system) review.  
 
Aharon Barak outlines the methods of interpretation, between objective and subjective, 
outlined in the below table. 
 
 
                                                 
396 ‘A text has no “true” meaning. … All understanding results from interpretation, because we can 
access a text only after it has been interpreted’ (Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law (2005), 9). 
397 ‘In terms of the positive law, there is simply no method according to which only one of the several 
readings of a norm could be distinguished as “correct”’ (Kelsen, General Theory of Norms, trans 
Hartney ([1979] 1991), 130 in ibid). 
398 Hart, A Concept of Law ([1961] 2012), 94. 
399 See Tushnet ‘Comparative Constitutional Law’ in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, 
edited by, Reimann and Zimmermann (2006), 1242. 
400 Tushnet, ‘Alternative Forms of Judicial Review’ (2003), 2784. 
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Table: Methods of Interpretation 
 
Subjective401 The interpreter begins with language of the text to realise 
the author’s intent, following the same track as the authors, 
in the other direction 
 
The interpreter considers the historical and psychological 
intent of the author to understand the meaning 
 
Objective402 The interpreter understands that the text and the intent of 
the author are severed after the text is written; the meaning 
of the text is interpreted without reference to the intent of 
the author 
 
Four subcategories of objective interpretation: 
 
(i) meaning of the text interpreted through intent of the 
author, as understood by a reasonable person (therefore, 
different from subjective intent)  
 
(ii) text is interpreted as a reasonable person would interpret 
the language at the time of drafting403  
 
(iii) the meaning of the text is found in the objective purpose 
of the text or legal system  
 
(iv) the text is interpreted according to the interpreters 
understanding the meaning of the language of the text, 
rather than the author’s intent or the purpose of the text, 
relying on the subjectivity of the interpreter404  
 
Subjective-Objective405 Non-integrative subjective-objective interpretation:  
 
                                                 
401 Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law (2005), 32-33. 
402 Ibid, 33-35. 
403 This is type of interpretation is called ‘new textualism’ and is the approach adopted by originalists, 
see Scalia, ‘Originalism’ (1989). 
404 This approach assumes that ‘textual language is always vague and ambiguous; understanding is 
always a function of context, but because even context is vague and ambiguous, language does not 
pose an obstacle to the interpreter who seeks to realize his or her own ideas … [so that] law becomes 
politics, [such that] any attempt to present objective legal doctrine [is, according to this approach,] 
masking the reality that the judge interprets the text according to his or her political views’ (Barak, 
Purposive Interpretation in Law (2005), 35).  
405 Ibid, 35-37. 
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(i) two stage process, the interpreter aims to understand the 
author’s intent, however, because of a lack of information, 
the interpreter must also adopt and objective approach by 
understanding the meaning of intent of the author as a 
reasonable person  
 
(ii) the interpreter interprets the (objective) meaning of the 
text given by the author (this approach is used to suggest 
that the drafters of the US Constitution intended for it to 
have an objective meaning) 
 
(iii) the interpreter interprets the meaning and intent of the 
text as it would be understood by the current legislature, 
rather than the legislature that adopted the text406 
 
Integrative subjective-objective systems of interpretation the 
interpreter applies subjective interpretation (intent of the 
author) and objective interpretation (intent of the reasonable 
author or system) 
 
(i) purposive interpretation – uses a hermeneutic approach 
for the interpreter to use some discretion in interpreting the 
text, to find the objective of the text407 
(ii) pragmatic interpretation – as above, except the 
pragmatic interpreter is not confined to finding the objective 
purpose of the text, but rather able to make pragmatic 
decision408 
 
(iii) Dworkin’s system on interpretation (‘constructive 
interpretation’)409 
 
On the theory of interpretation, I agree with Barak who argues that, 
 
Judicial discretion exists, but it does not undermine the foundations of the 
interpretive project. It is rather, part of that project. Interpretive rules are 
                                                 
406 ‘The judge can only guess as to what the ancient legislature would really have wanted, as that 
legislature cannot express its disagreement with the interpretation attributed to it. … when the judge 
refers to the intent of the contemporary legislature, he expresses a conjecture that can be tested, 
because if the contemporary legislature disagrees, it can express its opinion and enact a statute 
governing the way statutes should be interpreted’ (Perelman, Logique Juridique [Legal Logic] (1984 
[1976]), 131 in Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law (2005), 37).  
407 Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law (2005), 288. 
408 Ibid. 
409 Dworkin, Law’s Empire ([1986] 1998), 53, see also Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law 
(2005), 290- 291. 
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critical to law. In the absence of interpretive rules, a legal text in the hands of 
the judge becomes an ax [sic] to grind as he or she chooses. The judge’s intent 
supplants the intent of the author of the text. The text loses its independent 
character, and jurisprudence is reduced to an exercise in the psychology or 
sociology of the interpreter. Law becomes a caricature of itself. Anyone who 
recognizes the existence of law must also recognize the existence of legal rules 
that bind the interpretation of legal texts.410  
 
This position sits somewhere in between Dworkin’s belief in law as interpretation and his 
faith in the ‘philosopher judge’411 and the position taken by critical legal theorists that law is 
simply a matter of politics. Ronald Dworkin gives perhaps the best identified argument in 
support of judicial review in contemporary jurisprudence. Dworkin made a career of 
defending the institution of judicial review, asserting that ‘[t]he United States is a more just 
society than it would have been had its constitutional rights been left to the conscience of 
majoritarian institutions’.412 Dworkin argues that constitutional interpretation is grounded 
in a moral reading of the constitution which ‘invoke moral principles about political decency 
and justice’.413 It is, according to Dworkin, the judge who must interpret the morality of the 
written constitutional text: 
 
The great constitutional clauses set out extremely abstract moral principles 
that must be interpreted before they can be applied, and any interpretation will 
commit the interpreter to answers to fundamental questions of political 
morality and philosophy.414 
 
Dworkin’s faith in the judge as the interpreter of the constitution rests on his believe that the 
judge is also the philosopher who can interpret the constitution through such a moral reading. 
Dworkin’s theory is normative; it is advice on how judges ought to behave in interpreting the 
constitution. There are some who would disagree with Dworkin’s belief in the ‘philosopher 
judge’; however, while the judge may not be the moral philosopher wished for by Dworkin, 
she may consider higher principles (or purpose) in interpreting the constitution.  
 
The language of a constitution requires interpretation, but it is not boundless. The judge 
cannot find in the text of the constitution something which could not be detected by a linguist. 
Language (and perhaps good faith in the process415) is the boundary, or frame,416 that holds 
the constitution to its foundational meaning: 
 
                                                 
410 Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law (2005), 39.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
411 Dworkin, Law’s Empire ([1986] 1998). 
412 Ibid.   
413 Dworkin, Freedom’ Law ([1996] 2005), 2. 
414 Ibid, 343. 
415 Tribe, American Constitutional Law (1988), 92. 
416 Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, trans./ed. by Knight, ([1934] 1967), 348. 
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[I]n interpreting a statute (in the narrow sense), one can only actualise the 
purpose of the legislation using its language. The language must be capable of 
actualizing the purpose … words are a means of communication, and those who 
use them must give them a meaning that is acceptable in the language in which 
they are written417  
 
The text of the constitution is a frame, as Kelsen imagines - as though the constitution is a 
work of art that is studied by the judge who gives some interpretive understanding to the 
shades of paint, the use of shadow or images drawn on the canvass. Without wishing to extend 
the analogy too far, the peace constitution may be like an artist’s exhibit, bound together by 
style or period but not contained to a single work. The judge interpreting the purpose of the 
constitution must look to other works of art by the same artist418 to draw inspiration and to 
comprehend the history of the original piece. In so doing, the judge considers the reasoning 
behind the constitution. In one of the first Charter cases, the Supreme Court of Canada, 
holding that the law in question was inconsistent with s. 8 against unreasonable search or 
seizure, emphasised that the Charter was a ‘purposive document’. Justice Dickson, writing for 
the majority reasoned that: 
 
Such a broad, purposive analysis, which interprets specific provisions of a 
constitutional document in the light of its larger objects is also consonant with 
the classical principles of American constitutional construction enunciated by 
Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland (17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)) 
… The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is a purposive document. Its 
purpose is to guarantee and to protect, within the limits of reason, the 
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms it enshrines.419 
 
Justice Dickson, writing again for the majority, in a case concerning the application of s 2 
(fundamental freedoms), repeated the Court’s understanding of the Charter as a purposive 
document: 
 
The proper approach to the definition of the rights and freedoms guaranteed 
by the Charter was a purposive one. The meaning of a right or freedom 
guaranteed by the Charter was to be ascertained by an analysis of the purpose of 
such guarantee ... the purpose of the right or freedom in question is to be sought 
by reference to the character and larger objects of the Charter itself, to the 
language chosen to articulate the specific right or freedom, to the historical 
origins of the concept enshrined, and where applicable, to the meaning and 
purpose of the other specific rights and freedoms with which it is associated 
within the text of the Charter. The interpretation should be ... a generous rather 
                                                 
417 Barak, P., LCA 6339/97, Roker v Solomon, 55(1) P.D. 199 [1999], 283. 
418 Hart, A Concept of Law ([1961] 2012). 
419 Supreme Court of Canada, Dickson JJ, Hunter et al. v. Southam Inc. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, p. 156. 
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than legalistic one, aimed at fulfilling the purpose of a guarantee and securing 
for individuals the full benefit of the Charter's protection.420  
 
This interpretive method used by the Supreme Court of Canada is common. The German 
Federal Constitutional Court, for example, took a similar approach early on in looking for the 
‘function’ of the rule under review:  
 
The teleological method is today probably the most important technique of 
interpretation n German constitutional law … The teleological method might 
also be characterized as ‘functional’, because it asks for the function which a 
certain rule as to accomplish within the context of the Constitution … Today 
the teleological method asks for the present purpose of the present meaning of a 
rule.421  
 
The distinction between originalism and purposive interpretation is its temporal perspective. 
Originalism is past-looking, while purposive interpretation is future- r present-looking. Kim 
Lane Scheppele very helpfully makes clear the difference between the two approaches as the 
difference between ‘because’ and ‘in order to’. Purposive interpretation considers the past, but 
does so only in order to imagine the future.422 
 
Language, Silences and Constitutional Interpretation423 
 
The environment in which a peace constitution is negotiated and implemented is violent (with 
actual violence or the threat of violence). A constitution drafted in violence requires a cautious 
approach, taking care in deciding where the constitution should be comprehensive and where 
it is better for it to be silent. There is a large body of literature that deals with negotiation 
and mediation in the peace process, however, as argued in the introduction, this literature 
(and, in fact, the practitioners involved in peace and constitution making processes) does not 
go far enough in considering these questions. Again, while constitutional silences were 
approached from a theoretical point of view in chapter two, silences in peace constitutions 
may be a consequence of violence, or, just as likely, may cause violence. 
 
The closest analogy to silences in peace constitutions is to the post-colonial constitutions. 
Ivor Jennings, who was tasked by the British government to draft the constitutions of their 
former colonies – including Nepal. Jennings (and British constitutional lawyers in general) 
was a constitutional minimalist, reluctant to include what was not necessary. Jennings, who 
was not involved in the drafting of the Indian Constitution, thought it ‘far too large and 
                                                 
420 Supreme Court of Canada, Dickson J, R v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. [1985] 1 S.C. R. 295, p. 34 
(emphasis in original). 
421 Friauf, ‘The Technique for the Interpretation of Constitutions’ in Proceedings of the Fifth 
International Symposium on Comparative Law (1968) in Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law 
(2005), 372. 
422 Schppelle, ‘Jack Balkin is American’ (2013), 24. 
423 This section benefited from a discussion with Asanga Welikala.  
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therefore far too rigid’424 and difficult to amend. The Indian Constitution is one of the most 
amended constitutions and the Supreme Court of India has been a very activist court, both 
things Jennings warns could not happen with such a rigid and lengthy constitution.    
When ‘[c]onstitutional politics threatens to absorb all politics ... the coinage of constitutional 
protection is devalued.’425 In favour of constitutional reticence, Webber argues that courts are 
given too much authority to determine constitutional disputes, which removes the dispute 
from the legislature, but also from the people: 
 
Constitutional entrenchment, by taking the issues out of the legislative realm 
and placing them in the courts, can promote a more passive and less 
participatory approach to the issues, in which citizens leave the definition and 
protection of their rights to the courts. That lack of engagement may in the end 
undermine the very interests one wants to protect.426 
 
The inclusion of moral values in a constitutional document can make it quickly out-of-date. 
For example, the Third Amendment of the American Constitution427 has no modern meaning, 
although at the time of drafting it held value in `the context of the war with Britain.428  
The constitution must be limited by its language. As Barak reasons ‘linguistics sets the 
boundaries of legal interpretation [so that an] interpreter may not give a text a meaning that 
a linguist could not give it’,429 however, the meaning of the constitution may still be found in 
the broader constitution through its framework. As Laurence Tribe puts it: 
                                                 
424 Dam, ‘A British Misreading’ in Constitution-Making in Asia, edited by Kumarasignham (2016), 
79. Dam’s argument is that the Jennings was too focused on the text of the Indian constitution at the 
expense of understanding the political and legal context in which it operates.   
425 Webber, ‘Constitutional Reticence’ (2000), 127. 
426 Ibid, 141.  
427 The amendment reads: No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the 
consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law. 
428 The same case could be said of the Second Amendment – the ‘right to bear arms’ clause. In a 2008 
judgment (District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)), Justice Scalia, writing for the 
majority, held that the Second Amendment allows individuals the right to keep and bear arms, outside 
of service with a militia, for the purpose of self-defence, which includes possession in the home. 
Justice Scalia was famously identified with originalism (see Graber, A New Introduction to American 
Constitutionalism (2013)). Mark Graber makes a compelling case that the Dred Scott decision (Dred 
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857)) ‘may have been constitutionally right’. In this case, the Court 
overruled an Act of Congress contesting the American citizenship of a slave, finding that the plaintiff, 
Dred Scott, had no standing as he was not considered to be a citizen of the United States. The decision 
of the Court is an example in where the Court was less progressive than the government. Graber 
argument is based on the premise that the reasoning in this case is a problem of constitutional evil. For 
Graber, ‘[p]olitical orders in divided societies survive only when opposing factions compromise when 
constitutions are created and when they are interpreted’ and that the ‘price of constitutional 
cooperation ... is a willingness to abide by clear constitutional rules protecting evil that were laid 
down in the past and a willingness to make additional concessions to evil when resolving 
constitutional ambiguities and silences.’ (Graber, Dred Scott (2006), 1, 3.   
429 Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law (2005), 19. 
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The Constitution’s ‘structure’ is (borrowing Wittgenstein’s famous distinction) 
that which the text shows but does not directly say. Diction, word repetitions, 
and documentary organizing form (e.g., the division of the text into articles, or 
the separate status of the preamble and the amendments), for example, all 
contribute to a sense of what the Constitution is about is obviously 
‘constitutional’ as are the Constitution’s words as such.430  
 
Interpretation of the constitution must take consideration of the language of the text in its 
entirety, not simply the language of the provision or rule under review, for the meaning of 
the document read as a whole may give rise to an interpretation that could not be found in 
reading a section alone. It is not to dismiss the authority of the text, or to find meaning in the 
language where none could be said to exist. To do so would fall into the danger of collapsing 
the principle of interpretation:  
 
Language is not, however, infinitely malleable. It may be vague, ambiguous, 
and capable of meaning different things in different contexts. But language 
cannot take on any meaning an interpreter wishes.431  
 
The language of the text is open to interpretation, and language itself is changeable.432 So 
while the interpreters of the constitution are limited, so that they cannot find in the 
constitution something which any reasonable person would not read in the document, the 
changeability of language over time and in understanding, allows some flexibility to the 
interpreter. It is this that means the judiciary and the legislature may legitimately disagree 
over the meaning of the constitution, or courts and judges may be at odds with each other 
over questions of constitutional law.433 
 
The constitution is interpreted and measured by its language, but also by its silences. The 
written text of the constitution needs to be interpreted, but its silences need to be given equal 
considerations. Those silences may be ‘implicit understanding and tacit agreements that could 
never survive the journey into print without compromising their capacious meaning and 
ruining their effect as a functional form of genuine and valued ambiguity’.434 The silences or 
spaces that are present in a constitution, most especially, in a peace constitution that is in 
competition with political violence, are as important to consider as is the adopted language 
and the constitutional canon. Constitutional silences may be intended – to leave space where 
                                                 
430 Tribe, American Constitutional Law (1988), 40 (emphasis in original). 
431 See Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law (2005), 24 who references Moore, ‘The Semantics of 
Judging’ (1981). 
432  ‘A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought, and may 
vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used’ 
(Justice Holmes in Towne v Eisner, 245 U.S. 418 (1918).  
433 The example that is relevant here is the opposing decisions by the Bosnian Constitutional Court 
and the European Court of Human Rights on the application of the European Convention.  
434 Foley, The Silence of Constitutions (1989), 9.  
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consensus could not be found – or accidental – as the future is open to possibility435 and, like 
the language of the constitution, are open to interpretation. Tribe who has written on the 
silences in the American Constitution436 makes the case that ‘[t]he text of the Constitution 
is not just words but also spaces, often gaps arranged in telling ways, not simply ambiguities 
around the edges – spaces which, it may truly be said, structures fill and whose patters 
structure defines’.437 The ‘unwrittenness’ within a constitution gives to it a way to transcend 
time, and to  inject flexibility, in as much the same way as the ‘unwritten’ constitution is said 
to do so. The distinction between the ‘written’ and ‘unwritten’ constitution is ‘analytically 
redundant’ as there are very few examples of ‘unwritten’ constitutions. Foley’s study, rather, 
is concerned with the ‘unwritten’ notion of the constitution as a ‘constitutional abeyance’ – 
that which ‘represents a form of tacit and instinctive agreement to condone, and even 
cultivate, constitutional ambiguity as an acceptable strategy for resolving conflict’. 438 The 
significance of constitutional silences or ‘abeyances’ goes beyond those constitutions that are 
drafted out of actual conflict. The crises considered by Foley are the years prior to the English 
Civil War, when ‘the English constitution could be said to be at its most unwritten’ and the 
American Constitution in late 1960 and early 1970, when ‘it could be said [it] was at its most 
written’.439  
 
Constitutional silences are easy to misunderstand or to see. Constitution-drafters may prefer 
to use vague constitutional language, which may give some indication of the meaning of the 
constitution drafters without holding the present generation to the will of the past. However, 
like constitutional silences, they are open to misinterpretation, and may leave too much to the 
discretion of the interpreter, which in many cases is the court. Silences, on the other hand, 
leave more spaces for future legislatures to amend the constitution.  
 
Constitutional interpretation, like all legal interpretation, have consequences that go beyond 
the clarification or reading of the legal text. The judge must make determinations on the law 
that have impact on people, singularly or collectively. The level of impact of the judge’s 
decision will depends on the context of the case. Robert Cover argues that ‘[i]nterpretations 
in law also constitute justifications for violence which has already occurred or which is about 
to occur’ so that ‘[n]either legal interpretation nor the violence it occasions may be properly 
understood apart from one another.’440 The interpretation of a peace constitution has capacity 
to cause (and prevent) violence so that the action of interpretation can be thought of as a 
(possible) act of political violence. Violence is not considered in constitutional theory, either 
in its connection to authority or as a part of a theory of interpretation.  
                                                 
435 As Hart notes: ‘If the world in which we live were characterized only by a finite number of 
features, and these together with all the modes in which they could combine were known to us, then 
provision could be made in advance for every possibility’ (Hart, A Concept of Law ([1961] 2012), 
128).  
436 See, Tribe, ‘Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid’ (1982) and Tribe, ‘The Curvature of Constitutional 
Space’ (1989) See also Tribe, American Constitutional Law (1988). 
437 Tribe, American Constitutional Law (1988), 47. 
438 Foley, The Silence of Constitutions (1989), xi. 
439 Ibid, 11.  
440 Cover, ‘Violence and the Word’ (1986), 1601. 
 99 
 
Arguments relating to the authority of the constitution are grounded in the traditional 
understanding of constituent power: that the legitimacy and authority of the constitution is 
found in ‘the people’ who act in unison and are in agreement with the constitution. Yet the 
very concept of ‘the people’ is often under dispute in post-conflict transitions, both because 
‘constituent power’ appears to be imposed from above and outside441 and because divided 
societies include multiple sources of ‘constituent power’.442 A peace constitution requires 
comprise between two (or more) ‘constituent powers’ with the intent of establishing a unified 
polity, rather than the constitution emerging out of a clear commitment to act as a unified 
‘people or polity’. The concept of ‘constituent power’ is complicated and there can be no 
automatic assumption that the peace constitution is a straightforward manifestation of a 
common commitment to a common political community, with common values, residing inside 
a united territory. The commitment to any common concept of the state often remains 
contingent on continuing political events. In such an uneasy setting, peace constitutions 
potentially hold authority because they are part of the political settlement. If this source of 
authority is accepted, courts can claim legitimacy to preserve that settlement, even if they are 
acting in an activist or political way. A court becomes the instrument to continue the political 
settlement and to balance the elite pact needed to uphold the peace, against the broader 
demands of the constitution. In this setting, peace is both the necessary precondition for 
constitutionalism and the purpose for which the constitution exists. 
 
Conventional discourses on constitutionalism and judicial review often understand 
democracy as the justification and grounds against which the political and legal 
constitutionalism debate is set. The reasoning of political and legal constitutionalism take 
democracy as the normatively appropriate end goal of constitutionalism and so disagree solely 
on the means to best support that goal. However, if peace is taken as the principal normative 
aim of a peace constitution, the grounding and reasoning of the discourse on judicial review 
is unable to capture the place courts hold in the political settlement. This chapter aims to 
outline an alternative perspective though which to read the case law of courts interpreting 
peace constitutions. In so doing, this thesis brings together the study of constitutional law 
and political settlements.  
 
Constitutional Identity  
 
Each conflict has its own distinct problems and protagonists, which are reflected in the peace 
process, agreement, and constitution. Additionally, a negotiation process rather than 
principled intent guides constitutional peace processes – making both process and outcome 
unique to the situation. The constitutive capacity of a constitution is of as much importance 
as its institutional design and may - in language and tone - impact significantly on a 
constitution’s interpretation and survival.  
 
                                                 
441 Dann and al-Ali, ‘The Internationalized Pouvoir Constituent’ (2006). 
442 See Tierney, 'We the Peoples' in Paradox of Constitutionalism, edited by Loughlin and Walker 
(2008). 
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Aristotle believed that the identity of the state came from its constitution. Constitutional 
identity is different from national identity, as constitutional identity results from the very fact 
of the constitution, its content and the context in which it was drafted.443 Constitutional 
identity is a relevant issue that needs more consideration in this context. Rosenfeld 
understands ‘the place and function of constitutional identity is determined by the need for 
dialectical mediation of existing, evolving, and projected conflicts and tensions between 
identity and difference—or, more precisely, identities and differences—that shape the 
dealings between self and other within the relevant polity committed to constitutional rule 
and favorably disposed toward the aims of constitutionalism’.444 Whereas Gary Jacobsohn 
believes that constitutional identity is acquired because of the disharmonious constitution, 
through a dialogical process.445 Constitutional identity may also be developed by 
constitutional interpretation.446 Similarly, and more in line with the argument being made 
here, constitutional interpretation may be influenced by constitutional identity.447  
Michel Rosenfeld, in writing on constitutional identity, reasons that the constitutional model 
and the circumstances under which the constitution is drafted are relevant to the resulting 
constitutional identity. He lists seven constitutional models. These are: (1) the German 
constitutional model that is defined by the ethnos not the demos (he also uses the German 
example in his category on war-based model); (2) the French constitutional model, that takes 
the demos as its foundation (in contrast to the German model); (3) the American model, which 
like the French model rests on the demos, however, unlike the French model, requires no pre-
existing nation; (4) the British constitutional model, an immanent ‘unwritten’ constitutional 
model that emerges and grows over time; (5) the Spanish constitutional model (Rosenfeld 
uses Spain as an example of pacted transition model of constitution-making) has a multi-ethic 
polity (unlike the US which has a multi-ethnic society) and imports transnational norms (in the 
case of Spain, European Community (now EU) norms); (6) the European transnational 
constitutional model, a unique constitutional model that would need to take characteristics 
from the other models; and (7) the post-colonial constitutional model (post-World War Two, 
so excluding settler colonies, such as Canada and Australia).  
 
                                                 
443 Sujit Choudhry suggests that the constitution drafting process in a divided society may allow an 
opportunity to craft a ‘political community’ (Choudhry, ‘Introduction’, in Constitutional Design, 
edited by Choudhry (2008)). 
444 Rosenfeld, ‘Constitutional Identity’, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, 
edited by Rosenfeld and Sajó (2012), 761, italics added. 
445 Jacobsohn, Constitutional Identity (2010). 
446 Rosenfeld uses the famous Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) decision in the US Supreme Court as 
an example, see Rosenfeld, ‘Constitutional Identity’, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Constitutional Law, edited by Rosenfeld and Sajó (2012). 
447 For this, Rosenfeld cites the Holocaust Denial Case (BFVerfGE 90, 241 (1994)) before the 
German Federal Constitutional Court, as an example, see Rosenfeld, ‘Constitutional Identity’, in The 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, edited by Rosenfeld and Sajó (2012), 771. The 
German Constitution may be one of the best examples of a constitution with clearly articulated 
hierarchy of values, which is a result of its origins as the constitution drafted after the end of the 
Second World War and the Holocaust. 
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In addition to these seven models, Rosenfeld suggests that there are six models of 
constitution-making. These six models of constitution-making, along with the seven 
constitution models, ‘substantially circumscribe the formation and evolution of the main 
different types of constitutional identity’.448 The six models of constitution-making are: (1) 
the revolution based model, where the revolution causes a break from the past, however the 
constitution holds onto certain elements of the ancien régime449; the invisible British model, 
which is not made but grown, and where constituent power rests in the parliament, rather 
than the people (this model is unique to Britain, and not likely to be replicated elsewhere); (3) 
the war-based model, this example includes the cases of Japan and Germany, which had their 
constitution externally imposed after their total defeat in the Second World War450; (4) the 
pacted transitional model, similar to revolutionary or war constitution making, except that 
there is no obvious winner or loser (Rosenfeld uses the case of Spain as an example); (5) the 
transnational model (such as the EU); and (6) the internally grounded model, where the 
international community has ‘initiated, guided and supervised’451 constitution-making that 
would not have occurred absent international intervention. The result of such external 
intervention is the incorporation of international norms into the domestic constitution. 
                                                 
448 Rosenfeld, ‘Constitutional Identity’, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, 
edited by Rosenfeld and Sajó (2012), 766. The work on the constitutional models in the Oxford 
Handbook is a summary of chapter six of Rosenfeld, The Identity of the Constitutional Subject (2010). 
(All below references to Rosenfeld are to his chapter in Rosenfeld and Sajó).  
449 Hannah Arendt explains the failure of the French Revolution and the success of the American 
Revolution. The American Revolution was fought against a limited (constitutional monarchy) 
government, while the French Revolution was in opposition to an absolutist monarchy. The American 
revolutionaries used the existing structures of self-government to grant authority to the Constitution. 
The French Revolution removed all existing sources of authority and so left a vacuum that was filled 
by power, not law (Arendt, On Revolution ([1963] 2006), ch 4, esp 165-6). 
450 Again, this model of constitution-making is unlikely to be replicated. Although the American’s 
attempted to do the same in Iraq after the 2003 war, the effort largely failed and has is not seen as 
legitimate. See Ginsburg et al., ‘Baghdad, Tokyo, Kabul’ (2008) who use the cases of Japan and Iraq 
as examples of constitution-making in occupation. They propose several reasons why the Japanese 
case was a success while the American involvement in the constitution making in Iraq has been 
problematic. One reason for the different outcomes, is that Japan was left with an ideological vacuum 
when the Emperor renounced his claim of divinity, while Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was not unified 
under his rule and other groups were present to fill the void after the dissolution of the Ba’athist party 
by the Coalition Forces beginning in May 2003. For more on the constitution-making process in Iraq, 
see Haysom et al. History of the Iraqi Constitution-Making Process (2005). According to a note 
included in the document: ‘This unofficial history of the Iraqi constitutional drafting process was 
drafted in late 2005 by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq’s Office of Constitutional 
Support. Although it was reviewed on a number of occasions, it was never published or circulated 
beyond a limited number of individuals within the United Nations’. 
451 Rosenfeld, ‘Constitutional Identity’, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, 
edited by Rosenfeld and Sajó (2012), 770. Rosenfeld points to Security Council Resolution 544 
(1984) on South Africa in which it condemns the 1983 South African Constitution for ‘[continuing] 
the process of denationalization of the indigenous African majority, depriving it of all fundamental 
rights ... [and so] declares that the so-called ‘new constitution’ is contrary to the principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations’.  
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However, Rosenfeld cautions that for this model of constitution-making to apply, the 
substantive decisions on the constitution must be left to the relevant (and domestic) political 
actors to prevent suggestion of bias and to allow the international norms to be internalised 
and viewed as legitimate by the people. It is this last category of constitution-making that is 
being considered here.  
 
In an article on the aspirations and values in the Australian Constitution452 – a document that 
would not fall under the category of peace constitution, although it has a troubled past (and 
present) with its Indigenous Peoples that is reflected in its constitution 453  –  it is suggested 
that Australian’s are ‘modest’ about their constitution, so that it is invisible in public debate, 
unlike the Indian’s who find aspirational values in their constitution454 or the German’s whose 
constitutional values are shaped by their violent history.  The narrowness of the Australian 
Constitution is given as the reason for the lack of aspirational value and feelings of public 
sentiment toward the document. The Australian Constitution, unlike many modern 
constitutions, is a thin, structural constitution, dividing power at the federal level and 
establishing the institutions of government.  Arguably, the benefit of a ‘thin’ constitution is 
to allow for debates on fundamental values and aspirations to be left to the democratic 
process.455 This argument circles around to the debate between legal and political 
constitutionalists. Rather the take away is that although the Australian Constitution is 
procedural, it is possible, possibly necessary, to find substantive and political commitments 
within the constitution.456 Further, that the ‘thinness’ of the Australian Constitution does not 
remove the possibility of finding within it Australian values and aspirations. Constitutional 
identity, values, and aspirations are embodied within the constitution, not simply with it its 
words or provisions, but also in its silences. 
 
Conclusion  
 
For any constitution, judiciaries and legislatures must always (re)negotiate and continually 
(re)interpret their constitution, allowing it to move from its founding political moment and 
adapt to address unforeseen situations and progress beyond the customs and norms that were 
                                                 
452 Stone and Arcioni, ‘The Small Brown Bird’ (2016). 
453 Williams, ‘Why It’s Time to Recognise Indigenous Peoples’ (2015). 
454 The Indian Constitution is ‘at once recognises and creates an identity, articulating a vision of what 
it means to be Indian. ... It is a constitutional experience that best captures the aspirations and conflicts 
within India because the battle for what the Constitution truly means ultimately reflects a deeper 
debate about what the idea of India signifies’ (Khosla, The Indian Constitution (2012), xiii quoted in 
Stone and Arcioni, ‘The Small Brown Bird’ (2016), 62). 
455 This is the argument made by Webber, ‘Constitutional Poetry’ (1999). See also Adrienne Stone’s 
reply to Webber in Stone, ‘The Means and Ends’ (2000). 
456 Stone and Arcioni, ‘The Small Brown Bird’ (2016), in particular, 66. Stone and Arcioni’s 
argument compares the US Supreme Court’s case-law on the First Amendment (specifically, New 
York Times v. Sullivan 376 U.S. 254 (1964)). The First Amendment, while protecting the substantive 
right of freedom of speech, is also procedural (John Ely Hart’s argument on judicial review is in fact 
based on the belief that the US Constitution protects process – see Ely Hart, Democracy and Distrust 
(1980). Still, the First Amendment is a basis of American national identity.   
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held at the moment of its enactment. Likewise, a peace constitution must move on from the 
divisions and tensions that existed at its signing to establish a sufficient level of stability, 
introduce new political and legal institutions, and simultaneously accommodate warring 
factions while moving towards a more united national identity. However, a peace constitution 
is, by necessity, a compromised and imperfect document, which may not be able to overcome 
tensions inherent in it. Courts, in their capacity to interpret and (re)negotiate the constitution, 
also in a sense (re)interpret the peace agreement as they articulate the nature of the political 
settlement captured in the peace constitution. Courts must balance the stability of that 
political settlement captured in the past on the one hand, with more universal and general 
ways of understanding the constitution’s foundation on the other, to enable its more 
particularistic understandings to be transcended over time.      
 
It is a matter of contention that drafting constitutions as part of the political settlement can 
be a remedy for conflict, as is often hoped.  However, such hope and belief is asking too much 
of a constitution. Violence can also be a result of constitution-making and the ongoing process 
of constitutional activity. While writing a peace constitution, the parties to the process are 
required to make numerous compromises in the interest of reaching a final agreement. The 
result is that the tensions normally present in any constitutional system become acute in a 
peace constitution context. Since most peace constitutions include strong-form judicial 
review, the settlement of these tensions is often left to the courts. 
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Chapter Four: Courts as Peace Makers? 
 
 
 
 
 
A PEACE PROCESS does not end with the implementation of a new (or revised) 
constitutional arrangement, and constitutional courts should be considered an instrumental 
actor in this ongoing process, and through judicial review engage as one of many actors in a 
continuing (re)negotiation. No matter what the original intentions of political actors to allow 
for a strong constitutional court, the peace agreement constitution cases under indicate that 
domestic courts often uphold the core tenets of peace, even when those clash with literal 
interpretations of the constitutional text or more absolutist notions of how human rights 
apply.  
 
Court seeking grounds on which to limit constitutional rights are recognising the ending of 
conflict as a proper purpose of the constitution. However, introducing a requirement of 
proportionality also allows space for the court to maintain discretion on those rights that can 
be limited and the extent and time to which such limitations are valid. The use of the doctrine 
of proportionality is a mechanism for courts to continuously (re)negotiate the constitution, 
which will shift as the state transitions from conflict.  The courts, in such cases, can 
reinterpret the political settlement between the elite driven compromise and the on-going 
demands of transition. 
 
Courts are relevant actors in considering how a state transitions throughout the political 
settlement.  They are not neutral arbitrators of the constitution but may also play a vital role 
as peacebuilders or spoilers of the peace agreement.  They are less visible then other 
institutions and may uphold or unwind the political settlement more gently. Both domestic 
and international courts play this role.  While domestic courts often are highly aware of the 
political context of their decisions and can produce a nuanced ‘peace jurisprudence’, 
international human rights courts, however, have often made different rulings and a review 
of how the same or similar cases have been dealt with illustrates examples where courts have 
adopted different approaches and become ‘unwinders of ethnic political bargains’. Richard 
Pildes, as an example, uses the Constituent Peoples Case457 in which the Bosnian Constitutional 
Court declared unconstitutional provisions of the entities constitutions that limited 
citizenship in the entity based on ethnicity. The Court found that all ethnic groups were 
‘constituent peoples’ under the constitution. While Pildes argues that this decision dismantled 
part of the ‘accommodationist’ political settlement, the decision also entrenched the ethnic 
divide in the constitution, recognising collective ethnic rights of the ‘constituent peoples’, and 
                                                 
457 Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Request for Evaluation of Constitutionality of 
Certain Provisions of the Constitution of Republika Srpska and the Constitution of the Federation of 
BiH, Case U 5/98, Partial Decision (30 Jan 2000), Partial Decision (19 Feb 2000), Partial Decision (1 
July 2000), Partial Decision (19 Aug 2000). For more on this case see Mansfield, ‘Ethnic but Equal’ 
(2003).  
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in so doing found a balance between democratic principles and international law, on the one 
hand, and peace, on the other.458 Christopher McCrudden and Brendan O’Leary borrow this 
phrase from Pildes, suggesting that courts can determine the success or failure of 
consociational arrangement, however, they admit that there has been very little research done 
on this question.459 Pildes also suggests that there is a temporal element to courts acting as 
‘unwinders’ – the idea of time as a crucial factor in political settlements is also reflected in the 
ideal of the ‘constitutional moment’, which is elusive in a peace agreement constitution.460  
 
Courts play a necessary and balanced role in the resolution of conflict on many levels of 
society, which includes conflict at the highest and most dangerous level of the state. The 
Supreme Court of Colombia (later to be replaced by the Constitutional Court under the 1991 
Constitution) emphasised in a judgement the value and strength of the Court to allow for the 
peaceful resolution of conflict: 
 
Conflicts and disagreements in Colombian democracy are frequently resolved 
in a peaceful and legitimate manner through political participation and 
representation. However, these political mechanisms are not trusted by certain 
minorities for different reasons, or are not responsive to the expectations of the 
majority of the people. Therefore, other means for resolving major 
disagreements that divide society become important. This is specially the case 
in a context where unresolved conflicts may lead to the expansion of violence, 
as had recurrently happened in Colombia. 
 
These other mechanisms in Colombia have been judicial avenues which provide 
open and easy access to constitutional justice. Thus, the Constitution becomes 
the ground where the battles that could have evolved into violent 
confrontations are fought with legal arguments. The forum for these battles are 
the courts.461 
 
Although Colombia has experienced civil war for over six decades, the Court was a trusted 
mechanism of the people.462 Trust in the court is not, however, necessarily present following 
conflict, and is based more on context than the institution itself. Generalisations across cases 
is challenging as context has more bearing on the outcome than set institutions or processes.  
 
Peace constitutions are distinct in their source of authority and constituent power, as well as 
in how courts are interpreting them to balance between the elite pact and more normative 
requirements of constitutionalism. Still, all constitutions are in some way the outcome of 
violence in some form.  To the extent that all constitutions have similar objective, this section 
                                                 
458 Pildes, ‘Ethnic Identity and Democratic Institutions’, in Constitutional Design for Divided 
Societies, edited by Choudhry (2008), 173-204, 195.  
459 McCrudden and O’Leary, Courts and Consociations (2013), 43. 
460 See Pildes, ’Forward: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics’ (2004). 
461 Cepeda Espinosa, ‘The Peace Process and the Constitution’ (2016). 
462 See Ríos-Figueroa, Constitutional Courts as Mediators (2016), 65-67.  
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refers to constitutional principles from more settled constitutional systems, which are then 
applied to the cases in the following section. This thesis proposes that courts interpreting 
peace constitutions are engaging in a common ‘peace jurisprudence’, a judicial doctrine that 
is grounded in activist purposive interpretation and the principle of proportionality to protect 
the underlying political settlement. In what follows, I contextualise the peace jurisprudence 
in constitutional law, turning first to foundational cases as distinct judicial decisions made by 
apex courts that have an extraordinary place in constitutional jurisprudence for having heavy 
implications on the constitutional canon.  
 
Peace Jurisprudence  
 
Foundational cases 
 
A part of the constitutional canon that goes beyond the text of the constitution which includes 
the peace agreement, is the judicial decisions which go to the heart of the relationship between 
the constitutional text and what might be understood as the political settlement. Such cases 
can be understood as foundational463 and can be located in the jurisprudence of courts 
interpreting non-peace constitutions. The German Federal Constitutional Court, for 
example, in the first case decided after the enactment of the Basic Law, reasoned that: 
 
A constitution has an inner unity and the meaning of any one part is linked to 
that of other provisions. Taken as a unit, a constitution reflects certain 
overarching principles to which individual provisions are subordinate.464  
 
The Court found, that by using this concept of unity, there were certain fundamental 
principles in the Basic Law that were superior to other political acts and to lesser 
constitutional principles, and that the federal government was bound by the decisions and 
reasoning of the Court. These included, for example, the federal nature of the state itself. 
Further, the Court in this decision asserted its authority to respond to constitutional 
questions at issue in the case, including questions not directly raised in the petition. In so 
doing, it articulated what it understood to be the essential aspects of the constitution that 
encapsulated the fundamental political settlement within Germany, and on which the 
constitution’s continued existence in that form depended.  
 
The Indian Supreme Court used similar reasoning in its 1967 decision Golaknath v State of 
Punjab,465 in which it found that constitutional amendments could not abridge or take away 
                                                 
463 One leading example is Marbury v Madison from the American Supreme Court. That decision 
altered the interpretation of the US Constitution by allowing courts, once petitioned, to review if 
legislation complied with the US Constitution. Marbury, like the cases considered foundational in this 
article, established the legitimacy of courts to conduct judicial review, but, unlike the other decisions 
considered here, did not go beyond that to articulate the basic meaning of the constitution. 
464 Southwest State Case 1 BVerfGE 14 (1951) in Kommers and Miller, The Constitutional 
Jurisprudence (2012), 82.  
465 Golaknath v. State of Punjab, Supreme Court of India (1967) AIR 164, 1967 SCR (2) 762. 
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Fundamental Rights enshrined in Part III of the Indian Constitution. In a second landmark 
ruling that overturned the decision in Golaknath, the Court in Kesavananda Bharati v State of 
Kerala466 protected the constitution from the proposed constitutional amendments of Indira 
Gandhi, finding that the basic structure of the constitution was outside the political 
amendment process. In this judgment, the Court established the Basic Structure Doctrine. 
The doctrine was subsequently applied by the Court to invalidate amendments. It has also 
been used to uphold the public interest litigation of the Court, which has made the Indian 
Supreme Court one of the most activist constitutional courts. Again, this case can and has 
been read as creating an understanding of the political settlement that must be preserved for 
the constitution to continue to exist in any meaningful form. If these cases are not to be 
dismissed (and all these cases remain controversial), they have to be justified in terms of an 
implicit hierarchy in the constitutional order that involves understanding the core conditions 
and values that enable the constitution. 
 
Similarly, the French Conseil Constitutionnel struck down a law for breaching fundamental 
rights found in the Preamble of the 1958 Constitution and the principles of the Republic, in a 
case concerning the constitutionality of restrictions placed on freedom of association.467 In its 
first decision, in 1971, the Conseil struck down a piece of ordinary legislation, and in so doing 
placed constraints on parliament. The effect of the decision was to read into the Constitution 
the declaration of 1789, the preamble of 1946, and the fundamental principles of the law of 
the Republic.468 The Supreme Court of Israel is another example where the court has ruled 
on cases that are considered as ‘foundational’. Here, most of these decisions were issued in the 
first few decades of the Court’s existence and, despite the absence of a written constitution in 
Israel, involved limiting government power on quasi-constitutional grounds.469  
 
Vicki Jackson and Mark Tushnet question the usefulness of categorising foundational 
cases;470 however, I suggest that the concept remains helpful in demonstrating a distinctive 
form of judicial review that is focused on articulating the basic meanings of the pre-
constitutional political settlement that provided authority to the constitution and which 
remains grounded in the constitutional text. In many of the examples given above, notably 
that of the Indian Supreme Court in Kesavananda, the decisions have had lasting and profound 
impact on the direction the court and on its subsequent rulings.  
 
There are two additional principles which have been borrowed by courts in decisions on peace 
constitutions which have an element of similarity of approach between the peace agreement 
cases discussed in this paper and traditional constitutional cases, albeit operationalised in a 
different way in peace jurisprudence. These are purposive interpretation and the principle of 
proportionality. 
                                                 
466Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala, Supreme Court of India (1973) 4 SCC 225. 
467 French Conseil Constitutionnel, Decision no 77-44 DC (16 July 1971). 
468 Jackson and Tushnet, Comparative Constitutional Law (2006), 586. 
469 See, for example, the Supreme Court of Israel, Kol Ha-am case (1953); the Bergman case (1969); 
the Elon Moreh case (1979).  
470 Jackson and Tushnet, Comparative Constitutional Law (2006). 
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Purposive interpretation 
 
‘Foundational cases’ find justification in concepts of purposive interpretation linked to the 
authority of the constitution. Joseph Raz, reflecting on constitutional authority and 
interpretation, reasons that ‘the grounds for the authority of the law help to determine how 
it ought to be interpreted’. 471 The authority of a peace constitution authority is found in the 
authority of the peace agreement and in the promise of peace. In intention and principle peace 
constitutions hold up peace, in its broadest sense, as their purpose. In all three cases cited 
below, the courts determined, implicitly and explicitly, that peace was the main purpose of 
the constitutional drafters. Locating the authority of the constitution, at least in part, in peace 
and following the link made by Raz, the interpretation of these constitutions rests on the same 
grounding. 
 
Aharon Barak proposes that purposive interpretation can be objective and subjective.472 The 
objective purpose being found in the ‘interests, goals, values, aims, policies, and function that 
the constitutional text is designed to actualize’ and understood through the language of the 
constitution.473 The subjective purpose of the constitution is in the principles ‘that the 
founders of the constitution sought to actualize’.474 The subjective purpose can be located in 
the history of the constitution, ‘including its pre-enactment history – the social and legal 
background that gave birth to the constitution, [including] the history of the procedures by 
which the constitution was founded’.475 In the case of a peace constitution, its ‘history’ is the 
peace process and agreement. Peace agreements, however, tend to be elite driven processes, 
that may not be representative of the broader population. Peace agreements are also political 
compromises that are far from the ideal type. Again, the peace constitution, unlike the ideal 
constitutional document, is unlikely to find a source of authority in a collective agency or a 
united constitution maker. Subjective purpose constitutional interpretation, in this context, 
cannot be settled as the purpose of the constitution is not settled and is a matter of ongoing 
contestation. The use of historical intent is therefore not particularly useful or applicable to 
peace constitutions (and, in fact, remains contested in more settled contexts).  
 
In both settled and peace constitutions, the trouble with according significance to subjective 
purposive and authorial intent is that the constitution may become stuck in time. This is 
perhaps best conveyed by Justice Lamer of the Canadian Supreme Court in his judgement on 
the meaning of the phrase ‘fundamental justice’ in s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms: 
 
[A] danger with casting the interpretation of s. 7 in terms of the comments 
made by those heard at the Special Joint Committee Proceedings is that, in so 
                                                 
471 Raz, ‘On the Authority and Interpretations’ in Between Authority and Interpretation, edited by Raz 
(2009), 332. 
472 Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law (2005). 
473 Ibid, 377.  
474 Ibid, 375. 
475 Ibid, 376. 
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doing, the rights, freedoms and values embodied in the Charter in effect become 
frozen in time to the moment of adoption with little or no possibility of growth, 
development and adjustment to changing social needs … If the newly planted 
‘living tree’ which is the Charter is to have the possibility of growth and 
adjustment over time, care must be taken to ensure that historical 
materials…do not stunt its growth.476 
 
The danger of a peace constitution being held in time may be greater than it is for 
constitutions written at other points in history. Peace agreements are compromise deals that, 
in many cases, have required concessions from both sides (and international actors) in order 
for agreement to be reached. However, when incorporated into the constitution, it is a risk 
that these tensions can freeze the social divisions of the conflict in time. 
 
Barak lists six internal and external sources to determine objective purpose.477 The most 
relevant being the fundamental values of the constitution, ‘embodied in the words of the 
constitution … as well as the objective purpose guiding the interpretation’.478 Fundamental 
values can also be found in documents ‘external to the constitution [which] encompass the 
constitution and form part of its objective purpose’.479 For a peace constitution, peace is 
without doubt a fundamental value of the constitution, and the peace agreement is an example 
of a further source of fundamental values that are external to the constitution but which must 
be considered as part of its objective purpose. Peace has no clear meaning, and although the 
word ‘peace’ is included in the Colombian and Bosnian constitutions480 there is no definition 
included. It is therefore at the discretion of the constitutional court, when referencing peace, 
to determine its meaning and scope, which in part explains the differences between domestic 
and international courts, as discussed below.  
 
Proportionality 
 
Proportionality has become a common tool in constitutional interpretation481 and again finds 
a different form in the peace constitution context. Broadly, there are four elements of 
                                                 
476 Supreme Court of Canada, Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, 504. The Australian 
and German constitutional courts have made similar pronouncements. The United States Supreme 
Court has, on the other hand, engaged with original intent doctrine.  
477 Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law (2005), 377–384. 
478 Ibid, 381. 
479 Ibid. 
480 See the preambles of the Bosnian and Colombian Constitutions; and Art 22 of the Colombian 
Constitution.  
481 Proportionality as a principle of constitutional law has its origins in post-World War II European 
jurisprudence. The principle of proportionality as a moral norm, can find expression in Jewish and 
Christian thought. As a legal concept, proportionality can be found in legal texts as early as the 
Magna Carta and finds expression in international law, the early writings of Thomas Aquinas and the 
doctrine of just war, see Barak, Proportionality (2012), 175-176, ch 7 broadly for the historical 
origins of proportionality; see also Poole, ‘Proportionality in Perspective’ (2010) who places the 
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proportionality: (1) proper purpose; (2) rational connection; (3) necessity; and (4) 
proportionality stricto sensu, or balancing.482 
 
Limitation clauses, which provide a means for courts to access principles of proportionality, 
are sometimes included in constitutional texts. The German Constitutional Court and the 
Supreme Court of Canada have been influential in developing the principle of 
proportionality,483 which has been ‘borrowed’ by other constitutional courts and adjusted in 
meaning to be contextual and contingent.484 The principle, while having roots in the Middle 
Ages, in linked to ‘the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century and the notion of the social 
contract’485 The principle of proportionality was originally used by German administrative 
courts in the late 19th century. It was only adopted into German constitutional law after 1950, 
when the Constitutional Court included it in its jurisprudence on the Basic Law; but, the 
Court did not articulate a test for its application until a series of cases from 1958.486 The 
German Constitutional Court, however, has not expanded on the constitutional groundings 
of the principle.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
origins of proportionality, not in post-War Europe, but in the classical period, especially in the 
writings of Plato and Cicero. 
482 Barak, ‘Proportionality (2)’, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, edited 
by Rosenfeld and Sajó (2012).  
483 See Grimm, ‘Proportionality in Canadian and German’ (2007). 
484 See Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (2004). 
485 The history of the principle of proportionality, while interesting, is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
for a more detailed history, see Barak, Proportionality (2012) and Barak, ‘Proportionality (2)’, in The 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, edited by Rosenfeld and Sajó (2012). It is, 
however, notable and relevant to comment on the concurrent development of the principle of 
proportionality and the social contract. The social contract implied limitations on the ruler, the same is 
true of the principle of proportionality which is to limit the state from infringing the human rights of 
the individual. (see Cohen-Eliya and Porat, ‘American Balancing and German Proportionality’ 
(2010)). The same purpose of limitation is not present in the current discussion of proportionality, 
which is intended to protect the peace rather than to limit the power of the state. In the same way, the 
PAC is not simply intended to limit the authority of the state, but also to protect the peace, a notion 
not directly considered in early discussions of the social contract.  
486 BVerfGE 7, 377 (1958), BVerfGE 13, 97 at 104, 108 (1961), BVerfGE 16, 194 at 201 (1963), 
BVerfGE 19, 342 at 348 (1965) and BVerfGE 95, 48 at 58 (1996) – for an explanation of these cases 
see Grimm, ‘Proportionality in Canadian and German’ (2007), 385-386.  
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Figure: The Migration of Proportionality487 
 
 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada, in one of the first cases brought under the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms, established a clear doctrine for the application of proportionality. The case 
concerned the use of s. 1 of the Charter,488 the so-called ‘limitations clause’. The Court 
reasoned that ‘[i]t may become necessary to limit rights and freedoms in circumstances 
where their exercise would be inimical to the realization of collective goals of fundamental 
importance’. The Court held that s.1 had to be interpreted ‘contextually’ as a result of the 
qualification that the government could limit otherwise constitutionally protected rights if 
such limitations could be justified in a ‘free and democratic society’. In so doing, the Court 
relied on the phrase ‘free and democratic society’ contained in s.1 as evidencing both the 
justification for limiting a constitutional right and the purpose for which the Charter was 
                                                 
487 Reproduced from Barak, Proportionality (2012), 182. 
488 The most notable example of a limitations clause is s. 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms which reads as follows: ‘The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the 
rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society’. South Africa (Art 36, of 1996 Constitution), 
Israel, New Zealand (Art 5, Bill of Rights) and Australia (s 28, 2004 Human Rights Act of the 
Australian Capital Territory and s 7, 2006 Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act of the 
State of Victoria) have also included limitations clauses in their constitutional documents. The 
European Convention on Human Rights allows limitations that are ‘necessary in a democratic society’ 
(Arts 8(2), 9(2), 10(2), 11(2)). 
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enacted, such that ‘the underlying values and principles of a free and democratic society are 
the genesis of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter and the ultimate standard 
against which a limit of a right or freedom must be shown…to be reasonable and justified’.489 
In coming to this decision, the Court articulated the grounds on which a limitation would be 
found reasonable and justified, namely, that the means chosen must (1) be rationally 
connected to the objective served by the limitation; (2) impair ‘as little as possible’ the right 
or freedom in question and, most importantly; (3) be ‘a proportionality between the effects of 
the measures which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the 
objective which has been identified as of “sufficient importance.”’490   
 
It has even been suggested, although not without criticism, that proportionality has ‘provided 
a common grammar for global constitutionalism’491 and some have even gone so far as to 
argue that it is an expression of the ‘ultimate rule of law’.492 I am cautious that the claim being 
made in this article of an emerging global ‘peace jurisprudence’ based on the principle of 
proportionality is not evidence of a ‘globalising’ legal trend, rather, it has been taken up by 
courts – in ways that address, in whole or in part, the four elements, without fully engaging 
in a proportionality test like Oakes – to allow for the demands of peace to be balanced gently 
against the activity of a continuously (re) negotiated political settlement.  
 
A key assumption underlying the principle of proportionality in domestic legal analysis and 
in the global constitutionalism methodology is its application in a democracy, with Aharon 
Barak, in his book, declaring that democracy and the rule of law are values that are ‘central 
to the understanding of constitutional limitations’ and that proportionality ‘can be defined as 
the set of rules determining the necessary and sufficient conditions for a constitutionally 
protected right’.493 The literature, with a few exceptions, limits the analysis of proportionality 
on certain ‘old world’ constitutional democracies.494 This literature goes into detail on the 
rules and application of the principle, however, the strength of the arguments are 
circumscribed by the methodological limitations of the literature.495   
 
For peace constitutions with judicial review, the court is given the authority that is re-
negotiating the constitution. Grégoire Webber provides a particularly useful understanding 
of the constitution as not as articulating an end-state, but as an on-going activity. Webber 
reasons that limitation clauses are a ‘promising avenue’ to allow for democratic re-
negotiating.496 The principle of proportionality is one way for courts to navigate between 
                                                 
489  Supreme Court of Canada, R. v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. 
490 Ibid, paras. 69-71. 
491 Cohen-Eliya and Porat, ‘American Balancing and German Proportionality’ (2010), 263. 
492 Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (2004).  
493 Barak, Proportionality (2012), 3. 
494 These include: the UK, Europe, the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Israel. This is 
evidence of a methodological bias that is present in comparative constitutional0020law, see Hirschl, 
Comparative Matters (2014).  
495 This is a consequence their selection of case studies, which necessarily limits the scope and 
generalisability of the theory.  
496 Webber, The Negotiable Constitution (2009), 13.  
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conflicting constitutional rights. Constitutional limitations clauses often refer to democracy 
as a justifiable means to limit other constitutionally protected rights. As with the political and 
legal constitutionalism discussion, democracy is used as the benchmark against which 
limitations are measured. In a post conflict transition, however, peace and democracy may 
have different requirements and require different sequencings. For this reason, democracy 
may not be the most suitable value against which to determine if the proportional limitation 
of a right is allowed under a peace constitution. Rather, it may be peace that is the more 
relevant and critical value, since peace is the prerequisite to democracy and not vice versa. 
Courts seeking grounds on which to limit constitutional rights recognize that putting an end 
to conflict is a proper and paramount purpose of any constitution. The constitutional courts 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Colombia, as the cases will make clear, upheld limitations on 
constitutionally recognised rights and, in doing so, accepted the need for certain rights to be 
understood as proportional to peace. Implicit in these decisions is a view that peace is an 
appropriate constitutional purpose. However, upholding a limitation using the principle of 
proportionality also allows space for the court to maintain discretion on which rights can be 
limited and the extent and time to which such limitations are valid. The use of the principle 
of proportionality is a mechanism for courts to continuously (re)negotiate the constitution to 
reflect the changing needs and customs of society. Nowhere are the needs and customs of 
society changing more suddenly and dramatically than in the transition from a state of conflict 
to a state of peace. In such cases, the principle of proportionality empowers the courts in such 
cases to reinterpret the political settlement between the elite driven compromise and the on-
going transition.  
 
Cases 
 
The cases considered in this chapter serve to illustrate what I suggest is an emerging global 
‘peace jurisprudence’. The conflict and peace process in Colombia is ongoing,497 and while the 
direct conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Northern Ireland ended, both continue to be 
constrained by their pasts. The constitutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Colombia were both 
drafted as part of their peace processes, while the Northern Ireland Act (1998), that forms the 
basis for the Northern Irish judicial decision, operates as the implementing ‘basic law’ or 
‘devolved constitution’ for that jurisdiction. In principle and fact the Belfast (or Good Friday) 
Agreement acts as a constitution for Northern Ireland, as the Judicial Committee of the House 
of Lords accepted in the case discussed below. It is this continued association to the peace 
process that make Bosnia-Herzegovina and Colombia interesting examples. The first case 
involving the Belfast Agreement and the case of Northern Ireland is also noteworthy case, as 
it involves a sub-state government and constitutional arrangement within a more settled 
national constitutional setting.  
 
                                                 
497 The Colombian government and FARC-EP signed an historic ceasefire agreement on 23 June 2016 
intending to end a conflict that has lasted over 50 years, available at 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/23/world/americas/colombia-farc-peace-deal-rebels-cease-fire-
santos.html?_r=0>, accessed 19 August 2016. The peace agreement failed to pass a referendum. The 
government has also agreed to a negotiation agenda with the National Liberation Army (ELN). 
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Northern Ireland 
 
The conflict in Northern Ireland has deep historical roots that cannot be covered in this thesis. 
However, it is necessary to give some background in order to contextualise the peace process 
and agreement. Although, the isle of Ireland was under British colonial rule from the mid-
12th century, agitation of Irish nationalism in the late 19th century led to a policy of ‘home 
rule’. A revolt against ‘home rule’ and for independence started with the 1916 Easter Rising 
and the election of nationalist party Sinn Féin in the 1918 general election. In response to 
raising communal tensions and ongoing War of Independence, the Government of Ireland 
Act 1920 was passed to partition the island and to enact a legislative parliament for Northern 
Ireland, modelled on the Westminster model, with judicial oversight. 498 The Act made 
similar provisions for the south, which gave raise to further violence. A compromise deal was 
reached in July 1921 between the representatives of the Irish Republic and the British 
Government (Articles of Agreement for a Treaty Between Great Britain and Ireland) to hold 
to the partition (although as a temporary measure with provision for voluntary reunification), 
with the six northern-eastern counties of Ulster to remain part of the United Kingdom, and 
the remaining counties to establish the new Irish Free State under dominion status. 
Resistance to the treaty lead to the Irish Civil War, eventually won by the pro-treaty side. A 
new constitution was eventually drafted and passed in a referendum in July 1937, which 
recognised the whole of the island as its territory, but pending reunification, the laws of the 
Irish Parliament would apply only to the Irish Free State (Articles 2 and 3).499 Ireland became 
a Republic in 1949 when it opted to leave the Commonwealth.  
 
The new Northern Irish Parliament was dominated by the unionists, with sustained 
campaigns by the Irish Republican Armey (IRA). The inequality and discord between 
unionists (Protestants) and nationalists (Catholics)500 and the failure of the state to provide 
relief, led to rioting during the 1964 General Election campaign and to the establishment of 
the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association in 1967 to push for civil rights reform. 
However, with sustained tension and violence, the British military was deployed in 1969, 
beginning the period of conflict known as ‘The Troubles’. In 1971, the British government 
instituted a policy of internment (detention without trial). The Northern Irish government 
was suspended in March 1972 with executive and legislative authority moved to Westminster 
under ‘direct rule’.501 This followed Bloody Sunday in January when thirteen men were killed 
at a civil rights march by the Parachute Regiment. In response, the British embassy in Dublin 
was burned down and the Official IRA attacked the Regiment Headquarters in Aldershot.  
                                                 
498 The partition was based on demographics. The north was 66% Protestant (who largely supported 
continued union with Britain) and 34% Catholic (who mainly opposed partition).  
499 Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution were removed by the Nineteenth Amendment following a 
referendum in 1998, in accordance with the Belfast Agreement.  
500 The terminology used in this conflict is problematic. I have used the terms Unionists (Protestants) 
and Nationalists (Catholics). The dual terminology disguises the differences in positions inside both 
sides, however, in the context of this chapter, a more detailed account is not necessary. I also refer to 
the peace accord as the Belfast Agreement, although it is also called the ‘Good Friday’ Accord. This 
is not done with any intention of taking a position.     
501 The Northern Irish Parliament was abolished in the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973.   
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The nationalists and unionists, with the British and Irish governments, agreed to a power-
sharing arrangement in the 1973 Sunningdale Agreement. The Agreement included the 
creation of a Council of Ireland and a North-South Consultative Assembly. The devolved 
Northern Ireland Assembly was established in 1974 which collapsed five-months later, 
resulting in a return to ‘direct rule’. The next significant step in the conflict was the signing 
of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 between the governments of Ireland and Britain, 
granting the Republic a limited role in the governance of Northern Ireland. The 
constitutional status of the Northern Ireland was contested by the governments of Ireland 
and Britain, with both holding claim to the territory of the North. The Irish government 
making this claim in Articles 2 and 3 of the 1937 Constitution and Britain in the Northern 
Ireland Act 1920 and Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973. The positions of the Irish and 
British governments underwrote those of the nationalists and unionists.502 The Agreement 
reached between the two states, therefore, was a significant step towards the peace process 
that began in 1994.  
  
Secret talks were held between the British government and the IRA from 1990. Further pre-
negotiation talks were also held between the leaders of the two largest nationalist parties, the 
Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and Sinn Féin (the political wing of the IRA). 
By late 1992, secret talks were taking place between Sinn Féin and the Irish government. 
These talks led to the Irish and British government’s signing the Downing Street 
Declaration, in which both parties agreed that it was for the people of Ireland as a whole, with 
the consent of the majority of the North, to determine the future status of Northern Ireland.503  
 
The IRA declared a ceasefire in August 1994, which was followed by ceasefire declarations 
by loyalist paramilitary organisations.504 Although the British and Irish governments 
published a framework for the negotiations, the ceasefire collapsed in February 1996 
following the IRA bombing in London. Peace talks continued, although without Sinn Féin.  
 
The final stages of the peace talks came about with the election of a new Labour government 
led by Tony Blair in May 1997. Blair invited Sinn Féin back into the talks, which resumed in 
September (the IRA having declared a ceasefire in July). An agreement was reached in April 
1998. The Belfast Agreement, signed by the major political parties,505 the British and the Irish 
governments, was a power-sharing agreement for Northern Ireland.506 The Agreement was 
accepted by referendum in both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland in May 1998. 
The British Parliament subsequently passed the Northern Ireland Act implementing the 
                                                 
502 See Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights (2000), 55. 
503 Joint Declaration on Peace' (The Downing Street Declaration), issued 15 December 1993 by John 
Major, then British Prime Minister, and Albert Reynolds, then Taoiseach (Irish Prime Minister), on 
behalf of the British and Irish Governments. 
504 ‘Loyalist’ is the term used for unionists who have a militant approach.  
505 The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) was the only major party to oppose the Agreement. There 
were eight Northern Irish political parties involved in the talks, along with the British and Irish 
governments.   
506 For more on the Belfast Agreement see O’Leary, ‘The Nature of the Agreement’ (1999). For more 
on the power-sharing arrangement see O’Leary and McGarry, The Northern Ireland Conflict (2004). 
 116 
 
power-sharing arrangement in a devolved assembly for Northern Ireland. The Act outlined 
the procedure by which the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister were to be elected, 
stipulating that: ‘Each Assembly shall, within a period of six weeks beginning with its first 
meeting, elect from among its members the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister’.507 
Section 16 left open what would happen if the six week deadline was overreached, only 
suggesting in Section 32(3) that: ‘If the period mentioned in section 16 ends without a First 
Minister and a Deputy First Minister having been elected, the Secretary of State shall propose 
a date for the poll for the election of the next Assembly.’508   
 
The case being considered here involved a challenge to a failure by the Northern Irish 
Assembly to appoint a First Minister and Deputy First Minister by the deadline specified in 
the Northern Ireland Act.  By the time of the facts in question in the case, the 1998-elected 
devolved government had been suspended and restored three times. When the devolved 
government was restored on 23 September 2001 the positions of First Minister and Deputy 
First Minister had become vacant. A vote was held on 2 November 2001, which was unable 
to gain the necessary agreement between the then main Unionist and Nationalist parties. 
Undesignated members of the Assembly re-designated as Unionists to get the required cross-
party support needed to elect the First Minister and Deputy First Minister on 6 November, 
by which time the six-week deadline had expired.  
 
Mr Peter Robinson, a Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) Assembly member, brought a case 
on the grounds the elections were unlawful and that new elections should be held in 
accordance with Section 32(3). The DUP, one of the then-potential ‘spoilers’ of the peace 
agreement which they opposed, were on the cusp of becoming the main Unionist party in 
Northern Ireland.509 Having not been party to the Belfast Agreement, the DUP were at that 
time hopeful of dismantling it and who were making electoral gains vis-à-vis the then larger 
pro-agreement Ulster Unionist Party on the back of their opposition to the agreement.  Their 
challenge therefore was more than technical – had elections had been called, the DUP stood 
a good chance of becoming the dominant Unionist party and of refusing to enter the power-
sharing executive, effectively collapsing the central political mechanism and the 
Agreement.510 
 
The question before the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords was whether the holding 
of a vote for the First Minister and Deputy First Minister after the deadline of 5 November 
2001 violated the Northern Ireland Act.  In what appeared to be an activist, highly purposive 
                                                 
507 Northern Ireland Act 1998, s 16 (1), reproduced in full in Robinson v Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland & Ors [2002] UKHL 32, para 3. 
508 Reproduced in full, alongside Section 31, in Northern Ireland Act 1998, s 16 (1), reproduced in full 
in Robinson v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland & Ors [2002] UKHL 32, para 16. 
509 Unionists (loyalists) support the political union between Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom 
(and are mostly Protestant). Nationalists (republicans) favour union with the Republic of Ireland (and 
are mostly Catholic).   
510 Sinn Féin was also likely to become the dominant Nationalist party in the Assembly had a new 
election been called. There were concerns that the DUP and Sinn Féin would replace the more 
moderate Ulster Unionists and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (a nationalist party).  
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reading of a text that was arguably ambiguous, the House of Lords, in essence read the time 
limit and requirement to hold elections as not applicable.511 They did so on the basis of the 
relationship of the Northern Ireland Act to the Belfast Agreement. Lord Bingham, giving the 
leading speech in the majority, held that: 
 
[T]he 1998 Act … was passed to implement the Belfast Agreement, which was 
itself reached, after much travail, in an attempt to end decades of bloodshed and 
centuries of antagonism. The solution was seen to lie in participation by the 
unionist and nationalist communities in shared political institutions … If these 
shared institutions were to deliver the benefits which their progenitors 
intended, they had to have time to operate and take root.  
 
The 1998 Act does not set out all the constitutional provisions applicable to 
Northern Ireland, but it is in effect a constitution. So to categorise the Act is 
not to relieve the courts of their duty to interpret the constitutional provisions 
in issue. But the provisions should, consistently with the language used, be 
interpreted generously and purposively, bearing in mind the values which the 
constitutional provisions are intended to embody. Mr Larkin [on behalf of the 
appellant] submitted that the resolution of political problems by resort to the 
vote of the people in a free election lies at the heart of any democracy and that 
this democratic principle is one embodied in this constitution. He is of course 
correct … [However, while] elections may produce solutions they can also 
deepen divisions. Nor is the democratic ideal the only constitutional ideal which 
this constitution should be understood to embody…this constitution is also 
seeking to promote the values referred to in the preceding paragraph, [namely 
the values set out in the Belfast Agreement].512 
 
It is also worth repeating here an extract from the opinion of Lord Hoffmann (in the majority): 
‘According to established principles of interpretation, the Act must be construed against the 
background of the political situation in Northern Ireland and the principles laid down by the 
Belfast Agreement for a new start. These facts and documents form part of the admissible 
background for the construction of the Act just as much as the Revolution, the Convention 
and the Federalist Papers are the background to construing the Constitution of the United 
States’.513 The language in this decision reinforces the idea that the 1998 Act, implementing 
the Belfast Agreement, is in effect a constitution for Northern Ireland, and that as a 
constitutional document it embodies and protects the values and purposes of the peace 
agreement. The decision also makes note of the tensions between democratic values, such as 
                                                 
511 C Turpin and A Tomkins agree that the ‘majority of the House of Lords interpreted the legislation 
purposively, the purpose being to maintain devolved government in Northern Ireland’. And that 
‘Robinson suggests that, when it comes to the interpretation of what the courts deem to be 
‘constitutional statutes’ (whatever that may mean in our unwritten constitution), different rules may 
apply from those which govern the interpretation of ordinary (i.e. nonconstitutional) legislation.’  
Turpin and Tompkins, British Government and the Constitution (2007), 70-71. 
512 Robinson v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland & Ors [2002] UKHL 32, para 10-11. 
513 Robinson v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland & Ors [2002] UKHL 32, para 33. 
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election and parliamentary procedure and strict compliance with the constitutional text (in 
this case the Northern Ireland Act), and values of peace and reconciliation can possibly be 
worsened by enforcing such democratic processes even when the effect would be to end the 
possibilities for democratic self-government. The House of Lords does not use the language 
of proportionality explicitly (which would not immediately have had the same connotation in 
British constitutional practice in any case), however, they rejected the petition of the appellant 
on the grounds that the provision of the Act requiring elections should a First Minister and 
Deputy First Minister not be elected was not intended to constrain the Assembly from acting, 
and that the provision ‘must be read in context’.514 The House of Lords sought to preserve 
the arrangements in the original agreement in its spirit, even at the expense of the strict 
literal meaning of the implementing Northern Ireland Act.  This case was brought shortly 
after the passing of the Act, making the decision in this case relevant to the success of the 
peace accord. The position taken in this case is an example in which the underlying political 
settlement was endorsed and protected by the judiciary, at the expense almost of the wording 
of the Northern Ireland Act, demonstrating the essential role of this ‘least dangerous 
branch’515 of government in managing the ongoing political settlement process.  
 
Bosnia-Herzegovina  
 
Again, while the complete history of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia is beyond the scope of this thesis, a brief account is needed to provide some context 
to the peace process. The conflict in the former Yugoslavia began after the end of the Cold 
War and the death of Communist leader, Josip Broz Tito. The federal system of Yugoslavia 
held together the six republics of Serbia (which included the autonomous provinces of Kosovo 
and Vojvodina), Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. The 
preamble to the 1974 Constitution held that: ‘The nations of Yugoslavia, proceeding from the 
right of every nation to self-determination, including the right to secession on the basis of 
their will freely expressed ... have together with the nationalities with which they live, united 
in a federal republic of free and equal nations and nationalities and founded on a socialist 
federal community of working people – the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’516 The 
republics of Slovenia and Croatia declared independence from Yugoslavia on 25 June 1991. 
This was followed by Bosnia’s declaration in March 1992.  Conflict broke out in Croatia and 
Bosnia when their Serbian minority populations made bids to remain in Yugoslavia, and the 
Croat nationalists in Bosnia attempted to form their own sub-state. The conflict in Yugoslavia 
is in fact five conflicts: (1) the first was the brief war between the Yugoslav’s People’s Army 
(YPA) and the newly declared independent state of Slovenia; (2) the second was the conflict 
in Croatia, that like Slovenia, eventually successful but only after a protracted war; (3) the 
third war was between the Croatian army and the Serbian minority in Krajina which ended 
                                                 
514 Robinson v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland & Ors [2002] UKHL 32, para 17. 
515 Alexander Hamilton contended that the US Supreme Court would be the ‘least dangerous to the 
political rights of the Constitution’ (Hamilton, Federalist No. 78 ([1788] 2009)). 
516 Cited in Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights (2000), 92. The fact that the Constitution 
recognised the federal borders of the republics allowed the newly independent state to make a stronger 
claim of self-determination.  
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when the Croatian army pushed out most of the Serbs; (4) the forth conflict is the one in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina that began following their bid for independence in 1992; (5) the fifth 
conflict was in Kosovo between Serbia and the ethnic Albanians who made claims on self-
determination, and the war between NATO and the Serbian army that resulted.517 The deadly 
and protracted conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina lasted until 1995. The upper-hand that was 
held by Serbia was reversed in the summer of 1995 by NATO’s military campaign, an 
American diplomatic push, and a coordinated Croat and Bosniak offensive.  
 
The Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina was drafted as an annex to The General Framework 
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Agreement), the final peace 
agreement to resolve the war in the former Yugoslavia.518 The Agreement was drafted in 
November 1995 under the supervision of the European Union special negotiator and 
delegates from France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. The 
Agreement recognised the new state of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a decentralised federation 
composed of two entities, the Republic of Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
A power-sharing arrangement was agreed at the state federal level recognising Bosniacs, 
Croats and Serbs as ‘constituent peoples’, thereby, limiting election to the presidency and 
upper house to members of these groups.519 The power-sharing arrangement was a necessary 
compromise needed to allow the Dayton Agreement and in particular its commitment to a 
central Bosnian state to go forward.520 The Constitution also incorporated the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to ‘apply directly in Bosnia and Herzegovina.’521 
 
Over time the foundation of the power-sharing arrangement, the provision that Serbs, Croats, 
and Bosniacs only were ‘constituent peoples’, was challenged.  In a case concerning the 
constitutionality of the electoral law the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina - 
comprised of a careful balance of Bosniak, Croat, Serbian and international judges found that: 
 
the provision of Article 8 of the Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina [on 
the election of the Presidency], including Article V of the Constitution of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, should be viewed in the light of discretionary right 
                                                 
517 Ullman, ‘Introduction’, in The World and Yugoslavia’s Wars, edited by Ullman (1996), 1-2; see 
also Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights (2000), 94, who also looked at the final Yugoslav 
conflict in Kosovo.  
518 For a complete history of the peace process and a more considered evaluation of the Dayton 
Agreement and the constitution see Szasz, ‘The Quest for a Bosnian Constitution’ (1995).  See also 
O’Brien, ‘The Dayton Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, in Framing the State, edited by 
Miller (2010). 
519 The Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina sets out in the preamble that the constitution is ‘dedicated 
to peace, justice, tolerance and reconciliation’ and is determined by the ‘Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs, 
as constituent peoples (along with Others), and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina’. 
520 PW Galbraith, United State ambassador to Croatia between 1993 and 1998, in an interview with B 
O’Leary in August 2012, suggests that ‘absent explicitly ethnic power-sharing assurances to the three 
main groups the negotiations would neither have begun or concluded’ (McCrudden and O’Leary, 
Courts and Consociations (2013), 24). 
521 Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Art II (2). 
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of the State to impose certain restrictions when it comes to the exercise of 
individual rights. The said restrictions are justified by the specific nature of 
internal order of Bosnia and Herzegovina that was agreed upon by Dayton 
Agreement and whose ultimate goal was the establishment of peace and 
dialogue between the opposing parties … [The articles] serve a legitimate 
aim, that they are reasonably justified and that they do not place an excessive 
burden on the appellants given that the restrictions imposed on the appellants’ 
rights are proportional to the objectives of general community in terms of 
preservation of the established peace.522 
 
Justice Feldman, one of the three international judges on the Court, wrote, in his concurring 
opinion, that he regarded ‘the justification as being temporary rather than permanent’, 
concluding, however, that ‘the time [had] not yet arrived when the State [had] completed 
its transition away from the special needs which dictated the unusual architecture of the State 
under the Dayton Agreement and the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina.’523  Justice 
Feldman’s reasoning hints that the political process will eventually hit a stage at which time 
a justification on the grounds accepted in this case would not be constitutional. 
 
In a second case on a similar matter, the Court found that: 
 
The…restrictions are justified by the specific nature of internal order of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina that was agreed upon by Dayton Agreement and whose 
ultimate goal was the establishment of peace and dialogue between the 
opposing parties given that the said provision was intentionally incorporated 
into the Constitution… [and that such restrictions] are proportional to the 
objective of general community in terms of preservation of the established 
peace [and] continuation of dialogue.524  
 
The decisions of the Bosnian Constitutional Court reflect the theories of Richard Pildes525 
and Samuel Issacharoff,526 who agree that constitutional courts tend to be restrained when 
power-sharing arrangements are in tension with human rights provisions. This article goes 
further than the conclusions made by Pildes and Issacharoff, in suggesting that the Court is 
picking up the principal of proportionality to safeguard the power-sharing arrangement, 
although the Court did exercise caution in these cases. Further, as Justice Feldman holds the 
Court does not hold the constitutional authority to go beyond the constitution in determining 
legal and constitutional issues to bring the state law or constitution in line with Bosnia’s 
                                                 
522 Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Admissibility & Merits, Case No. AP-2678/06, 29 
Sept 2006, para 21-22.  
523 Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Admissibility & Merits, Case No. AP-2678/06, 29 
Sept 2006, Separate Concurring Opinion of Judge David Feldman, para 3.  
524 Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Decision on Admissibility and Merits, U-5/09, 25 
Sept 2009 cited in McCrudden and O’Leary (n 507) 89. 
525 Pildes, ’Forward: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics’ (2004). 
526 Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies (2015). 
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international obligations under the Convention.527 However, as I discuss below, the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) came to the opposite decision in its judgment on the power-
sharing arrangement, raising the question of whether and how regional or international 
courts apply a ‘peace jurisprudence’. The ECtHR rejected the reasoning of the Constitutional 
Court, upholding the individual rights of the applicants over the power-sharing arrangement, 
in effect, finding the Constitution to be in violation of the Convention and Protocol.  
 
Colombia 
 
The situation in Colombia is unlike that in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Northern Ireland as the 
civil war is not yet resolved despite several peace agreements having been signed over the 
fifty-year duration of the conflict. The conflict in Colombia has its roots in the political, and 
sometimes violent, battle between the Liberal and Conservative parties. The 1886 
Constitution528, the one in effect until the enactment of the new 1991 Constitution, was 
adopted by the Conservative government, and replaced the 1863 Constitution of the previous 
Liberal Government. The 1886 Constitution was highly centralised and authoritarian, 
concentrating power in the president, who frequently used the emergency powers of the 
constitution to suspend the constitution.  
 
The two most relevant groups are the FARC and the ELN. The ELN was formed in 1964, 
inspired by the Cuban revolution. The FARC, established in 1966, as a revolutionary Marxist 
group. The other guerrilla groups that have significantly impacted on Colombian politics are 
the Ejército Popular de Liberación (Popular Liberation Army, EPL), founded in 1968, and the 
Movimiento 19 de Abril (April 19 Movement, M-19), founded in 1973. These groups were 
urban-based groups. The government negotiated the successful demobilisation and 
disbandment of the M-19 in a process that culminated in the enactment of the 1991 
Constitution. The EPL also demobilised in the 1990s. 
 
Paramilitary groups formed in the 1960s as state sponsored militias529 in reaction to the rise 
of the guerrilla groups, and in the 1970s and 1980s as private military for landowners and 
drug traffickers. Official state support of these groups was removed in the late 1980s after the 
La Rochela massacre in January 1989 in which paramilitaries murdered members of a judicial 
commission. However, continued collaboration between the security forces and paramilitary 
groups has been documented by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.530 These groups 
organised together in 1997 under the Autofensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self Defense 
Units of Colombia, AUC). 
                                                 
527 Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Decision on Admissibility, Case No. U13/05, 
Separate Concurring Opinion of Judge David Feldman, 26 May 2006, para 4. 
528 Amended in 1910, 1936rt and 1945. 
529 Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report on the Demobililzation Process in Colombia, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.120, doc. 
60 para. 36 (Dec. 13, 2004). 
530 Merchants v. Colombia, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 109 (July 5, 2004); Mapiripán 
Massacre v. Colombia, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 134 (Sept. 15, 2005); Pueblo Bello 
Massacre v. Colombia, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 140 (Jan. 31, 2006); Ituango Massacres 
v. Colombia, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 148 (July 1, 2006). 
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The 1991 Constitution of Colombia replaced the 1886 Constitution. The new constitution of 
Colombia created the Constitutional Court, which, in accordance with Article 24, is entrusted 
to ‘[safeguard] the integrity and supremacy of the Constitution’.531 The institution of 
constitutional review, however, was not unique to the 1991 Constitution. Under the previous 
1886 Constitution, the Supreme Court of Justice (CSJ) was called on to rule on the 
constitutionality of a national law when there was a disagreement concerning its 
constitutionality between the President and Congress. The judicial review function of the 
Court was extended in the 1910 amendment. The Supreme Court of Justice was a court of 
cassation and a constitutional court, with four chambers, including a constitutional chamber. 
The Constitutional Chamber would consider the claim before it would be decided on by the 
full court of twenty-four judges. The Supreme Court of Justice was also an active court, but 
limited it activism to structural questions. David Landau puts the approach of the pre-1991 
Supreme Court of Justice in his first category, arguing that the Court made little distinction 
between ordinary legislation and the constitution, taking a strongly Kelsenian view, expect 
in decisions concerning the separation of powers doctrine, which the Court considered to be 
a principle pillar of the Constitution.532 In line with this approach, the Court made a series of 
judgments limiting the executive’s capacity in a constitutional emergency or state of siege.533  
 
In an early decision, the Court listed some of the constitutional values and principles that 
inform the constitution and constitutional interpretation, including peace as ‘captured in the 
preamble to the constitution’.534 The Court has been judicially active and progressive,535 
rulings on laws that have bearing on the continuing peace process and in a way that supports 
the idea of an emerging ‘peace jurisprudence’. 
 
In an initiative of the Uribe government from 2003 onwards, the government passed the 
Justice and Peace Law in 2005 (Law 975)536 as part of a ‘peace process’ with the United Self-
Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). These were right wing paramilitary groups who sought 
to uphold a ‘pro-state’ agenda and were often alleged to be acting in collusion with elements 
of the government meaning that the concept of a ‘peace process’ between these groups and 
the government was contentious. However, both the AUC and the government signed the 
Santa Fe de Ralito Agreement in July 2003, setting out the terms for the demobilisation and 
reintegration of AUC members. The Agreement included provisions limiting the prosecution 
of demobilised members. As a part of this process, in the period between November 2003 and 
                                                 
531 There are four courts under the Constitution of Colombia: the Supreme Court of Justice (highest 
court of ordinary jurisdiction and court of cassation); the Constitutional Court; the Council of State of 
Colombia (administrative court); and the Superior Council of the Judiciary (highest court of appeal on 
administration of justice). There is also the Office of Attorney General of the Nation (see Art 116). 
532 No. 43, 2418 G.J. 383, 387 (1984). 
533 No. 126, 2430 G.J. 141, 146-47 (1987); No. 45, 2413 G.J. 32, 40 (1983). 
534 See Landau, ‘The Two Discourses in Colombian Constitutional Jurisprudence’ (2005), 727 
535 Landau suggests that the Colombian Constitutional Court has adopted a ‘new constitutionalism’ 
approach to constitutional review which considers constitutions as extraordinary documents ‘that 
should be read broadly and with the document's hierarchy of ideals in mind’ (ibid, 709). 
536 Enacted by Congress on 22 June 2005, signed into law by President Uribe on 22 July 2005. This 
was followed by Decree No. 4760, 30 December 2005, which regulated aspects of the law. 
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April 2006, more than 30,000 members from 35 armed groups under the AUC, participated 
in the demobilisation process.537 The law established a ‘transitional justice’ mechanism for 
paramilitaries to demobilise and confess in exchange for reduced penal sentences of five to 
eight years.538  
 
A coalition of human rights organisations brought the case before the Constitutional Court 
under Article 241(4) of the Constitution,539 challenging the content of thirty-three of the 
seventy-two articles of the Law on the grounds that there were irregularities in the legislative 
process in some of the rules; that the bill allowed for judicial pardons to members of illegal 
armed groups without procedural requirements; and that the measures were inadequate to 
the protections of victim’s rights. In its ruling, the Court: 
 
named the pursuit of peace as a complex legal entity, as a collective right, an 
essential purpose of the Colombian state and a constitutional value. Therefore, 
the State had the authority to provide reasonable transitional instruments, 
justified and proportionate, even limiting other constitutional guarantees, in 
order to achieve peace. However, such limitations could not be based on the 
understanding of peace as an “absolute value”. Instead, the peace achievement 
should be compatible with the main aspects of the Rule of Law, in particular the 
rights of victims.540 
 
The Court determined that the alternative punishment mechanism was aimed at achieving 
peace, and so, found the law to be constitutional in general. However, the Court issued 
guidelines on victims’ participation541 and access to reparations,542 the meaning of 
‘paramilitarism’ as a crime under the law, and introduced legal consequences to those 
participating in the mechanism who concealed information543 removing some of the more 
contentious aspects of the law. The Court ‘found that the settlement of the claim depended 
on the balance between the pursuit of peace and the rights of victims.’544  The law remains 
controversial both in its passing and its implementation. 
 
                                                 
537 This is according to official data, cited by the Statement by the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights on the Application and Scope of the Justice and Peace Law in Colombia, 
OEA/Ser/LV/II.125, Doc 15, 1 Aug 2006, para 7. 
538 For a fuller account of the Justice and Peace Law, see Laplante and Theidon, ‘Transitional Justice 
in Times of Conflict (2006). 
539 Under Art 214(4), the Court may ‘[d]ecide on the petitions of unconstitutionality brought by 
citizens against statutes, both for their substantive content as well as for errors of procedure in their 
formation’.  
540 Gustavo Gallón Giraldo y Otros v. Colombia, Judgement, C-370/2006 (Dossier D-6032), 18 May 
2006. 
541 Ibid, para 6.2.3.2.2.1 – 6.2.3.2.2.10. 
542 Ibid, para. 6.2.4.1 – 6.2.4.1.24. 
543 Ibid, para 6.2.2.1.1 – 6.2.2.1.7.30. 
544 Constitutional Court, Press Release on the legal challenge to the Justice and Peace Law, Law 975 
of 2005, Dossier D-6032 - Decision C-370/06, 18 May 2006.   
 124 
 
In keeping with a strict reading of the Constitution, the Court may review the procedural 
constitutionality of an amendment, not the content. 545  However, in a series of decisions from 
2003,546 the Court has introduced the constitutional replacement doctrine as a doctrine on 
‘unconstitutional constitutional amendments’, like the Indian Supreme Court’s basic 
structures doctrine. The doctrine sanctions the Court to review the content of amendments 
because it modifies or replaces the essential element of the Constitution.547  
 
The Santos government, elected in 2010, pushed forward the peace process with the FARC 
and the ELN. As part of these efforts, the ‘Legal Framework for Peace’548 was passed as a 
constitutional amendment, introducing Transitional Articles 66 and 67 as an ‘exceptional’ 
transitional justice framework to facilitate the peace negotiations and achieve ‘a stable and 
lasting peace’.549 The amendment has been criticised for contravening certain human rights 
provisions of the 1991 Constitution and international human rights law.550 However, the 
Court, exercising the constitutional replacement doctrine, ruled on the content of the Legal 
Framework for Peace amendment, accepting its constitutionality on the grounds that the 
essential principles of the constitution were not undermined by the amendment so long as it 
was proportional to the intended objective of facilitating peace.551 Again, as in all the cases 
reviewed in this section, the Court was able to find a way to both honour the agreement so as 
to shield the political settlement and future peace negotiations, while tweaking it to better 
protect human rights, so as not to back track too far on the constitution’s protection of human 
rights and international law. 
 
All three jurisdictions therefore, illustrate how courts often balance the requirements of the 
letter of the constitution, with its purpose as being to bring about peace. They show the ways 
in which courts will adopt flexible approaches to ensuring the constitution is not used to 
defeat the underlying political agreement that enabled it. 
 
 
 
                                                 
545 See Arts 241 and 379. 
546 C-551/2003, C-1200/2003, C-970/2004, C-153/2007, C-588/2009, C-141/2010, C-1056/2012 and 
C-10/2013. See Bernal, ‘Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments’ (2013). 
547 Bernal, ‘Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments’ (2013). 
548 Legislative Act 1/2012. 
549 Although the transitional justice mechanisms established under this amendment are to be 
‘exceptional’, no clear timeline was given.  
550 For more on the tensions between (temporary) transitional justice mechanisms and (more 
permanent) constitutions, see Méndez, ‘Constitutionalism and Transitional Justice’, in The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, edited by Rosenfeld and Sajó (2012) and Bernal, 
‘Transitional Justice’ (2014). 
551 Judgment C-579/2013 (in which the Court accepted that prosecutions of members of illegal armed 
groups could be selected and prioritised as part of the transitional justice mechanism) and Judgment 
C-577/2014 (in which the Court ruled that former members of illegal groups could participate in 
politics after serving their sentence for ‘political crimes’). The details of these cases go beyond the 
scope of this article. For a fuller account of the cases see Bernal, ‘Transitional Justice’ (2014). 
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International Courts 
 
While so far I have focused on domestic jurisprudence, often these same cases and fact 
patterns are subject to subsequent international human rights court rulings. These have the 
capacity to take quite different decisions, posing the question of whether international or 
regional human rights courts understand the relationships of rights to peace differently than 
domestic courts.  
 
European Court of Human Rights 
 
A claim was brought before the ECtHR concerning a challenge by two applicants, both 
citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina, because their Jewish and Roma origins made them ineligible 
to stand for election to the House of Peoples and the Presidency, both governed by the power-
sharing arrangement. The applicants, Dervo Sejdić and Jakob Finci, did not have a declared 
affiliation with the three ‘constituent peoples’ barring them from standing for election, which, 
they argued, amounted to racial discrimination under the Convention and Protocols.552 
 
The ECtHR came to the opposite view from the Constitutional Court, finding, by fourteen 
votes to three, a violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the ECHR, together 
with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (right to free elections) and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 
(general prohibition of discrimination) to the Convention.553 The Court concluded that 
Bosnia-Herzegovina had moved on sufficiently from the conflict settled by the Dayton 
Agreement, and, therefore the objective of peace articulated by the Bosnian Constitutional 
Court was not a sufficient reason for overriding the individual equality rights of the 
challengers. In spite of accepting that ‘[t]he nature of the conflict was such that the approval 
of the “constituent peoples” … was necessary to ensure peace …. [there have been] significant 
positive developments in Bosna and Herzegovina since the Dayton Agreement.’ 554 The 
Court, quite dramatically found that the Constitution which comprised part of the Peace 
Agreement violated the ECHR. The contradictory decisions from the Constitutional Court 
and the ECtHR on similar facts illustrate the quite different balancing acts possible when 
applying the doctrine of proportionality and the ways in which differently positioned courts 
will evaluate the imperatives of peace differently.  
 
                                                 
552 The claim was based on Art 14 of the Convention, Art of Protocol No. 1 and Art 1 of Protocol No. 
12. 
553 Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), 27996/06 
and 34836/06, 22 Dec 2009. Two separate applications were submitted to the Court in summer 2006, 
which were joined and heard before the Grand Chamber in 2009, three years after the Constitutional 
Court decision. The decision has not yet been fully implemented. 
554 Ibid, para 45 and 47. On the issue of proportionality, as the Court was competent ratione temporis 
to consider the period after the ratification and the Protocol No. 1, it did ‘not need to decide whether 
the upholding of the contested constitutional provisions after ratification of the Convention could be 
said to serve a “legitimate aim” since … the maintenance of the system in any event does not satisfy 
the requirement of proportionality’ (para 46). 
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The decision of the ECtHR has been criticised by Christopher McCrudden and Brendan 
O’Leary,555 who are concerned that the approach adopted by the Court in this case may reveal 
a new precedent of court’s being sceptical to consociational (power-sharing) arrangements. I 
agree with McCrudden and O’Leary’s argument that ‘the historical and political contexts in 
which the provisions of constitutions and peace agreements are drafted – especially peace 
agreements that are constitutional texts – need to be properly understood, especially by 
courts’ and that ‘[a]pparently repugnant provision may have defensible political origins’.556 
I also agree with their assessment of the ECtHR decision as being problematic, although it is 
necessary to note that there were strong dissenting opinions.557  
 
This case of Sejdić and Finci reveals how the international court came to its decision in 
contrast to the Bosnia Constitutional Court’s approach of proportionality. The imperative of 
peace had passed for the ECtHR, which called ‘time’ on the transition during which a peace 
jurisprudence could apply. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Bonnello is critical of the Court 
for ignoring the realities of the peace in Bosnia and is sceptical that the Court should ‘behave 
as the uninvited guest in peacekeeping multilateral exercises and treaties that have already 
been signed, ratified and executed.’558 He also questions the Court’s reasoning that the 
situation in Bosnia had changed sufficiently making the power-sharing arrangement no 
longer necessary. The case may seem a clear violation of human rights, as Justice Bonnello 
concedes, however, the reasoning of the majority opinion can also be criticised for going too 
far in preserving the electoral rights of the two applicants over the imperatives for the peace 
agreement in the first place. In the case before the Constitutional Court, Justice Feldman 
(cited above) had signalled that time will move the political settlement on so that 
compromises such as that in Dayton may no longer be necessary, but that time had not yet 
arrived. There is also a serious question, as Justice Bonnello indicates, as to whether the 
ECtHR (or any international court) is the appropriate institution to determine when that time 
has come and peace has been achieved sufficiently to enable the dismantling of the power-
sharing arrangements.   
 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
 
A more flexible approach to a peace jurisprudence seems to be operating in the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights.  In a case before the Court concerning Colombia’s response 
to the murder of judicial officials, the Court held that the punishment for serious violations of 
the law must be proportionate to the crime and that ‘[e]very element which determines the 
severity of the punishment should correspond to a clearly identifiable objective and be 
                                                 
555 McCrudden and O’Leary, Courts and Consociations (2013). 
556 Ibid, xv. 
557 Partly concurring and partly dissenting opinion of Judge Mijovic, joined by Judge Hajiyev, and 
Dissenting opinion of Judge Bonello in Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR), 27996/06 and 34836/06, 22 Dec 2009. 
558 Dissenting opinion of Judge Bonello in Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), 27996/06 and 34836/06, 22 Dec 2009. 
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compatible with the [American Convention on Human Rights].’559 The Court interpreted the 
Justice and Peace Law (Law 975), and in so doing, signalled, obiter dicta, that it accepted the 
Colombian Constitutional Court’s reasoning on the principle of proportionality:560 ‘the 
punishment which the State assigns to the perpetrator of illicit conduct should be 
proportional to the rights recognized by law and the culpability with which the perpetrated 
acted, which in turn should be established as a function of the nature and gravity of the 
events.’561 However, the Court stopped short of declaring the act of reducing sentences in 
consideration for demilitarization and confessions as being consistent with the Convention: 
 
Given that uncertainty exists with regard to the content and scope of Law 975, and the fact 
that the initial special criminal proceedings are underway which could provide juridical 
benefits to individuals who have been identified as having some relationship to the events of 
the Rochela Massacre, and taking into account that no judicial decisions have yet been issued 
in these proceedings … the Court deems it important to indicate, based on its jurisprudence, 
some aspects of the principles, guarantees and duties that must accompany the application of 
the juridical framework of the demobilization process.562 
 
In this case, the Court appeared sympathetic to the need for a contextual application of human 
rights law that was understanding of the imperatives for peace and appeared to view its role 
as one of sketching out the parameters that the law should stay within, in terms of ‘principles, 
guarantees and duties,’ rather than give a black and white answer to the question of 
compliance with human rights law.   
 
A second Inter-American Court judgement on the issue of amnesties after non-international 
armed conflict is worth mentioning briefly because it signals a reinforcing of this approach 
perhaps with a forward glance to Colombia’s peace process to the FARC, although this case 
concerns the situation in El Salvador. The Court again considered the human rights 
implications of El Salvador’s transitional justice mechanisms.  
 
The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights found that ‘[i]n approving and enforcing 
the [General Amnesty for the Consolidation of Peace Law (1993)], the Salvadoran State 
violated the right to judicial guarantees [Art 8(1)] … and the right to judicial protection 
                                                 
559 La Rochela Massacre v. Colombia, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 11 May 2007, para 
192.  
560 Proportionality is also a principle in international law, under which full amnesties are prohibited, 
however, while ‘[i]nternational law may require that punishment be proportionate to the seriousness 
of the crimes committed … neither international law not judicial practice has yet determined with any 
certainty what quantum of penalty is proportionate’ (see Méndez, ‘Constitutionalism and Transitional 
Justice’, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, edited by Rosenfeld and Sajó 
(2012), 1278).  
561 La Rochela Massacre v. Colombia, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 11 May 2007, para 
196. 
562 Ibid, para 192. 
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[Art 25]’.563 Having failed to comply with the recommendations of the Commission Report 
on Merits No. 177/10 concerning the application of the Amnesty Law to the investigation of 
the alleged massacre of approximately 1,000 civilians between 11 and 13 December 1981 by 
the Salvadoran army, the Commission submitted the case to the jurisdiction of the Court. 
Justice Garcia-Sayán, in his concurring opinion, held that: 
 
States have a legal obligation to address the rights of the victims and, with the 
same intensity, the obligation to prevent further acts of violence and to achieve 
peace in an armed conflict by the means at its disposal. Peace as a product of a 
negotiation is offered as a morally and politically superior alternative to peace 
as a result of the annihilation of the opponent. Therefore, international human 
rights law should consider that peace is a right and that the State must achieve 
it. 
 
Thus, in certain transitional situations between armed conflicts and peace, it 
can happen that a State is not in a position to implement fully and 
simultaneously, the various international rights and obligations it has assumed. 
In these circumstances, taking into consideration that none of those rights and 
obligations is of an absolute nature, it is legitimate that they be weighed in such 
a way that the satisfaction of some does not affect the exercise of the others 
disproportionately.564 
 
The opinion of Justice Garcia-Sayán gives perhaps the best articulation of the concept of 
balancing of rights, which cannot be achieved all at once, and the principle of proportionality. 
Unlike the ECtHR, which went quite far in pushing for constitutional re-working in Sejdić,565 
the Inter-American Court, in La Rochela and The Massacres of El Mozote, has been are more 
sympathetic to the fragile balance that is demanded for peace.     
 
Legitimacy of Courts 
 
However, on a note of caution, not all courts are equally trusted or legitimate. The 
mechanisms by which judges are appointed have bearing on the perceived (and actual) 
legitimacy of the court.566 Still, courts may be the only institution that is trusted, especially 
following long, and violent conflict, where the executive and legislature are run by former 
parties to the war, who many may fear or distain. The level of trust placed in the court is 
                                                 
563 Lucio Parada Cea, Héctor Joaquín Miranda Marroquín, Fausto García Funes, Andrés Hernández 
Carpio, Jose Catalino Meléndez and Carlos Antonio Martínez, Inter-American Commission of Human 
Rights, Report Nº 1/99, Case 10.480, El Salvador, January 27, 1999, para 123, 129.  
564 Concurring opinion of Judge Diego Garcia-Sayán, Judgment of The Massacres of El Mozote and 
Nearby Places v. El Salvador, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 25 October 2012, para 37-
38. 
565 See Bell, ‘What We Talk about When We Talk about International Constitutional Law’ (2014), 
273-274 on the ‘mutually referencing’ positions of European institutions.  
566 See Irving, Gender and the Constitution (2008), ch 6, who lists how judges are appointed in 
Australia, Canada, the US, South Africa, and India as examples of different models.  
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contextual, however, the increased faith in the judiciary and judicial review may have an 
impact, yet this can be both positive and negative.567 
 
The interpretation of ‘peace constitutions’ demands that constitutional courts navigate 
between an elite pact and a more open constitutional way of doing business, where both 
remain important to any emerging constitutionalism. In the cases considered, the courts were 
asked to mediate between the tensions inside the political settlement, and in all examples, the 
courts interpreted peace to be the most important constitutional value, or the primary purpose 
of the constitution. As these examples make clear, judicial institutions are as important as 
political institutions in guaranteeing an enduring political settlement. The judiciary has, in 
some ways, limited the pace at which development of that political settlement has taken place, 
maintaining the constitutional link to the peace agreement, while acknowledging that the link 
should not preserve elite pacts against challenge permanently or without limits. The 
constitutional courts in all cases used similar reasoning that has impact on the meaning of 
post-conflict peace and the future of the post bellum state. In so doing, the courts have 
understood the constitution as an activity rather than an end-state, preventing the 
constitution from being frozen in time.  
 
The legitimacy of courts to hold a position of such authority over the legislature and executive 
is what concerns the debate between political and legal constitutionalist.568 In the case of 
peace constitutions, the court, as has happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Colombia, has 
authority over the political settlement. Although courts have been given increasing amounts 
of authority domestically, as the American model of strong-form judicial review has been 
adopted more widely, and internationally, as the number and jurisdiction of international and 
regional court has grown, the legitimacy of such courts to make decisions that are profoundly 
political is not clear. In the cases in this chapter, the courts were given extraordinary 
authority to interpret and therefore determine the implementation of the peace constitution. 
In the cases cited from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Colombia, each court also decided on the very 
meaning of peace, and put itself into a position to decide when peace has been achieved. 
  
There are those who defend the role of courts in protecting human rights under a liberal 
consociational constitution. Taking from the example of Canada, Stefan Wolff and Karl 
Cordell argue that, 
  
the rights of communities – minorities and majorities alike – are best protected 
in a liberal consociation system if its key provisions are enshrined in the 
constitution and if the interpretation and upholding of the constitution is left 
                                                 
567 For example, Kwasi Prempeh, ‘Marbury in Africa’ (2006), is cautious of the rise of juridical 
constitutionalism across Africa. While he sees the rise of new constitutions to underwrite the 
democratic trend, the reliance on the judiciary to secure and protect the constitution is limited and 
unable to adequately address deeper structural and institutional defects, including the distribution of 
power, in the post-colonial state.  
568 See Landau, ‘A Dynamic Theory of Judicial Review’ (2014) for a critical evaluation of the 
appropriateness of a democracy-improving model of judicial review, considering the cases of 
Colombia, South Africa and India.  
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to an independent constitutional court whose decisions are binding on the 
executive and legislature.569 
 
Christopher McCrudden and Brendan O’Leary argue that courts play an even more 
instrumental role under consociational arrangements. They argue that, 
 
[g]iven the potential conflict between the consociational and human rights 
aspects of the same pace agreement or political settlement, courts are likely to 
be called on to perform an even more delicate role than adjudicating disputes 
arising within long-established consociational arrangements.570 
 
Conclusion 
 
David Landau suggests that it would be a ‘significant mistake for scholars seeking to 
understand Latin American judicial behavior [sic] to fail to take account of judicial role 
conceptions’.571 Landau argues that, broadly speaking, Latin American judges approach 
constitutional interpretation through two, very different, worldviews. The first, and classic 
approach, is the traditionalism-positivism model that assumes judges interpret the 
constitution without distinction from ordinary statutes. The second, which he calls, ‘new 
constitutionalism’ considers constitutions as extraordinary documents ‘that should be read 
broadly and with the document's hierarchy of ideals in mind’.572 Using Colombia as his case 
study, Landau argues that the new Constitutional Court of Colombia has adopted the second 
approach. His empirical analysis of the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, in the 1980s, and 
the new 1991 Constitutional Court, led him to conclude that,  
 
The post-1991 Constitutional Court thus abandoned the notion of the flat 
constitution where only specific legal rules had enforceable content for a 
complex, hierarchical constitutional structure that general principles and 
values dominated. They believed that they were doing something that was both 
quite new and fairly international in outlook. They even selected a new hero: 
In place of the old worship of Kelsen, the new court cited Dworkin's theories. 
573 
 
In support of his argument, Landau cites a former justice of the Constitutional Court, who 
argues that the ‘Constitution has a hierarchy in its interior, or one might say, there exist some 
constitutional norms with greater weight than others’574 The Court has, in an early decision, 
listed some of the constitutional values and principles that inform the constitution and 
                                                 
569 Wolff and Cordell, ‘Consociationalism, in Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict, edited by Wolff 
and Cordell (2016), 295.  
570 McCrudden and O’Leary, Courts and Consociations (2013), 42. 
571 Landau, ‘The Two Discourses in Colombian Constitutional Jurisprudence’ (2005), 703. 
572 Ibid, 709 
573 Ibid, 728. 
574 RA Rivadeneira, El Valor de los Principios Fundamentales en la Interpretacion Constitucional, 
(1994) Revista de Derecho Publico, 58 quoted in ibid, fn 149. 
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constitutional interpretation, these are, ‘coexistence, work, justice, equality, knowledge, 
liberty, and peace captured in the preamble to the constitution ... service to the community, 
general prosperity ... [and] participation’575  
 
Landau is making his case for Colombia, specifically, and Latin America, more broadly, 
however, with the extraordinary rise of constitutional courts with strong-form judicial 
review, courts are relevant and significant actors. Courts are interpreting constitutions that 
underpin the foundation of the political settlement and which underwrite the aspirations and 
values of the state, including those values and aspirations that are part of the peace process 
and agreement.  
 
International courts are perhaps less well placed to make balanced judgements as to how the 
demands of justice should be weighed against the demands of peace as they may be less alive 
to the local requirements of the compromise and, in any case, may not be seen as the legitimate 
authority to navigate between these tensions. In such circumstances, it is perhaps best to 
follow the reasoning of the Inter-American Court in La Rochela, which set out broad 
parameters for what makes the compromise more acceptable in human rights 
terms.  International courts that do not adopt a peace jurisprudence risk intervening directly 
to ‘destroy’ the political settlement, with little capacity to assist in the reconstruction of a new 
alternative one. This was the risk taken by the ECtHR in Sejdić which, by prioritising 
individual rights over groups’ rights and failing to sufficiently understand the difficulty of 
constitutional change, put in jeopardy the foundations of the political settlement without 
providing an alternative solution. The Court failed to understand that ‘the philosophy and 
practice of contemporary constitutionalism offers a mediated peace’ and while in ‘theory and 
practice this is seen as second best to a just peace,’576 it is overreaching to make a 
determination on what that ideal peace should look like if it is at the expense of undoing the 
compromise arrangement that was necessary for a state of peace in the first place.  
 
In concluding, I wish to caution that the argument made here that constitutional courts can 
be influential actors in the peace process, should not be mistaken for an endorsement on the 
activity of all constitutional courts. Recent examples have made it obvious that courts (both 
domestic and international) are not necessarily ‘good’ actors, and that they may be willing (or 
coerced) participants in eroding constitutional and democratic norms and laws.577   
  
                                                 
575 Constitutional Court of Colombia, T-406, G.C.C. (1992) (2), 198 quoted in ibid, 727. 
576 Tully, Strange Multiplicity (2005) 211 cited in Hart, ‘Constitution-Making’ (2001), 168. 
577 The European Commission has recently extended a Recommendation to Warsaw under the Rule of 
Law Framework, in follow-up to its opinion of 1 June 2016 concerning the ongoing constitutional 
crisis in Poland (see http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-2657_en.htm). Russia’s 
Constitutional Court recently issued a decision which elevates the Russian Constitution above the 
European Convention of Human Rights., giving rise to some concern (see Smirnova, ‘Russian 
Constitutional Court’ (2015)). 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
FAITH IN THE liberal peace-making project has come under increasing scrutiny, however, 
increased attention is being directed towards constitution-making as a mechanism of state-
building and reconciliation. The current scholarship and theory of public law, however, is not 
able to sufficiently comprehend the implications of what is being required of these new peace 
constitutions. The intention of this thesis was to go some way to considering the value of 
constitutions in transitions from violence to peace. Christine Bell has made a compelling case 
for questioning the turn to constitution-making as a mechanism of state and peace building, 
which has occurred in line with a failure of the international community to manage transitions 
from conflict. As she points out the move towards constitutionalism as a strategy is a 
consequence of ‘international actors question[ing] the effectiveness of their development, 
peacebuilding and international legal interventions and increasingly turning to politics for 
explanations [while] paradoxically appear[ing] to place renewed faith in constitutions as 
capable of remedying the deficits of past state‐ building approaches.’578 The underlying aims 
of this thesis were, first, to question the type of constitution that emerged as part of a political 
settlement, including its status as a legal text, and the implications of its theoretical 
grounding on constitutional theory, and second, to better understand how courts, both 
domestic and international, are responding to the competing demands made of peace 
constitutions, that are being impacted by international law, while satisfying elite-demands 
and requirements of public participation in the peace and constitution-making process.  
 
A peace constitution captures and protects the political settlement. It is distinct to local power 
politics and to the outcome of the violent conflict. A peace constitution breaks with the 
understanding that a constitution is a ‘moment’, that is enduring, and that sits outside of 
ordinary politics. Rather, a peace constitution is a ‘process, a continuing conversation, or a 
forum for negotiation amid conflict and division.’579 Peace constitutions are limited by the 
dilemmas inherent in the process of negotiating the political settlement. The tension between 
elite buy-in and public participation, the balance between the time needed to establish trust 
and the immediacy of the situation, and the contradiction between local ownership of the 
process and constitution and the influence and involvement of the international community 
and law, makes each case distinct.  
 
Constitutional theory can provide some boundaries and language to better understand the 
peace constitution, although only in so far as it allows for a place to make the distinctiveness 
of peace constitutions clearer, as ‘the practical considerations of this new context are very 
different from those which generated the theoretical accounts which ground established 
                                                 
578 Bell, ‘Introduction: Bargaining on Constitutions’ (2017)  
579 Hart, ‘Constitution-Making’ (2001), 154. 
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constitutions’.580 The distinctive authority and constituent power of the peace constitution is 
held in the purpose of peace and the requirement of the constitution to move the state out of 
violence. It is this purpose which makes the peace constitution distinct, but, paradoxically, it 
is the very thing that a constitution may be too limited to deliver. The turn to constitution-
making as a policy of statebuilding in post-conflict states is a reaction to the disenchantment 
of the liberal democratic peace building projects that have failed. Nonetheless, ‘we know 
relatively little about … the precise roles that constitution design and constitutional courts 
play in this process of ‘statecraft’.581 
 
In answer to the second question, looking at Northern Ireland, Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Colombia where courts have addressed the validity of the underlying elite pact at the heart of 
the constitutional order, I suggest that the constitutional court found peace to be foundational 
to the constitution – noting the relationship of the constitution to the political settlement. In 
the cases from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Colombia, peace, as a basic value of the constitution, 
was used to measure proportional limitations of other constitutional rights. However, in none 
of these cases did the court find that the peace agreement was beyond question. In different 
ways, the courts in all three cases accepted that the peace settlement needed to stay open to 
other possibilities and re-evaluation. I also looked to the jurisprudence of international human 
rights courts, suggesting that international courts are less well placed to make balanced 
judgements as to how the demands of justice should be balanced with the demands of peace. 
 
Definition 
 
A peace constitution is distinctive in its foundation. It is central to the political settlement 
and holds peace at its foundation. While a peace constitution has many similarities to a 
constitution written as part of democratic transition, the concerns of peace are distinct from 
democracy, as peace is the central concern of the political settlement. A peace constitution is 
attached to the peace agreement, a document that was drafted separately from the 
constitution, and which has as its overriding objective to settle the war, making it a 
compromised political solution. The peace agreement may also rest on international law as 
its source of legal authority, bringing a heavy influence of international law into the domestic 
constitution. Vivien Hart proposes that constitutions are a part of a canon that, ‘borrowing 
from its literary counterpart, becomes a whole set of definitive sources rather than just one’.582 
The peace process and agreement are part of the canon of a peace constitution, and together 
form a part of a constitutional discourse that ‘emphasizes process’.583   
 
                                                 
580 Bell, ‘Introduction: Bargaining on Constitutions’ (2017), 20 
581 Ibid. 
582 V Hart, ‘Constitution-Making’ (2001), 158: ‘The map metaphor serves to introduce two of the 
features of constitutions: a map is both schematic and drawn from a particular perspective. However 
ingenious the cartographer in representing dimensions on the page, an act of imagination is required 
to comprehend the reality of the terrain from the signs and symbols of the map. Constitutional 
documents share these features’. 
583 Hart, ‘Constitution-Making’ (2001), 157. 
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Peace is the foundation of the constitution and the grounding of its authority. Constitutional 
theory has a long tradition of measuring constitutions against democracy and as the outcomes 
of revolutions, but constitutional theory does not engage sufficiently with the concerns of 
peace or violence. It was therefore the intention of this thesis to develop a theory of peace as 
the source of authority and as the common desire that binds together the constituent power. 
As a corollary to peace as the authority of constitutions, the place of violence in constitutions 
needs to be further understood as constitutional theory considers authority and legitimacy, 
but not violence. 
 
Authority 
 
Traditional constitutional theory finds authority in the constitutional drafters, who were 
granted some form of authority and legitimacy from an outside source, from a previous 
constitutional order, or in the activity of the people acting in union. New constitutions, 
however, often emerge from unconstitutional processes or revolutions that replace the old 
constitutional order, only to find authority after their enactment. Likewise, peace 
constitutions may be granted authority from the peace agreement that constituted their 
enactment, or from international law that has influence in the constitution-making process. 
Authority from a peace constitution may also arise from the narrative of peace, as the 
narrative of freedom and liberty in the American Declaration of Independence held authority 
for the US Constitution.  
 
Peace is a promissory act. The act of signing a peace agreement is symbolic, as well as a legal 
and political act. Transferring the narrative of peace from a peace agreement to a constitution 
is also a political act, that holds symbolic and actual authority. Peace as a term and political 
reality holds many conceptions (but it is exactly in both its collective and individual 
expression that it holds such power as a narrative). However, all people will understand peace 
to mean something different, which can be conditional of their experience of violence. The 
strength of the peace constitution rests on this fable of peace. 
 
Constituent Power 
 
At the heart of constitutional authority is constituent power. The notion of constituent power 
was originally conceived as a validation for the revolutionary constitution. The strength of 
the narrative, that all people acting in concert transferred consent to the constitution as a 
replacement to the monarch, held authority that was replicated in the words ‘we the people’. 
The power of this narrative was persuasive, and sufficient, to grant authority to the 
constitution. However, the true activity of the people was a myth. On the American 
Constitution, Robert Dahl askes: 
 
Why should we feel bound today by a document produced more than two 
centuries ago by a group of fifty-five mortal men, actually signed by only thirty-
nine, a fair number of whom were slaveowners, and adopted in only thirteen 
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states by the voices of fewer than two thousand men, all of whom are long since 
dead and many forgotten.584 
 
The beginning of the American constitution was the preserve of the elite, however, the 
attached notion of political freedom to the constitution grounded it in the circle of legitimacy 
between the constituent power and constituted power. The ideal of the constituent power was 
as constructed in the American revolution as it was in the French. The reason that the first 
succeeded but the second failed, was according to Arendt that the founders in Pennsylvania 
could pull on the pre-existing constitutional authority of the states. That the ‘legitimacy of 
the constituent power [was] derived from its capacity to give play to existing constituent 
practices’.585 Arendt also located authority in the ‘revolutionary spirit’, which gave voice to 
the constituent power. However, in the ‘self-evident truth’ of the words of the Declaration of 
Independence, was the beginning of something ‘permanent and enduring’ which diminished 
the authority of the constituent power, at the same time as creating it.586   
 
Like constitutional authority, however, constituent power has a distinctive understanding in 
peace constitutions, that is grounded in the common desire for peace, rather than an existing 
common identity based in national or political status, that is present and can give voice to the 
constitution in ‘we the people’. The understanding of a peace constitution as a process, 
removes the appeal of endurance, correcting for the permanence of the constitution having a 
limiting effect on the constituent power. Again, the traditional notions of constituent power 
are limiting as they have no place for the international, which is now heavily involved, 
practically and normatively, in domestic constitution-making. As the international 
community becomes more involved in the domestic constitution-making process, constituent 
power is become diffused between several constituent powers and an international constituent 
power. The legitimacy of the international constituent power, which is acting with a similar 
narrative to the revolutionary constituent power holding to a normative agenda of human 
rights, minority rights and democracy, is suspect. The international, however, unlike the 
people, holds an authority from above that can act as a watch on the constitution. So, in the 
way that Schmitt understands the people to always exist above the constitution, the 
international, in the process of the internationalisation of constitutional law, sits above the 
domestic constitution.  
 
Constitutional Interpretation 
 
Courts are instrumental actors in the peace process, and continue to facilitate the constant 
and on-going (re)negotiation that endures after the implementation of a new, or revised, 
constitutional arrangement. Every constitution is burdened with dilemmas; either inherent 
in the document itself, or introduced with the passage of time. In either case, many of these 
dilemmas are resolved in the courts. In the same way, peace constitutions, although likely 
burdened with more and tougher inconsistencies or dilemmas, are also subject to 
                                                 
584 Dahl, How Democratic is the American Constitution? (2002), 2. 
585 Bernal, ‘A Revolution in Law’s Republic’ (2009). 
586 Ibid. 
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constitutional review. Constitutional interpretation of peace constitutions, is therefore, 
distinctive. Interpretation is grounded on more teleological reasoning with the purpose of 
peace at stake. In the decisions considered from Northern Ireland, Colombia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the courts were willing to sacrifice certain human rights requirements or 
international legal precedent in the interest of the overarching purpose of peace. This 
approach was, however, done through balancing with proportionality analysis, with the effect 
of gently shifting the peace constitution towards a more normative constitutionalism, while 
holding in place the ‘dirty’ elite-brokered deal at the centre of the political settlement. These 
limitations on the normative constitution were not understood to be without constraint. In 
all cases, the courts recognised that time would need to be called on the balancing of peace - 
although when such a time would be reached not made clear.  
 
International courts have also decided on the merits of cases with implications on the 
domestic peace constitution. While the reasoning behind the decisions considered in the cases 
of the international human rights courts is reasoned, domestic courts are more alive to the 
requirement of the peace constitution and, therefore, hold more legitimacy to make such 
determinations on the purpose and balancing of the peace constitution. The Inter-American 
Court, perhaps being more exposed to cases concerning conflict, demonstrates a higher level 
of awareness on issues of peace. The Court, in its judgement concerning the situation in El 
Salvador, pointed out the tension present between peace and existing international 
commitments and human rights, and the delay in their implementation that may be necessary 
to achieve peace, which the Court understood as a right in itself.  
 
The jurisprudence of the courts, in all the cases considered, suggest a new way of interpreting 
constitution that is in line with the requirements of peace but which are not necessarily 
compatible with current constitutional theory. Peace as the overarching pressure on the 
constitution has allowed for courts to act creatively in holding peace as the purpose of the 
constitution against which other constitutional and human rights are balanced.  This common 
set of judicial practices suggests that there is an emerging global ‘peace jurisprudence’ that is 
mirroring the increased influence of international constitutional law on domestic processes.  
 
The Hope for the Peace Constitution 
 
Vivien Hart, writing years before other had started to consider the distinctiveness of 
constitution drafted in response to conflict, suggest that such constitutions are expected to 
 
drive the transformative process from conflict to peace, seek to transform the 
society from one that resorts to violence to one that resorts to political means 
to resolve conflict and/or shape the governance framework will regulate access 
to power and resources – all key reasons for conflict. [As well as also putting] 
in place mechanisms and institutions through which future conflict in the 
society can be managed without a return to violence.587 
 
                                                 
587 Hart, ‘Constitution-Making’ (2001), 156. 
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Peace constitutions may simply be words on pieces of paper, or, as this thesis argues, they 
can be promises of a better future. Still, it is but a promise. As constitutions are being looked 
at as a devise to transition out of conflict, it is as several states linger in a state of war, or 
return to conflict after years of stability. Constitutions, it is hoped, will bring stability and 
peace; however, this is requiring a lot of a document. Nonetheless, the new confidence in the 
peace constitution as a mechanism of conflict resolution and state-building, has the 
implication that the role of domestic constitutional courts, and regional human rights courts, 
has become significant in the potential success in the political settlement. 
 
There is a tendency for constitutional courts in new democracies to be more activist than 
courts of established democracies.588 Alec Stone Sweet argues that ‘[s]ince the Second World 
War, rights and review have been crucial to nearly all successful transitions from 
authoritarian regimes to constitutional democracy ... Indeed, it appears that the more 
successful any transition has been, the more likely one is to find an effective constitutional or 
supreme court at the heart of it’.589 The processes of democratisation from post-authoritarian 
regimes overlaps with those processes of state and institution building (which includes 
democratisation) in a post-conflict state, albeit in differing contexts. However, it reasons that 
newly institutionalised courts authorised by peace constitutions may also display similar 
characteristics as constitutional courts in newly democratising states. The faith that courts 
may in some way protect the state from a return to violence in upholding the foundation of 
the peace constitution may be placing too high a burden on the judiciary.  
 
This hope that a constitution may be able to repair and then hold together a state experiencing 
high-level violence is placing a great deal of reliance on what is a political and legal document. 
However, in helping to shape a constitutional identity and providing the language of a 
peaceful state, a constitution may be a tool in guiding a people and a country from war to 
peace.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
588 ‘All the new democracies have either created constitutional courts or endowed supreme courts with 
ample power of judicial review to enforce the democratic commands of the constitution. What is 
striking, and perhaps distinct, about the Third Wave of democratization is the central role assumed by 
these apex courts in sculpting democratic politics’ (Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies (2015), 9.) 
589 Stone Sweet, ‘Constitutional Courts’, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional 
Law, edited by Rosenfeld and Sajó (2012), 827. 
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